

FINANCES, STAFFING, AND JAIL SECURITY OPERATIONS

ORLEANS PARISH SHERIFF'S OFFICE

SPECIAL PROJECTS UNIT

April 8, 2026

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April 8, 2026

The Honorable J. Cameron Henry, Jr.,
President of the Senate
The Honorable Phillip R. Devillier,
Speaker of the House of Representatives

Dear Senator Henry and Representative Devillier:

This report provides the results of our evaluation of the operations related to finances, staffing, and jail security at the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office (OPSO) during calendar years 2022 through 2025. This evaluation was conducted in response to a legislative request received after the escape of 10 inmates from OPSO on May 16, 2025. Specifically, the Louisiana Legislative Auditor was requested to evaluate OPSO's budget, revenues, expenditures, jail monitoring, handling of escape incidents, and measures in place to ensure employees adhere to ethical standards and do not engage in criminal behavior.

The report contains our conclusions and recommendations. I hope this report will benefit you in your legislative decision-making process.

We would like to express our appreciation to OPSO for its assistance during this evaluation.

Respectfully submitted,



Michael J. "Mike" Waguespack, CPA
Legislative Auditor

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OPSO



Louisiana Legislative Auditor

Michael J. "Mike" Waguespack, CPA



Finances, Staffing, and Jail Security Operations Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office

April 2026

Audit Control #40250014

Introduction

We evaluated the operations related to finances, staffing, and jail security at the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office (OPSO) during calendar years 2022 through 2025. This evaluation was conducted in response to a legislative request received after the escape of 10 inmates from OPSO on May 16, 2025. Specifically, the Louisiana Legislative Auditor (LLA) was requested to evaluate OPSO's budget, revenues, expenditures, jail monitoring, handling of escape incidents, and measures in place to ensure employees adhere to ethical standards and do not engage in criminal behavior.

OPSO's mission is to provide community safety and service to the people of Orleans Parish by protecting the rights and humanity of people in custody, supporting the wellness of its staff, and facilitating connections to community in order to restore public trust and maintain a healthy community.

Organizational Structure. The Orleans Parish Sheriff is elected by Orleans Parish voters to a four-year term. In 2006, the Louisiana Legislature passed a law¹ that initiated the merger of the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's Office and the Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff's Office. Prior to this merger, the criminal sheriff operated the jail and other various units, while the civil sheriff executed and served legal documents and court orders issued by the civil courts. Although the Criminal and Civil divisions are now merged under one sheriff, they continue to operate separately.

Agency Responsibilities. OPSO is responsible for operating the parish jail, processing all individuals arrested within the City of New Orleans (the City), and exercising the duties required by the parish court system, such as providing security, executing court orders, and serving subpoenas. OPSO is different from other sheriff's offices in Louisiana because the state constitution establishes that the sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer in each parish *except* in Orleans Parish.² Instead, the City's Home Rule Charter establishes that the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) is the only police force for the City.³

¹ Louisiana Revised Statute (La. R.S.) 13:5581. Implementation of the law was temporarily postponed, but the offices were ultimately consolidated in 2010.

² Louisiana Constitution Article 5, Section 27

³ [City of New Orleans Home Rule Charter, Section 4-503](#)

Budget, Expenditures, and Staffing. OPSO is primarily funded by the City and an ad-valorem tax.⁴ During calendar year 2024, OPSO's revenues totaled \$81,389,977, including \$46,663,211 (57.3%) received from the City and \$9,319,475 (11.5%) generated from the ad-valorem tax. OPSO's 2024 expenditures totaled \$82,120,451, with the majority (\$58,268,363, or 71.0%) spent on personnel. While state law⁵ requires the City to fund operations of the jail, the Orleans Parish Sheriff retains the authority to expend funds received from the City in the manner they deem necessary.⁶ See Appendix C for a summary of OPSO expenditures during calendar years 2022 through 2024.

According to OPSO rosters, OPSO had 685 total employees as of December 31, 2025.⁷ This total included 370 (54.0%) deputies, recruits,⁸ and corrections monitoring technicians (CMTs),⁹ of which 198 (53.5%) were assigned to monitor inmates and 171 (46.2%) were assigned to other locations such as courts or within the Civil Division. The remaining 315 (46.0%) employees included administrative employees, rank law enforcement employees, maintenance staff, and employees assigned to other various positions.

OPSO Complex. OPSO owns and operates multiple buildings throughout Orleans Parish, including its base of operations at the Orleans Justice Center (OJC). The OJC, also referred to as "the jail" throughout this report, was completed in 2015 and is currently comprised of two buildings, with a third expected to be completed in 2026.¹⁰ The jail is a 1,438-bed facility comprised of 24 pods, each of which contains 30 cells that each house two inmates. Deputies and recruits are assigned to physically monitor the 24 pods, while CMTs monitor two pods at a time from an observation booth and via security cameras and computer monitors. The New Orleans City Council (Council) has limited the inmate population of the jail to 1,250 inmates.¹¹ However, according to City jail population reports, the jail's average monthly population was not below 1,250 between May 2024 and December 2025 and reached its highest average monthly population of 1,534¹² in November 2024.¹³ As of December 30, 2025, the jail housed 1,237 inmates.

⁴ La. R.S. 13:5604 requires the City to provide OPSO with semi-monthly funding.

⁵ La. R.S. 15:304, 13:5604, and 13:5603

⁶ La. R.S. 33:4715; *City of New Orleans v. State*, 426 So.2d 1318,1321-1322 (La. 1983)

⁷ This number excludes reserve deputies and employees on extended leave.

⁸ Deputies have a level 1 (highest) or level 2 Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) qualification, while recruits only have a level 3.

⁹ CMTs are civilian employees who are not POST certified and are not qualified or allowed to interact with inmates.

¹⁰ The Phase I building is comprised of OPSO's kitchen, warehouse, laundry facilities, and a workshop to coordinate maintenance efforts. The Phase II building contains the jail and OPSO's administrative offices. The Phase III building will be dedicated to mental health and medical care for inmates.

¹¹ [Ordinance No. 28300](#)

¹² Up to 150 additional inmates can be held in OPSO's Temporary Detention Center (TDC), which currently houses inmates with mental health issues. Due to this, any reference in this report to jail population includes inmates housed in OJC and TDC.

¹³ This represents the highest inmate average monthly population between January 2022 and December 2025.

Consent Judgement. On December 12, 2012, a consent judgement was filed in federal court between the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), multiple private plaintiffs, and OPSO to address certain alleged constitutional violations at OPSO. Since then, OPSO has operated under the oversight of a Federal Monitoring team, which routinely analyzes progress made by OPSO to satisfy the requirements of the consent judgement. The Federal Monitor publishes approximately two reports a year detailing the status of corrective actions taken by OPSO to address issues identified in the consent judgement.¹⁴ These reports have noted a decline in compliance with the consent judgement since OPSO re-assumed control of the OJC in August 2020.¹⁵ The costs associated with the Federal Monitor are paid by OPSO and totaled \$2,176,786 during January 2022 through December 2025.

The objective of this audit was:

To evaluate OPSO operations pertaining to finances, staffing, and jail security.

Our results are summarized on the next page and discussed in detail throughout the remainder of the report. Appendix A contains OPSO's response, and Appendix B contains our scope and methodology. Appendix C contains a summary of OPSO expenditures during calendar years 2022 through 2024. Appendix D summarizes the amount of overtime paid for each OPSO job title during calendar years 2022 through 2025. Appendix E lists deficiencies identified through inspections during May 11, 2025, through May 17, 2025.

¹⁴ [Federal Monitor Reports](#)

¹⁵ Due to continuing issues with implementing reforms to protect the rights and safety of prisoners, the DOJ and OPSO agreed in June 2016 to appoint an independent jail compliance director to take control of OPSO's jail operations. OPSO's jail operations remained under the control of this director until August 2020, when control was returned to OPSO.

Objective: To evaluate OPSO operations pertaining to finances, staffing, and jail security.

Overall, we found that the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office (OPSO) needs to strengthen its internal controls, create additional policies and standard operating procedures, and ensure that its staff comply with these internal controls, policies, standard operating procedures, the state constitution, and state law. Specifically, we found the following:

- **OPSO expenditures increased 38.9%, from \$59.1 million in calendar year 2022 to \$82.1 million in calendar year 2024, primarily due to contractual services and materials and supplies costs. While OPSO ended calendar year 2024 with a \$14.1 million fund balance, it issued bonds in July 2025 to pay for increased jail maintenance costs. We identified discretionary areas where OPSO could potentially reduce spending to assist with funding necessary expenditures.** These include examples such as the uniform allowance, fleet vehicles, and junior deputy badges and activity books.
- **OPSO appears to have violated Louisiana's constitution and state law related to the procurement of public works projects and materials in calendar year 2025. In addition, OPSO's computer systems are not integrated, preventing it from generating basic financial reports and operating efficiently. OPSO appears to have violated the Local Budget Act in 2023 by not amending its budget and may have violated the Louisiana Constitution by paying bills late.** A lack of policies for the budget process, expenditures, and the procurement of services combined with antiquated, disconnected financial systems could increase the chances of OPSO misreporting, overspending, and making improper payments.
- **OPSO payroll costs increased by 55.1%, from \$30.1 million in 2022 to \$46.7 million in 2025, in part due to overtime costs. However, the number of OPSO employees only increased by 8.6%, from 631 to 685, and the number of employees who supervise inmates only increased 6.9%, from 217 to 232, while the inmate population increased by 46.6%.** In addition, we compared OPSO's starting pay rate to other sheriff's offices in southeastern Louisiana parishes and found that OPSO has the lowest starting pay rate, which may affect recruiting and employee retention.
- **OPSO staff do not routinely conduct jail inspections and compliance checks as required by policy, resulting in fewer observations of potential inmate misconduct or maintenance issues and decreased security in the jail. We found that during**

the week of May 11, 2025, through May 17, 2025, OPSO staff only documented conducting inspections during 206 (64.0%) of the 322 required shifts and only documented performing 2,700 (29.8%) of the required 9,072 security checks. According to OPSO, factors such as the number of inspections and compliance checks required per hour and the lack of staff make it difficult to comply with policy.

- **OPSO deputies may have violated state law by being paid to work at OPSO during the same hours they were reported as working an off-duty detail. We also identified instances where OPSO deputies may have violated policy by not reporting details worked, exceeding daily work-hour limits, or working details while taking prohibited OPSO leave. An electronic detail scheduling system may reduce overlaps and increase OPSO's ability to monitor deputies who work details.** Weak detail controls at OPSO could contribute to staffing-related issues at the jail, such as unattended inmates and undetected maintenance issues, since the deputies who are supposed to be working at the jail may not always be there when scheduled.

Our conclusions and our recommendations are discussed in more detail in the following sections.

OPSO expenditures increased 38.9%, from \$59.1 million in calendar year 2022 to \$82.1 million in calendar year 2024, primarily due to contractual services and materials and supplies costs. While OPSO ended calendar year 2024 with a \$14.1 million fund balance, it issued bonds in July 2025 to pay for increased jail maintenance costs. We identified discretionary areas where OPSO could potentially reduce spending to assist with funding necessary expenditures.

The majority of OPSO's operating costs, such as those related to personnel, are necessary and not discretionary. Further, the fluctuating costs of operating the jail due to changes in the jail population is not fully within OPSO's control. Because of these factors, it is important for OPSO to ensure discretionary funds are expended in the most efficient and effective ways possible.

OPSO's expenditures of \$82,120,451 in calendar year 2024 exceeded its revenues of \$81,389,977. However, OPSO ended calendar year 2024

with a fund balance of \$14,095,118. Despite having this fund balance, in June 2025 OPSO told the Council it did not have enough funds to perform necessary jail maintenance. OPSO's two largest sources of revenue in calendar year 2024 were the City, which totaled \$46,663,211 (57.3%), and ad-valorem taxes, which totaled \$9,319,475 (11.5%). OPSO expenditures increased in all categories¹⁶ by 38.9%, from \$59,136,515 in calendar year 2022 to \$82,120,451 in calendar year 2024. For example, spending on contractual services increased 45.0%, from \$8,510,992 in calendar year 2022 to \$12,342,529 in calendar year 2024, and materials and supplies expenditures increased 54.3%, from \$4,287,063 to \$6,616,861 during this same period. Only \$19.0 million (23.1%) of OPSO's approximately \$82.1 million in expenditures during calendar year 2024 were related to operating costs, such as contracted work, materials, and supplies. Despite the increase in expenditures in categories that include jail maintenance, OPSO stated it did not have the funding necessary to perform maintenance required to keep the jail secure prior to and after the May 2025 escape. As a result, OPSO requested approximately \$900,000 from the Council in June 2025 to address plumbing concerns, including emergency repairs to fix leaks. See Appendix C for a summary of OPSO expenditures during calendar years 2022 through 2024.

Although OPSO's expenditures exceeded revenues in 2024, OPSO's fund balance increased by 120.5%, from \$6,391,309 at the beginning of calendar year 2022 to \$14,095,118 at the end of calendar year 2024, primarily because of increases in revenues from grants, ad-valorem taxes, and leases. While OPSO could have used some of its fund balance to perform necessary jail security maintenance, OPSO stated that it did not think it could use its fund balance for this purpose. Following the escape, we determined that OPSO had \$23,534,804 in cash on hand¹⁷ as of April 2025. We brought this to the attention of OPSO and the Council during a Council meeting on June 3, 2025. During that meeting, OPSO agreed that it could use some of its fund balance for emergency repairs; however, it would still need to seek additional funding from the Council for the necessary jail security maintenance.

OPSO issued bonds in July 2025 to pay for necessary repairs to the jail. However, we identified instances where OPSO could reduce discretionary spending to increase available funds for necessary jail maintenance. OPSO issued bonds of \$15 million in July 2025 to raise cash for costs related to the upkeep and maintenance of the jail. According to OPSO records, from August 2025 through January 2026, OPSO reimbursed itself \$5,213,979 (34.8%) from these bond funds for repairs. However, this amount includes reimbursements for invoices that OPSO stated were reimbursed twice. Also, at least \$512,948 of the amount reimbursed was for expenses invoiced to OPSO prior to the May 2025 escape instead of being used for new jail repairs.¹⁸

¹⁶ Except debt retirement

¹⁷ Cash on hand includes the funds in all bank accounts but does not factor in liabilities owed.

¹⁸ Invoices were dated from July 7, 2023, through May 9, 2025.

Because the majority of OPSO's operating expenses are not discretionary, OPSO should ensure that any discretionary spending is necessary and contributes to the operations of OPSO in the most efficient and effective ways possible. For instance, expenses such as contracted professional and legal services, which totaled at least \$2,653,300 in calendar year 2024, should be reviewed to determine if they are necessary or could be performed by OPSO staff. We identified expenditures that, while not improper, appear to be discretionary and could possibly be reduced or eliminated to allow OPSO to maximize available funds for maintenance and repairs at the jail. Examples of expenditures include:

- *Uniform allowance* - Each December during 2022 through 2025, OPSO paid \$500 to employees for uniform allowances, totaling \$1,305,000, to purchase uniforms from OPSO. While uniforms may be necessary for employees working at OPSO, the amount per employee and frequency that new uniforms are purchased could be reduced. Alternatively, OPSO could eliminate the uniform allowance and provide employees with a predetermined number of uniforms each year or upon request.
- *Fleet vehicles* - During January 2022 through January 2026, OPSO spent \$2,643,941 on fleet vehicle leases and corresponding repairs and at least \$571,465 for other vehicle expenses. In addition, on July 30, 2025, and August 12, 2025, OPSO ordered a total of 30 Dodge Durangos through purchase agreements for \$1,315,688 that were delivered to OPSO in November 2025. According to OPSO's Chief Financial Officer (CFO), as of February 24, 2026, OPSO had used Civil Division funds to pay \$552,805 toward the purchased vehicles. However, as of March 2026, only five of those vehicles had been assigned to employees. According to OPSO, the remaining 25 vehicles have not been assigned because OPSO does not have the funds available to outfit the vehicles for service.
- *Junior deputy badges and activity books* - From February 2024 through February 2025, OPSO spent \$31,828 on toy deputy badges and activity books that were distributed to the community.

Recommendation 1: OPSO should determine an appropriate fund balance to maintain and use the remainder for necessary jail operations and maintenance.

Management's Response: OPSO agreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 2: OPSO should ensure it properly spends bond funds on approved purposes, including not reimbursing invoices multiple times.

Management's Response: OPSO disagreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 3: OPSO should transfer bond funds back to the bond account for those instances where it reimbursed itself multiple times for the same expenditures.

Management's Response: OPSO disagreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 4: OPSO should identify discretionary funding that can be reduced to increase available funds for necessary jail operations and maintenance.

Management's Response: OPSO disagreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

OPSO appears to have violated Louisiana's constitution and state law related to the procurement of public works projects and materials in calendar year 2025. In addition, OPSO's computer systems are not integrated, preventing it from generating basic financial reports and operating efficiently. OPSO appears to have violated the Local Budget Act in 2023 by not amending its budget and may have violated the Louisiana Constitution by paying bills late.

According to the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA), financial policies are central to a strategic, long-term approach to financial management. Written policies help governments by defining how an organization will manage its resources and define limits on the actions staff may take.¹⁹ According to the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (Green Book),²⁰ internal controls are processes used by management to help an entity achieve its objectives related to operations, reporting, and compliance. In 2024, OPSO fell victim to two separate fraud schemes allegedly executed by OPSO employees with misappropriations totaling at least \$172,069. We interviewed OPSO finance and accounting staff and received inconsistent responses related to the financial operations of OPSO and the existence of governing policies. Further, we found that OPSO did not have any written purchasing policies prior to June 2025. The 2024 misappropriations may have been prevented if OPSO had written policies and standard operating procedures for expenditures and corresponding internal controls in place at the time.

¹⁹ <https://www.gfoa.org/materials/adopting-financial-policies>

²⁰ [The Green Book](#) may be applied as a framework for an internal control system by nonfederal entities, such as state, local, and quasi-governmental entities.

OPSO violated Louisiana's public bid law in calendar year 2024, according to its 2024 financial audit.²¹ We found OPSO continued to make purchases and vendor payments that appear to violate Louisiana's public bid law²² in calendar year 2025. Further, OPSO appears to have improperly used emergency orders in some instances. The purpose of the public bid law is to ensure that public entities receive the best possible price when using public funds for the procurement of materials and supplies (materials) or public works projects. During calendar year 2025, public bid law required public works projects exceeding \$250,000 or purchases of materials exceeding \$60,000 to be publicly bid. As mentioned previously, OPSO did not have any written purchasing policies prior to June 2025, including standard operating procedures to ensure purchases were made in compliance with public bid law. According to OPSO management, a new purchasing policy was "operationally implemented" in June 2025 but still had not been approved by the sheriff as of December 4, 2025. A lack of policies and controls may contribute to an environment where purchases could be made in violation of state law.

State law exempts public entities from following public bid law during emergencies, but these emergencies must be declared.²³ Louisiana's public bid law defines an emergency as "an unforeseen event bringing with it destruction or injury to life or property or imminent threat of such...".²⁴ However, Louisiana's Attorney General has historically opined that emergency exceptions should not be used for purchases that "can be delayed a few weeks longer to comply with the delays required by the public bid process."²⁵ OPSO issued two emergency orders related to purchases in calendar year 2025; however, we found issues with the timing of these emergency orders and related purchases as follows:

- **August 27, 2025** - OPSO issued an emergency order for the procurement of repairs for cell door locks and security mechanisms after the May 16, 2025, jail escape occurred.
- **December 2, 2025** - OPSO issued an emergency order to exempt any purchases made by OPSO to comply with the federal consent decree. This emergency order did not cite an unforeseen event that would cause an imminent threat due to complying with the federal consent decree, which has been in place since 2016. As a result, any public works project or purchase of materials or supplies made under this emergency order that exceeds the limits allowed by public bid law may be considered a violation of state law.

²¹ As part of its [2024 financial audit](#), OPSO's financial auditors tested 40 disbursements of \$30,000 or more made during calendar year 2024 and found nine (22.5%) did not contain required documentation.

²² La. R.S. 38:2212 and 38:2212.1

²³ La. R.S. 38:2212(P)

²⁴ La. R.S. 39:1314

²⁵ Louisiana Attorney General (La. AG) *Opinion Number 01-289*

In November 2024, OPSO obtained a quote of \$1,005,233 to replace 240 locks in the jail's high security pods and another quote of \$765,466 to replace 180 locks. According to OPSO records, "due to budget constraints" OPSO obtained a third quote of \$357,464 from the same company to replace only 60 locks and door hinges. Each of these three quotes exceeded the public bid law amount of \$250,000, but OPSO did not publicly bid the work or even obtain quotes from other vendors, as required by law. Installation of the 60 locks and door hinges began in April 2025.

On May 29, 2025, 13 days after the 10 inmates escaped, OPSO received a fourth quote from the vendor to replace 180 locks for \$1,267,814. OPSO initially approved this proposal on June 5, 2025, but postponed the replacement the next day while it verified "the Louisiana sole source guidelines due to the amount." On July 30, 2025, OPSO's CFO informed the vendor that any further work on the locks would need to be publicly bid and provided the vendor with a copy of the LLA's Public Bid Law Frequently Asked Questions document. OPSO received an invoice from the vendor that listed the installation of the original 60 locks and hinges as completed in June 2025 and paid the vendor \$402,464 for the completed work in August 2025.²⁶

Six days later, OPSO obtained a fifth quote of \$1,298,581 from the same vendor to replace 180 locks and hinges. OPSO paid the vendor \$942,703 in January 2026 for all materials and designs and 25% completion of the installations. Based on the timeline for these purchases, it appears OPSO may have violated public bid law by not publicly soliciting bids for the locks and hinges purchased in November 2024.²⁷ Further, OPSO may have violated public bid law since OPSO does not appear to have treated the malfunctioning locks as an imminent threat when they were identified in November 2024 and therefore would not be eligible to use the exception to the public bid law for emergencies due to the nine-month delay between identifying the malfunctioning locks and issuing the emergency order. Exhibit 1 shows a timeline of events related to the lock and door hinge purchases made during November 2024 through February 2026.

²⁶ The additional cost was from a change order on April 25, 2025, to add conductor wire to the 60 doors to power the locks.

²⁷ La. R.S. 38:2212 and 38:2212.1

Exhibit 1 Timeline of Locks and Door Hinge Replacement Activities November 2024 through February 2026	
Date	Description of Event
11/10/2024	OPSO obtains quote to replace 240 locks and hinges for \$1,005,233 and a quote to replace 180 locks and hinges for \$765,466.
11/25/2024	OPSO obtains quote to replace 60 locks and hinges for \$357,464, and OPSO’s CFO approves purchase order.
4/25/2025	Vendor confirms new locks and hinges are being installed and that a \$45,000 change order was needed to replace wiring in each door to power the new locks.
5/16/2025	Jail escape occurs in part due to issues with locks and hinges.
5/29/2025	Vendor provides OPSO’s CFO with new quote to replace 180 locks for \$1,267,814.
6/5/2025	OPSO employee emails the vendor that the CFO approved the purchase of additional 180 locks and hinges.
6/6/2025	OPSO’s CFO emails the vendor to request to postpone the order while OPSO verifies “the Louisiana sole source guidelines due to the amount.”
6/26/2025	Vendor invoices OPSO for installation completion of original 60 locks and hinges.
7/18/2025	OPSO approves payment for replacement of 60 locks and hinges for \$402,464.
7/30/2025	OPSO’s CFO emails the vendor that any new locks and hinges work will need to be publicly bid.
8/22/2025	OPSO pays vendor \$402,464 for replacement of 60 locks and hinges.
8/27/2025	Sheriff signs and CFO attests to emergency order due to imminent threat of injury due to malfunctioning locks.
8/28/2025	OPSO obtains quote to replace 180 locks and hinges for \$1,298,581.
12/2/2025	Sheriff signs and Finance Director attests to emergency order to exempt any purchases to allow OPSO to comply with the federal consent decree and prevent imminent harm to inmates.
1/6/2026	OPSO pays vendor \$942,703 for part of the work quoted on 8/28/2025.
2/26/2026	Installation of locks and hinges completed.
Source: Prepared by legislative auditor’s staff using information obtained from OPSO and the lock and hinge vendor.	

We identified additional expenditures that OPSO stated were made due to emergencies and exceeded the public bid law amounts, but no emergency declaration was made. For example:

- OPSO purchased 1,000 mattresses for \$89,660 from the same vendor in a two-month period without issuing a public bid. OPSO paid \$44,670 for 500 mattresses in March 2025 and then ordered 500 additional mattresses from the same vendor for \$44,990 in May 2025. Because the two purchases were from the same vendor, for the same item, and when combined exceeded \$60,000, OPSO should have publicly bid and obtained three competing price quotes for the mattress purchase rather than splitting it into two purchases.²⁸ OPSO employees stated that they did not obtain additional price quotes because they needed mattresses made of a specific type of tamper resistant material, and the company had a fast turnaround time.*
- OPSO obtained a \$351,000 estimate for the installation of razor wire on October 28, 2025. This amount exceeds the 2025 public bid law*

²⁸ Public bid law requires that purchases of materials or supplies of over \$30,000 but under \$60,000 have not less than three price quotes.

requirement that public work projects in excess of \$250,000 be let out for public bid, and OPSO does not appear to have obtained any additional estimates. According to OPSO, the razor wire installation was deemed to be an emergency, so it used a vendor that had previously gone through OPSO's vendor background check process to expedite the installation. However, according to the estimate, the vendor required a 50% payment upfront to order the razor wire, which would not ship for four to six weeks after it was ordered. OPSO approved a \$175,500 payment to the vendor on November 7, 2025, and, according to OPSO's maintenance request system, the work was completed on January 5, 2026.²⁹

OPSO's primary accounting and financial system is from 1988³⁰ and is not integrated with other OPSO systems, preventing OPSO from operating efficiently. These limitations appear to have contributed to OPSO potentially violating state law related to budget variances³¹ in its 2023 financial audit report. OPSO uses multiple data systems to operate that do not connect to each other, including accounting and finance, maintenance work orders, information technology work orders, time and attendance, and payroll. The antiquated computer system prevents OPSO from generating complete general ledger reports and reconciliation reports matching paid checks to their corresponding accounts payable information. Due to this, OPSO's purchasing process is extremely inefficient and requires it to conduct time-consuming manual bank and vendor payment reconciliations. In addition, OPSO is unable to accurately monitor and make timely contract payments to vendors.

The Local Budget Act requires OPSO to prepare a comprehensive proposed budget for the general fund and all special revenue funds.³² Additionally, OPSO is required to report when total revenue and other sources for a fund fall short of budgeted amounts by 5% or more, or total expenditures and other uses for a fund exceed budgeted amounts by 5% or more. According to OPSO's 2023 financial audit, OPSO failed to comply with this requirement. OPSO's accounting system does not electronically incorporate its budget, so OPSO manually creates and maintains its budget in an Excel file. Due to this and other issues discussed throughout this report, OPSO cannot efficiently monitor its fiscal operations by tracking its actual revenues and expenditures to its budget throughout the year. For instance, OPSO's original budget for Investigative Services in 2024 was \$2,623,620, but the actual expenses totaled \$4,730,045, resulting in OPSO underbudgeting by 80.3%. In another example, OPSO's original budget for Security Services in 2024 was \$24,557,246, but the actual expenses totaled \$19,918,556, resulting in OPSO

²⁹ We found that OPSO had razor wire installed in June 2025 by another vendor, which OPSO also considered to be an emergency. However, this vendor did not require additional time for the order and delivery of the razor wire. The installation of the razor wire for that project was complete 12 days after OPSO received the proposal.

³⁰ OPSO issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for financial software and services on August 20, 2025, but rescinded it on December 1, 2025.

³¹ La. R.S. 39:1311

³² La. R.S. 39:1301-1316

overbudgeting by 18.9%. By failing to reconcile budgeted revenues and expenditures to actual revenues and expenditures throughout the year, OPSO cannot efficiently monitor its fiscal operations.

OPSO does not have a contract management system or employee responsible for managing all contracts. We identified instances where OPSO entered into improper contracts without required supporting documentation and where there was no contract even though payments exceeded the amount requiring a written contract. We requested a list of all vendors OPSO had contracts with during calendar years 2022 through 2025. However, OPSO staff stated they do not maintain a listing of all contractors, contracts are handled by various sections within OPSO, and no one person is responsible for overseeing contracts. As a result, we could not ensure we reviewed all contracts for potential issues. However, we reviewed vendor contracts and invoices and found instances where contracts were improperly structured and documented or did not exist at all when required. For example:

- *Flat-rate contract with no detailed supporting documentation.* We found that OPSO entered into a flat-rate, professional service contract for consulting and paid the vendor a total of \$124,446 during September 2023 through July 2024. While the state constitution³³ allows for flat-rate, professional services contracts, the Louisiana AG advises against the use of this type of contract and has opined³⁴ that services billed must actually be performed in order for flat-rate contracts to be legal. This vendor submitted monthly invoices to OPSO for payment that listed the exact same services as being provided each month with only the invoice date differing. Because the invoices did not include detailed documentation of actual work performed, such as the number of hours worked, it is not clear the services invoiced and paid were actually provided.
- *Professional services with no contract.* OPSO paid \$305,279 to a single vendor from April 2, 2025, through July 11, 2025, for multiple fabrication, welding, and painting projects performed within the jail. State law³⁵ requires public work projects exceeding \$5,000 to be written and signed by both parties, and contractors must provide a bond for the sum of not less than 50% of the contract price for public work projects exceeding \$50,000. OPSO and this vendor did not enter into a written contract as required by state law, and there was no documentation that the contractor provided the required bonds. Further, it is recommended as good public fiscal policy that public entities competitively negotiate public work contracts of \$260,000³⁶ or less by using a Request for Proposal process or seeking three or more

³³ La. Constitution Article VII, Section 14

³⁴ La. AG *Opinions* No. [06-0155](#) and [91-0589-A](#)

³⁵ La. R.S. 38:2216

³⁶ Effective February 1, 2026

quotes.³⁷ OPSO was unable to provide us with any documentation that it obtained additional price quotes for any of these services.

- *Professional services with no contract.* OPSO paid \$91,754 to a single vendor from February 2024 through November 2025 for community outreach, photography, podcast production, and creating contact lists. However, OPSO did not have a contract with the vendor.

During June 2022 through November 2025, OPSO paid at least \$19,411 in late fees, interest, and finance charges on vendor invoices and credit cards. By incurring late fees or finance charges from not paying vendor invoices or its credit card timely, OPSO appears to have violated Louisiana's Constitution.³⁸ According to OPSO, late fees, interest, and finance charges paid as part of vendor invoices or credit card statements are not coded separately in OPSO's accounting system.³⁹ We reviewed invoices from two vendors paid during February 2022 through May 2025 and identified 34 instances where OPSO incurred late fees or finance charges totaling \$13,213. For example, OPSO incurred finance charges or late fees totaling \$11,730 for nine late payments for leased vehicles. We identified an additional 10 vendors from which OPSO incurred at least \$7,517 in late fees and finance charges; however, we did not compile a comprehensive list of all vendors or the total amount of finance charges and late fees incurred from those vendors.

In addition, from January 10, 2022, through November 16, 2025, OPSO incurred credit card charges totaling \$359,274. Of this amount, OPSO paid \$4,872 (1.4%) for finance charges and \$1,326 (0.4%) for late fees. Further, on the 48 monthly credit card statements we reviewed, OPSO was charged a late fee and/or a finance charge in 34 months (70.8%). For example, OPSO failed to pay a credit card statement that closed on June 20, 2025, by the due date, so it incurred a \$170 finance charge and a \$39 late fee. According to OPSO, payments were late because by the time it receives the credit card statement through the mail, reconciles the statement, and processes the payment, the payment due date has passed. After we discussed this issue with OPSO in July 2025, OPSO obtained online access to its credit card account and began scheduling credit card payments online. OPSO did not incur late fees, interest, or finance charges on its credit card statement between August 2025 and November 2025.

We identified at least \$14,030 in petty cash purchases during January 25, 2022, through October 10, 2025, that do not appear to have a public purpose and could be improper. According to a Louisiana Attorney General opinion,⁴⁰ the payment of or reimbursement for food, drink, or other expenses associated with luncheons, banquets, parties, or other similar functions

³⁷ <https://app.la.state.la.us/llala.nsf/0/90914CB4B38F37CE86257EDC0050E808>

³⁸ La. Constitution Article VII, Section 14 and [La. AG Opinion 16-0022](#)

³⁹ OPSO's system also could not produce a report listing each vendor payment check with the corresponding payment voucher number and vendor invoice number that would have allowed us to ensure that all documentation had been obtained for all vendor payments.

⁴⁰ [La. A.G. Opinion 03-0387](#)

from public funds is improper under Louisiana's constitution.⁴¹ According to OPSO employees, petty cash is used for employee per diems, expenditures that need to be expedited, and smaller purchases because OPSO's current accounting system does not support the use of a purchase card that could be used in place of petty cash. Individual petty cash purchases are not documented in OPSO's accounting system and, as a result, we could not compile a comprehensive list of all purchases made using petty cash.⁴² However, we identified purchases made using petty cash that do not appear to have a public purpose, including:

- \$7,463 for food and \$643 for balloons at OPSO 2024 Christmas parties
- \$3,377 for balloons at OPSO's 2024 Thanksgiving celebration
- \$2,297 for an OPSO employee "Thank You" barbecue in July 2025
- \$250 for gift cards distributed to crime victims at OPSO's 2024 Victim's Christmas dinner

Recommendation 5: OPSO should establish, approve, and implement written policies and procedures regarding contracting, purchasing, disbursements, receipts and cash collections, contracting, use of credit cards, and debt service.

Management's Response: OPSO agreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 6: OPSO should ensure it obtains bids in accordance with public bid law when procuring public works projects or making purchases of materials and supplies anticipated to cost more than allowed by public bid law.

Management's Response: OPSO disagreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 7: OPSO should obtain three quotes in writing when procuring professional services, public works projects, materials, or supplies that are anticipated to cost less than the amounts requiring them to be publicly bid.

Management's Response: OPSO disagreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 8: OPSO should ensure that all contracts for public works exceeding \$5,000 are reduced to writing and that OPSO receives a bond from

⁴¹ La. Constitution Article VII, Section 14

⁴² OPSO maintains a handwritten list of all instances where petty cash is taken for purchases with a summary of the reason for the purchases.

any vendor performing public works services exceeding \$50,000, as required by state law.

Management's Response: OPSO agreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 9: OPSO should procure an integrated accounting system that allows it to generate complete general ledger reports and reconciliation reports, monitor payments to vendors to ensure timely payment, and incorporate its budget.

Management's Response: OPSO agreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 10: OPSO should create or procure a contract management system for all contracts and assign contract management to a specific position or department.

Management's Response: OPSO disagreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 11: OPSO should ensure it pays vendor invoices and credit card charges on time so that it does not incur late fees, interest, and finance charges.

Management's Response: OPSO agreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 12: OPSO should establish a process to ensure petty cash expenditures are only made for public purposes.

Management's Response: OPSO disagreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

OPSO payroll costs increased by 55.1%, from \$30.1 million in 2022 to \$46.7 million in 2025, in part due to overtime costs. However, the number of OPSO employees only increased by 8.6%, from 631 to 685, and the number of employees who supervise inmates only increased 6.9%, from 217 to 232, while the inmate population increased by 46.6%. In addition, we compared OPSO's starting pay rate to other sheriff's offices in southeastern Louisiana parishes and found that OPSO has the lowest starting pay rate, which may affect recruiting and employee retention.

Law enforcement organizations nationwide have faced challenges in recruiting and retaining officers. A 2025 update to a survey performed by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) found that staffing numbers increased 0.4% between January 1, 2024, and January 1, 2025, but were still 5.2% lower than on January 1, 2020.⁴³ In a November 2024 audit report, LLA similarly found that the number of commissioned NOPD officers decreased by 23.4%, from 1,184 to 907 during calendar years 2019 through 2023.⁴⁴ According to the federal monitor, OPSO has dealt with jail staffing issues and employee retention since the OJC opened in 2016, and federal monitor reports consistently cite staffing as a concern. To combat the lack of available staff, OPSO has relied on the use of overtime to staff the jail, and staffing levels are driven by the jail's inmate population. However, the jail population is dependent on factors outside of OPSO's control, such as the amount of funding provided by the City, the number of arrests made by NOPD, and the speed at which cases are handled by the Orleans Parish District Attorney and Orleans Parish District Court.

⁴³ ["PERF survey shows police staffing increased slightly in 2024 but still lower than 2019", Police Executive Research Forum, July 5, 2025](#). The PERF update also found that hirings increased each year since 2020 and resignations decreased in 2023 and 2024. The survey credited the increase in hirings and retention to "offering financial incentives, adjusting hiring standards, streamlining hiring processes, and improving non-financial offerings."

⁴⁴ [New Orleans Police Department: Staffing, Response Times, and Job Satisfaction](#)

During January 2022 through December 2025, the total number of OPSO employees increased by 8.6%, from 631 to 685, with the number of deputies, recruits, and CMTs increasing by 11.1%, from 332 to 369. However, the number of deputies, recruits, and CMTs assigned to the jail to monitor inmates only increased by 2.6%, from 193 to 198 during this same time, compared to a 46.6% increase in the inmate population.⁴⁵ While

recruits and deputies are the primary employees assigned to supervise inmates in the jail, the majority of OPSO’s deputies are assigned to other locations such as intake and processing, field operations, or the kitchen due to their ability to carry firearms. Total OPSO deputy, recruit, and CMT staffing levels in January 2022 and at the end of each year through December 2025, by location, are shown in Exhibit 2.

Qualifications to Supervise Inmates


- **CMT** – Civilian employee, no POST Qualification required. Do not interact with inmates and cannot carry firearms.
- **Recruit** – POST Qualification Training Level III. Interact with inmates but cannot carry firearms.
- **Deputy** – POST Qualification Training Level I and II. Interact with inmates and can carry firearms.

Exhibit 2 Deputy, Recruit, and CMT Staffing January 2022 through December 2025							
Location	Jan. 2022	Dec. 2022	Dec. 2023	Dec. 2024	Dec. 2025	Change	Percent Change
Intake and Processing Center	30	28	32	40	45	15	50.0%
Field Operations	54	51	54	65	64	10	18.5%
Other*	34	25	31	27	39	5	14.7%
Kitchen	21	18	19	22	23	2	9.5%
Jail	193	183	216	219	198	5	2.6%
Total	332	305	352	373	369	37	11.1%

* Other includes locations such as transportation and warehouse.
Source: Prepared by legislative auditor’s staff using information from OPSO’s Automatic Data Processing (ADP) system.

Exhibit 3 compares jail staffing to the jail population during January 2022 through December 2025.

⁴⁵ The monthly average jail population in January 2022 was 872, while the monthly average in December 2025 was 1,278.



OPSO has been cited for inadequately staffing the jail, specifically with deputies, by Federal Consent Judgment Monitors from February 2014 through the most recent report issued in October 2024 (see text box at right). However, recruits are the main group of employees assigned to staff the jail, even though they are not qualified to carry firearms. According to OPSO staff, the warden cannot rely solely on deputies to staff certain job functions at the jail because they are the only group qualified to carry firearms and thus may be needed at any time for other duties such as providing security at courts and transporting inmates to hearings, court, another jail, or for medical reasons. As a result, any deputy scheduled to work in the jail could be pulled away from their job duty for unscheduled transportation, potentially leaving their area of the jail unsupervised.

A lack of adequate staffing leads to an increase in the number of assaults on prisoners by other prisoners, a decrease in awareness by OPSO staff that assaults were taking place, and a decrease in the number of shakedowns conducted to discover contraband items.

Source: February 13, 2014, and October 29, 2024 Federal Monitor Reports

During calendar years 2022 through 2025, OPSO payroll costs⁴⁶ increased 55.1%, from \$30.1 million to \$46.7 million, in part due to overtime costs.⁴⁷ OPSO paid \$19.1 million in overtime costs, of which \$7.2 million (37.7%) was paid to OPSO employees assigned to the jail to monitor inmates. As mentioned previously, the number of employees assigned to the jail only increased 2.6% during January 2022 through December 2025, resulting in OPSO having to pay more overtime to ensure that inmates were appropriately supervised. During this time, overtime costs for employees assigned to monitor inmates in the jail increased by 165.6%. Because OPSO is understaffed and must rely on the use of overtime to staff the jail, it has less funds available to pay for other expenses such as jail maintenance and repairs. Exhibit 4 summarizes annual overtime paid to OPSO employees assigned to the jail during calendar years 2022 through 2025, and Appendix D summarizes the amount of overtime paid annually for all OPSO job titles during this period.

In calendar year 2025, OPSO had 21 employees with annual salaries of \$100,000 or more, but 39 employees actually earned more than \$100,000 due to overtime pay. OPSO also had 44 employees with regular annual salaries of \$50,000 or more who increased their total income by between 25.0% and 48.7% because of overtime.

Exhibit 4					
Overtime Paid to Employees Assigned to Jail Security, by Job Title					
Calendar Years 2022 through 2025					
Job Title	2022	2023	2024	2025	Total
Deputy	\$332,646	\$477,083	\$736,107	\$868,024	\$2,413,860
Recruit	185,056	384,206	535,676	864,767	1,969,705
CMT	193,767	238,290	313,588	375,607	1,121,252
Sergeant	115,040	152,635	219,678	327,021	814,374
Captain	69,707	72,591	115,777	163,563	421,638
Lieutenant	67,090	53,339	86,609	76,416	283,454
Administrative Staff	25,246	30,910	28,819	17,626	102,601
Special Response Recruit	24,244	7,423	0	0	31,667
Colonel	0	0	3,794	3,440	7,234
Supervisor	2,559	0	0	0	2,559
Total	\$1,015,355	\$1,416,477	\$2,040,048	\$2,696,464	\$7,168,346
Source: Prepared by legislative auditor’s staff using information from OPSO’s ADP system.					

The October 2024 Federal Monitor report stated that staffing assigned to housing areas of the jail is extremely inadequate to comply with the consent judgement, necessitating the use of scheduled overtime. The report states that mandatory overtime of two shifts per pay period (14 days) was implemented in September 2024. However, the report also denotes that deputies are often reluctant to work overtime in the jail as they can make more per hour working off-duty details, as discussed in a later section of this report.

⁴⁶ This amount only includes payroll costs and does not include personnel costs, such as health and retirement benefits.

⁴⁷ Effective December 2023, OPSO gave an across-the-board 2.5% pay increase.

Other sections of OPSO also had large increases in the use of overtime during this period. For example, the maintenance service section’s overtime totaled \$2,031,655, increasing 110.4% from \$298,962 in calendar year 2022 to \$628,927 in calendar year 2025. According to OPSO employees, this increase was partially due to maintenance employees working overtime on weekends to put up OPSO tents for citizens at community events at no cost, which could possibly violate Louisiana’s Constitution.

During calendar years 2022 through 2025, OPSO lost a total of 650 employees either voluntarily or involuntarily. OPSO’s separations have increased each year since 2023, but OPSO does not consistently conduct exit interviews to determine separation reasons or accurately document known employee reasons for separation in OPSO’s termination report.⁴⁸

According to OPSO’s termination report, the most common reasons for separation were Personal – Other, Job Abandonment, and Misconduct. The GAO recommends that government agencies conduct exit interviews with separating employees to gain an understanding of the reasons for separation and to identify actions that management could take to improve employee retention and agency work environments. We found that OPSO does not appear to consistently conduct or document employee exit interviews that could be used to determine the reason for separation. We also found that reasons for separation listed in employee personnel files did not always match the reason for separation listed on OPSO’s termination report. However, based on notes listed in OPSO’s termination report, the reason noted most often for separations was “Personal - Other”. Exhibit 5 summarizes the annual number of separations, by reason, during calendar years 2022 through 2025.

Exhibit 5					
OPSO Separations Per Year					
Calendar Years 2022 through 2025					
Separation Reason	2022	2023	2024	2025	Total
Personal - Other	49	44	46	65	204
Abandoned job/No show/Attendance	13	31	29	70	143
Misconduct	11	21	19	26	77
Normal retirement	17	8	9	19	53
Personal - Health, family, relocation	16	13	11	10	50
Advancement/Left for new position	15	10	12	4	41
Other - Performance, working conditions, deceased, involuntary or voluntary separation	11	6	11	10	38
Resigned under investigation/On suspension	3	10	10	10	33
Reorganization/Reduction in force/Position ended	10	1	-	-	11
Total	145	144	147	214	650
Source: Prepared by legislative auditor’s staff using information from OPSO’s ADP system.					

We compared OPSO’s starting pay rate to other sheriff’s offices in southeastern Louisiana parishes and found that OPSO has the lowest starting pay rate, which may affect recruiting and employee retention.

⁴⁸ OPSO’s personnel system produces a termination report that is updated upon each employee separation.

Effective November 2022, OPSO increased hourly pay by \$2.43 for non-salaried employees. As of July 2025, the starting pay rate for an OPSO deputy is \$18.45 per hour, or \$35,424 per year. According to OPSO staff, this starting pay rate limits the number of applicants and is a factor in OPSO’s turnover rate. We compared OPSO’s starting salary data to that of sheriff’s offices in Jefferson, St. Tammany, Lafayette, and East Baton Rouge Parishes and found that OPSO’s starting hourly pay rate was between \$1.86 (10.1%) and \$3.53 (19.1%) lower per hour than the other parishes, as shown in Exhibit 6.

Exhibit 6 Comparison of Starting Salary Between OPSO and Select Sheriff’s Offices As of July 2025					
Office	Position	Starting Salary	Starting Hourly Rate	Hourly Difference from OPSO	% Difference from OPSO
Lafayette	Corrections Deputy	\$48,145	\$21.98	\$3.53	19.1%
East Baton Rouge	Corrections Deputy	\$46,755	\$21.41	\$2.96	16.0%
St. Tammany	Corrections Deputy	\$40,212	\$20.95	\$2.50	13.6%
Jefferson	Correctional Officer	\$39,000	\$20.31	\$1.86	10.1%
OPSO	Deputy – Jail	\$35,424	\$18.45		

Source: Prepared by legislative auditor’s staff using information from the above sheriff’s offices.

Recommendation 13: OPSO should evaluate jail staffing and current personnel resources to identify possible methods to staff the jail without relying on overtime.

Management’s Response: OPSO disagreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO’s response.

Recommendation 14: OPSO should monitor and minimize the use of overtime to staff the jail where possible, so that it has more funds available to pay for other expenses such as jail maintenance and repairs.

Management’s Response: OPSO disagreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO’s response.

Recommendation 15: OPSO should conduct exit interviews with separating employees to understand their separation reasons and to identify actions that management could take to improve employee retention and agency work environments, as well as document this information accurately and consistently.

Management’s Response: OPSO disagreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO’s response.

Recommendation 16: OPSO should work with the New Orleans City Council to attempt to increase the starting pay for OPSO deputies to better align with that in neighboring sheriff’s offices.

Management’s Response: OPSO disagreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO’s response.

OPSO staff do not routinely conduct jail inspections and compliance checks as required by policy, resulting in fewer observations of potential inmate misconduct or maintenance issues and decreased security in the jail. We found that during the week of May 11, 2025, through May 17, 2025, OPSO staff only documented conducting inspections during 206 (64.0%) of the 322 required shifts and only documented performing 2,700 (29.8%) of the required 9,072 security checks.

OPSO policy requires regularly-scheduled and unscheduled security inspections to be conducted and documented to safeguard the security of the jail and the safety and well-being of staff and inmates. At least three inspections should be conducted per shift and documented on a form that contains a checklist to note potential issues such as broken or missing equipment. Policy also requires security checks to be performed at

At approximately 1:00 a.m., on Friday, May 16, 2025, 10 inmates escaped from OJC. Their escape was not discovered until 8:30 a.m. during a routine headcount. All 10 inmates were eventually captured.

Security inspections are conducted to:

- Ensure OPSO facilities are secure;
- Respond to specific threats and intelligence;
- Comply with supervisor orders; and
- Identify security and/or potential security breaches.

Source: OPSO Policy and Procedure Manual

least every 30 minutes in general population pods and at least every 15 minutes in special management pods⁴⁹ to visually check each inmate to ensure they are physically present and safe and documented on a security check form. These inspections and security checks help OPSO to comply with the consent judgement, which requires OPSO to operate the jail in a manner that assures inmates are “reasonably safe and secure.”

⁴⁹ Special management pods are designated to house youth offenders in custody and inmates in administrative or disciplinary segregation, in protective custody, on suicide watch, with a diagnosis of mental illness, or who require medical housing.

We reviewed security inspection forms for the week of May 11, 2025, through May 17, 2025, the week of the escape incident, and found that OPSO staff only documented conducting inspections during 206 (64.0%) of the 322 required shifts. Further, 83 (40.3%) of the 206 forms that did exist were not filled out, meaning required information, such as whether the security electronics control panel was broken or the housing unit keys were missing, was not documented as part of the inspection. The remaining 123 forms that were partially or fully completed⁵⁰ in the sections of the form that identify deficiencies noted 309 deficiencies, with the highest percentage denoting issues with the washer/dryer (74, or 23.9%) and housing unit keys (39, or 12.6%). Exhibit 7 summarizes the top five deficiency categories noted on the inspection forms completed the week of May 11, 2025, through May 17, 2025, and Appendix E contains a summary of all 309 deficiencies by category during this week.

Escape Timeline – Friday, May 16, 2025:

- **12:20 a.m.:** Inmates begin tampering with the cell door.
- **12:43 a.m.:** Inmates enter the cell and exit through a hole cut behind a toilet.
- **1:00 a.m.:** Inmates escape the jail and leave via the OPSO loading dock.
- **1:19 a.m.:** Inmates scale the perimeter fence of the jail.
- **8:30 a.m.:** Escape is discovered during a routine headcount.

Exhibit 7		
Top Five Deficiencies Identified in 309 Total Deficiencies May 11, 2025, through May 17, 2025		
Deficiency	Number	Percentage of Total
Washer/Dryer	74	23.9%
Housing Unit Keys	39	12.6%
Utility Closet	28	9.1%
Computer Monitor	25	8.1%
Security Electronics Control Panel	24	7.8%
Source: Prepared by legislative auditor’s staff using OPSO inspection forms.		

OPSO policy and standard operating procedures require inspection forms to be reviewed by various OPSO employees. Specifically, shift supervisors are required to review and sign each inspection form, note any comments about issues identified, direct deputies to take action to correct issues, and document correction on the form. However, the inspection form does not have a designated place for the supervisor to sign, only six (2.9%) of the 206 forms reviewed listed the supervisor’s name, and there were no supervisor comments on any of the forms. This indicates that deputies and supervisors are not performing their required duties related to these forms, potentially missing the opportunity to identify deficiencies in the jail that compromise security.

The inspection form for Pod 1D, which is the pod from which the inmates escaped, was not filled out for either the day shift or the night shift on Thursday, May 15, 2025, the day prior to the escape, or for the first shift on Friday, May 16, 2025, the morning of the escape. The only issues noted in the scope of our analysis

⁵⁰ Only 76 (36.9%) of the 206 forms reviewed were fully filled out in the sections that identify deficiencies.

for this pod prior to the escape were reported on May 13, 2025, when the inspection form indicated issues with the first aid, blood spill, and personal protective equipment kits; housing unit keys; televisions/remotes; utility closet; and washer/dryer. No issues were noted related to cell door hinges, jammed door locks, or any other maintenance issues that contributed to the escape. However, OPSO staff stated that these issues did exist in the pod and were just not noted on the forms.

OPSO's failure to comply with its inspection requirements is not confined to just the week of the escape. The Federal Monitor also reported in October 2024 that "daily inspections of [pods] as required by [the consent judgement] were not performed in a consistent enough manner to warrant a continued rating of partial compliance as they are seldom performed, and the ones that are performed do not cover all areas."⁵¹

We reviewed security check forms for May 11, 2025, through May 17, 2025, the week of the escape, and found that only 2,700 (29.8%) of the required 9,072 security checks were documented as being performed.

OPSO policy requires deputies to perform security checks at least every 30 minutes for a general population pod during a 12-hour shift, meaning each general population pod should have at least 24 checks each shift. For special management pods, checks should be performed at least every 15 minutes, meaning each pod should have at least 48 checks each 12-hour shift. Deputies document the security checks on a form with information such as the date, the pod, names of the assigned deputies and supervisors, the start and end times of any security checks conducted, and signatures. Deputies are also able to add comments about the shift, such as whether any other deputies or CMTs were assigned to monitor the pod during the shift.

We reviewed security check forms from May 11, 2025, through May 17, 2025, and found that only 2,700 (29.8%) of the 9,072 required security checks were documented as being performed, with performance varying by pod. For example, only 14 (4.2%) of the 336 checks that should have been performed on Pod 1C were documented, while 244 (72.6%) of 336 checks on Pod 2E were documented. Issues with security checks are also not confined to the week of the escape. According to the October 2024 Federal Monitor report, reviews of video footage and security check forms often found that deputies were not actually doing the checks they documented. In addition, OPSO staff audited security checks from April 14, 2024, through April 20, 2024, and found that the jail day shift only performed 15% of the checks indicated on the forms and the night shift only performed 7% of the checks indicated.

According to OPSO, it does not have enough staff to perform the required checks. Staff turnover and unexpected absences contribute to the lack of deputies available to perform the required security checks and inspections. As discussed previously, OPSO staff qualified to work in the jail are not always assigned to the

⁵¹ October 29, 2024, Federal Monitor Report

jail. We found that deputies indicated on 81 (25.2%) of 322 security check forms that they were the only deputy or that there was no CMT present to assist with oversight. According to OPSO staff, when this happens, deputies often are unable to conduct all required checks while performing other duties. OPSO staff further stated that some deputies do not feel safe performing these checks because they do not have backup in case an incident occurs with an inmate.

OPSO staff also stated that it is not possible to conduct security checks in accordance with the mandated time increments in policy with current staffing levels. Further, OPSO staff stated that the requirement to conduct 30-minute checks for low-security pods does not make sense but is required by the consent judgement. The October 2024 Federal Monitor report stated that staffing assigned to housing areas of the jail is extremely inadequate to comply with the consent judgement, necessitating the use of scheduled overtime.

Recommendation 17: OPSO should ensure security checks and inspections are conducted and documented as required by establishing a policy and procedure to review them for completeness on a routine basis and providing additional training on the importance of these functions.

Management's Response: OPSO agreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 18: OPSO should amend its inspection form to allow for a signature line for supervisors as required by policy.

Management's Response: OPSO disagreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 19: OPSO should ensure that issues identified through inspections and security checks are documented and reported so appropriate corrective action can be taken.

Management's Response: OPSO disagreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 20: OPSO should work with the federal monitor to determine if OPSO can amend its security check requirements based on the security risk of the pod and availability of qualified staff to conduct the required checks.

Management's Response: OPSO agreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

OPSO deputies may have violated state law by being paid to work at OPSO during the same hours they were reported as working an off-duty detail. We also identified instances where OPSO deputies may have violated policy by not reporting details worked, exceeding daily work-hour limits, or working details while taking prohibited OPSO leave. An electronic detail scheduling system may reduce overlaps and increase OPSO's ability to monitor deputies who work details.

Off-duty details (details) allow POST-certified⁵² OPSO deputies to provide security and other safety services for private businesses and functions in their community and supplement their OPSO income. OPSO policies and standard operating procedures⁵³ require deputies who want to work a detail to submit a detail authorization form, which must be approved by their supervisor and verified by the Detail Department. This approval and verification is to confirm that the deputy is eligible to work details and that the detail will not conflict with their OPSO work schedule.⁵⁴ Weak detail controls could contribute to staffing-related issues at the jail, such as unattended inmates and undetected maintenance issues, since the deputies who are supposed to be at the jail may not always be there when scheduled.

"All details will be exclusively organized and managed by the Detail Department following this policy and ensure fully compliance with the policy."

Source: OPSO Policy Manual Section 301.09

According to data provided by OPSO's Detail Department, deputies worked 38,865 details during January 3, 2022, through June 29, 2025, or an average of 925 details per month. However, our review found that the data did not include start or end times for 13,483 (34.7%) of these details, which would be necessary for OPSO to ensure that the detail did not overlap with OPSO work hours. While OPSO policy requires details to be reviewed by immediate supervisors and the Detail Department,⁵⁵ neither policy nor

⁵² POST training requirements for all Louisiana peace officers, as defined in R.S. 40:2402.

⁵³ A policy is a general written document that establishes a standard by which an organization manages itself. A standard operating procedure is a description of the processes necessary to implement the policy.

⁵⁴ In a November 2024 report, the New Orleans Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that Detail Authorization forms were not maintained for 34.4% of the tested details, and Off-Duty Detail Coordinator Forms were not maintained for 45.2% of the tested details. The OIG also found that the forms maintained were missing required information or were not approved by the requesting deputy's immediate supervisor. In addition, OPSO policies and standard operating procedures for off-duty details did not substantially comply with best practices from the International Association of Chiefs of Police. [New Orleans OIG - OPSO Off-Duty Details and Mardi Gras Pay Audit - November 2024](#)

⁵⁵ OPSO policy states that it shall closely regulate deputies working details and will ensure everyone follows all policies and standard operating procedures governing details. To achieve this, the Detail Department is required to conduct detail inspections, meet with vendors on any issues, check

standard operating procedures describe how or when this review should be performed. OPSO's detail request process is paper-based and, other than manually reviewing each request, OPSO has no formal process to analyze details or document the results of reviews performed. In addition, OPSO does not maintain documentation of detail reviews or the results of these reviews.

"...While the allowance of off-duty details does provide an essential service to the public, all participants in the off-duty detail process must remain mindful that their first obligation is the faithful performance of their duties to OPSO and OJC."

Source: OPSO Standard Operating Procedure 301.09

According to OPSO Detail Department staff, they manually review the detail authorization forms after the detail is performed to ensure the forms are completed and appropriate approvals were obtained. Staff then manually compare the dates and times for approximately 10.0% of the details approved to time sheet data to confirm that the detail times worked do not overlap with the times worked at OPSO. Any instances of overlap identified are reviewed and forwarded as potentially inappropriate to OPSO investigators for review and potential disciplinary action. However, without complete beginning and ending times of each detail, there is no way for OPSO to ensure that details do not overlap with OPSO work hours.

We compared OPSO timesheet records to detail data from January 2022 through May 2025 and identified 1,316 instances where 179 deputies appear to have been working at OPSO during the same hours that they were listed as working a detail which may violate state law.^{56,57} Further, in 714 (54.3%) of these instances, deputies' time working at OPSO and the detail overlapped by more than 30 minutes, and the remaining 602 (45.7%) instances overlapped by less than 30 minutes.

Three of the deputies identified by our analysis were previously identified as possibly working details while on the clock at OPSO in a March 2016 LLA report of OPSO. A list of the deputies identified in the 2016 audit as working details while on the clock at OPSO was provided to OPSO on February 1, 2016; however, based on a review of their personnel files, it does not appear that OPSO took any disciplinary action against these employees.

Source: [LLA Report of OPSO, March 30, 2016](#)

For example, on April 23, 2025, a deputy worked at OPSO from 8:01 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. but is also listed as working a detail from 2:00 p.m. until 9:30 p.m. As a result, the deputy was paid for working at OPSO and the detail for the same 7.5 hours. In another instance, on

attendance records, and review detail authorization forms for verification or possible "double-dipping" (i.e., overlapping times worked at OPSO and the off-duty detail).

⁵⁶ La. R.S. 14:138(A) states, in part, that "Public payroll fraud is committed when: (1) Any person shall knowingly receive any payment or compensation, or knowingly permit his name to be carried on any employment list or payroll for any payment or compensation from the state, for services not actually rendered by himself, or for services grossly inadequate for the payment or compensation received or to be received according to such employment list or payroll."

⁵⁷ La. R.S. 14:134(A) states, "Malfeasance in office is committed when any public officer or public employee does any of the following: (1) intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully required of him, as such officer or employee; (2) intentionally perform any such duty in an unlawful manner; or (3) knowingly permit any other public officer or public employee, under his authority, to intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully required of him or to perform any such duty in an unlawful manner."

March 12, 2024, a deputy worked from 5:48 a.m. to 6:27 p.m. at OPSO, while detail data listed them as working a detail from 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., resulting in an overlap of the same 11 hours. If deputies are paid to work at OPSO but are not physically there performing their duties, this further reduces the already limited staff of deputies who oversee the inmate population in the jail. Further, by performing details while they were being paid to work their regularly-scheduled OPSO shift, these OPSO deputies may have violated OPSO policies and standard operating procedures for details and state law. Exhibit 8 lists the number of overlaps between OPSO and detail shifts by OPSO employee position per year during January 2022 through May 2025.

Exhibit 8					
Annual Detail Overlaps by Job Title					
January 2022 through May 2025					
Job Title	2022	2023	2024	2025	Total
Deputy	141	149	188	56	534
Sergeant	72	92	120	49	333
Detective	18	29	50	23	120
Executive Security	1	3	82	8	94
Captain	22	20	7	5	54
Lieutenant	10	16	14		40
Corporal	2	14	12		28
Locksmith			4	19	23
Director	7	1	9	4	21
Training Instructor	2	4	3	10	19
Clerk		5	6	4	15
Mechanic	9	2	3		14
Colonel		1	5	3	9
Manager		7	1		8
Maintenance Supervisor	4				4
Total	288	343	504	181	1,316
Source: Prepared by legislative auditor’s staff using information from OPSO and detail vendors.					

We identified 922 additional instances during the same period where the start or end time of a deputy’s OPSO shift was the exact same as the start or end time of the deputy’s detail shift. As a result, there is no time allowed for any necessary travel time between OPSO and the detail location. Further, by performing details with no time allocated for travel between OPSO work and detail work, these OPSO deputies may have violated OPSO policies and standard operating procedures for details and state law.^{58,59}

We identified 160 instances during July 1, 2022, through May 30, 2025, where OPSO employees appear to have worked details that were not reported to OPSO, which the New Orleans Office of Inspector General (OIG) also identified as an issue in its November 2024 report.⁶⁰ We compared detail timesheet data from six private entities that hired deputies for

⁵⁸ La. R.S. 14:138(A)

⁵⁹ La. R.S. 14:134(A)

⁶⁰ [New Orleans OIG - OPSO Off-Duty Details and Mardi Gras Pay Audit - November 2024](#)

security services to the detail data from OPSO’s Detail Department and identified 160 instances where 43 deputies worked details that were not approved by the Detail Department. Further, two of these details appear to have overlapped with times that the deputies’ OPSO timesheets show they were also working at OPSO.⁶¹ By working details not reported to OPSO, these OPSO deputies may have violated OPSO policies and standard operating procedures and state law⁶² for these details.

We identified 12,016 details worked by an OPSO deputy during January 2022 through October 2025 that do not appear to comply with OPSO policy or standard operating procedures regarding the total hours worked or the use of leave. We also found that OPSO detail policies and standard operating procedures lacked clarity regarding the maximum hours of OPSO work and detail work that could be performed in a 24-hour period. For instance, OPSO policy says 15 continuous hours, while OPSO standard operating procedures says 16 hours in a 24-hour period. We also found inconsistencies related to whether any leave type or only specific types of leave could be taken to work a detail.

We identified 10,558⁶³ instances where an employee’s combined time spent working at OPSO and detail work exceeded 16 hours. For example, one deputy worked a detail from 7:28 a.m. to 4:54 p.m. and then worked at OPSO from 5:50 p.m. to 7:16 a.m. the following day. Nine minutes later, the deputy began working a detail lasting from 7:25 a.m. to 2:42 p.m., totaling more than 30 hours of work in under a 32-hour period. Deputies working long hours in excess of policy limits could lead to declined performance at OPSO and possible safety issues.

Further, OPSO policy states that staff are prohibited from working details on days during which they are absent from work due to sick leave, illness, Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave, workmen’s compensation leave, leave without pay, suspension, or otherwise absent during scheduled work hours. However, we identified 1,467⁶⁴ instances where an OPSO deputy worked a detail while on one of these prohibited leave types. By not enforcing policy and allowing deputies to work details while taking

Exhibit 9 Details Worked While on Prohibited OPSO Leave June 2022 through May 2025		
Leave Description	Number of Instances	% of All Instances
Absent Without Pay	1,044	71.2%
Sick Leave	371	25.3%
Bereavement Leave	32	2.1%
Administrative Leave	13	0.9%
Suspended	4	0.3%
FMLA	2	0.1%
Jury Duty	1	0.1%
Total	1,467	100.0%
Source: Prepared by legislative auditor’s staff using OPSO timesheets, OPSO detail data, and vendor detail data.		

⁶¹ These two instances are included in the 1,316 overlapping details previously discussed in this report.

⁶² La. R.S. 14:138(A) and La. R.S. 14:134(A)

⁶³ Nine of these details were also included in the number of details worked by an employee on a prohibited type of leave from OPSO.

⁶⁴ Nine of these details were also included in the number of details where an employee’s combined time spent working at OPSO and detail work exceeded 16 hours.

prohibited types of leave, OPSO's ability to fully staff the jail may be negatively affected. Exhibit 9 above shows the prohibited OPSO leave types used while a deputy worked a detail during June 2022 through May 2025.

Additionally, we identified 1,174 instances where deputies took annual leave on a day during which they worked a detail. While OPSO's policy manual does allow deputies to work details while on annual leave, allowing deputies to use annual leave to work details reduces the staff available to work at OPSO.

We found that the use of an electronic detail scheduling system may reduce overlaps and increase OPSO's ability to monitor deputies that work details. According to OPSO, staff tested an electronic detail management system in 2025 and began implementing the system for additional details in March 2026. Although it is not performed in real-time, the electronic detail system will allow for an automated comparison of deputy work schedules to their detail work schedules. Our analysis of 331 details scheduled through the electronic detail scheduling system tested by OPSO in 2025 found zero instances of overlaps and only one instance where a deputy's OPSO shift ended at the exact time that their detail shift began. Implementing an electronic scheduling detail system, such as the one OPSO tested or the one used by NOPD,⁶⁵ may reduce the number of instances where details are worked in violation of OPSO policy.

Recommendation 21: OPSO should revise its policy and/or standard operating procedure to include the number and/or percentage of off-duty details that should be reviewed by the Detail Department.

Management's Response: OPSO stated it could not agree or disagree with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 22: OPSO should require all detail authorization forms be complete and approved prior to the detail being worked and confirm that detail start and end times are included on all detail forms.

Management's Response: OPSO agreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 23: OPSO should compare time sheet data to details worked by deputies on a routine basis to identify instances of overlaps for details and potential violations of policy.

Management's Response: OPSO agreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

⁶⁵ NOPD's Office of Police Secondary Employment schedules details through an electronic system to ensure all details are authorized.

Recommendation 24: OPSO should revise its policy and/or standard operating procedure to clarify the maximum number of combined hours of OPSO shifts and details that can be worked in a period.

Management's Response: OPSO agreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 25: OPSO should revise its policy and/or standard operating procedure to clarify the types of leave that can be taken to work details.

Management's Response: OPSO agreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

Recommendation 26: OPSO should continue to implement an electronic detail management system for all details its employees perform that corresponds with the OPSO's ADP payroll/timesheet system.

Management's Response: OPSO agreed with this recommendation. See Appendix A for OPSO's response.

APPENDIX A: MANAGEMENT'S RESPONSE



SUSAN HUTSON

Sheriff



OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF
Parish of Orleans • State of Louisiana

April 6, 2026

TO: Michael J. "Mike" Waguespack
Louisiana Legislative Auditor

Via Email
mwag@lla.la.gov

From: Susan A. Hutson
Sheriff of Orleans Parish

RE: Finances, Staffing, and Jail Security Operations Initial Audit Response
Project Report Number 40250014

Mr. Waguespack,

I am writing in response to the Finances, Staffing, and Jail Security Operations audit that your office initiated in the wake of the May 16, 2026 resident escape at the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office ("OPSO").

First, thank you for the time and effort invested in conducting the audit. Over the roughly eleven months that your staff spent evaluating OPSO, I am pleased that they did so professionally and with minimal disruption to OPSO operations. As you know, OPSO is routinely monitored and audited for our use of best practices, and although the assessments intensified after the escape, I am also pleased that my team fully cooperated with all audit requests in keeping with transparency as a core OPSO value. Certainly, the May 16th escape was an unfortunate event, and there are many external factors that critically effected OPSO's ability to optimize its security operations leading up to the escape. Nevertheless, OPSO continues working tirelessly to reinforce and adhere to all standards that ensure a safe and secure jail facility.

My leadership team and I have read the audit report and there are some findings and recommendations with which we agree. Undeniably, there are some aspects of OPSO operations that have proven to be difficult to fully rectify. A prime example here is issues related to deputy detail controls which we are actively working to improve by reaching targeted solutions.¹ Staffing shortages and inadequate starting pay rates for new OPSO deputies is another example of audit findings that we agree with. While these issues are not unique to OPSO or to my administration, great effort has been dedicated to increasing our staffing levels and deputy pay. It goes without saying that OPSO deputies should be paid fairly for their brave and hard work, and your report finding of the same is appreciated.

On the other hand, there are some findings and recommendations with which my team and I respectfully disagree. In short, certain parts of the report lack important context, is contradictory, and can be misleading to readers. As explained during our exit meeting that took place on March



SUSAN HUTSON

Sheriff



OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF

Parish of Orleans • State of Louisiana

24, 2026, this difference in determinations reached between OPSO and your audit team is largely due to an incomplete understanding of OPSO operations, some factual inaccuracies, a disregard for managerial choice, and OPSO obligations under an effective federal consent decree, 2:12-cv-00859-LMA-MBN, *Jones et al v. Gusman et al.*

Accordingly, OPSO hereby submits this response to each finding and recommendation identified within the audit report.

Responsive documents include:

- Statements of agreement or disagreement with each audit finding;
- Documentation supporting OPSO's position of agreement or disagreement;
- And, where applicable, a detailed Corrective Action Plan for any findings with which OPSO either partial or completely concurs with the stated finding.

Through this process, OPSO remains committed to institutional accountability, operational transparency, and compliance with all applicable standards and best practices. I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the audit findings, and I hope to continue to improve our jail operations by working alongside your office and other stakeholders.

I ask that after considering the provided response and documentation supporting OPSO's compliance determinations, please make any and all adjustments to the audit report, or provide any rebuttal responses to OPSO **on or before Friday, April 10, 2026**. This will enable OPSO to continue to take any necessary corrective measures in a timely and orderly manner.

Again, thank you for assisting OPSO as it works to improve operations and I look forward hearing from you soon.

Cordially,

/s/ Susan A. Hutson

Sheriff of Orleans Parish

OPSO Responses to LLA Audit Findings, Project Report Number 40250014

OPSO Response to Recommendation 1:

The Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office ("OPSO") acknowledges the importance of maintaining a clearly defined and disciplined approach to fund balance management and agrees in principle with the recommendation to establish a formal fund balance policy. However, OPSO respectfully submits that the recommendation must be evaluated within the context of the agency's unique legal obligations, operational risks, and structural funding constraints, which materially distinguish OPSO from a typical governmental entity. As detailed below, OPSO's operating environment — defined by federal consent decree obligations, emergency operational demands, and structural revenue uncertainty — necessitates fund balance levels that exceed standard minimum benchmarks, consistent with the very guidance issued by the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA).

OPSO will develop and implement a formal fund balance policy consistent with the GFOA Best Practice: Fund Balance Guidelines for the General Fund. The GFOA states that *"the adequacy of unrestricted fund balance in the general fund should be assessed based upon a government's own specific circumstances."* The GFOA further recommends that, at a minimum, general-purpose governments maintain an unrestricted fund balance of no less than two months of regular general fund operating revenues or expenditures, while also emphasizing that *"a government's particular situation often requires a higher level of unrestricted fund balance."* In accordance with this guidance, OPSO's fund balance policy will establish minimum reserve thresholds at or above the GFOA baseline, define target reserve ranges calibrated to OPSO's specific risk profile, set clear conditions governing the use and replenishment of reserves, and align fund balance management with multi-year financial planning objectives.

Consistent with GFOA guidance that higher reserves may be required based on an agency's specific circumstances, OPSO's operating environment necessitates fund balance levels that exceed minimum benchmarks. Three distinct risk factors — legal, operational, and structural — independently and collectively justify this positioning. Decree Obligations (Legal Risk Factor) GFOA specifically notes that fund balance levels should reflect: *"Volatility of revenues, expenditures, and the potential for unanticipated expenditures."* OPSO operates under a federal consent judgment, requiring:

- Immediate correction of deficiencies
- Continuous compliance with constitutional standards

This creates non-discretionary, unpredictable financial exposure that directly justifies maintaining elevated reserves.

The GFOA further states that *"governments facing higher levels of risk... should maintain higher levels of unrestricted fund balance."* OPSO routinely confronts emergency infrastructure failures, security risks requiring immediate response, and unplanned operational expenditures that cannot be anticipated in advance. These conditions demand readily available liquidity and cannot be adequately addressed through delayed or external funding mechanisms. Maintaining sufficient reserves is therefore not a matter of fiscal preference, but of operational necessity.

The GFOA highlights the importance of reserves where “*there is a high degree of revenue volatility or uncertainty.*” OPSO’s funding structure relies heavily on City of New Orleans appropriations, over which OPSO has no direct control regarding timing or sufficiency. This dependency creates meaningful cash flow variability and aligns precisely with the GFOA’s criteria for maintaining fund balance levels above the minimum threshold.

The GFOA emphasizes that “*fund balance classifications... should be clearly defined to distinguish between restricted, committed, assigned, and unassigned amounts.*” A proper analysis of OPSO’s fund balance must account for this classification structure. OPSO’s fund balance includes restricted funds subject to legally limited use, assigned funds designated for specific purposes, and committed funds approved for future obligations. Only a portion of the total fund balance qualifies as unrestricted and available for general use, and even that portion must be preserved to meet applicable risk thresholds. Any assessment of the fund balance that fails to account for these classifications will overstate the resources actually available to OPSO.

The GFOA explicitly cautions that “*failure to maintain adequate levels of fund balance can... negatively impact a government’s financial stability.*” For OPSO, the consequences of reducing fund balance below appropriate levels would be immediate and serious. Such a reduction would increase the risk of operational disruption, delay critical maintenance and infrastructure repairs, compromise public safety and security within the Orleans Justice Center, and expose OPSO to heightened legal and federal compliance risk. Given the agency’s consent decree obligations and emergency operational environment, these are not theoretical risks — they are foreseeable and material consequences.

The GFOA supports the strategic use of fund balance, stating that it “*should be used in a manner that is consistent with a government’s long-term financial plan.*” OPSO currently uses its fund balance to bridge timing gaps in funding, address emergency expenditures, and support continuity of operations — all of which are consistent with GFOA’s guidance. Going forward, OPSO will align fund balance usage with its formal policy, monitor reserve levels relative to its risk profile on an ongoing basis, and ensure long-term sustainability through structured replenishment protocols.

In conclusion, OPSO agrees with the recommendation to establish a formal fund balance policy and will implement one aligned with GFOA best practices. However, OPSO respectfully asserts that the GFOA explicitly supports higher fund balance levels where risk is elevated, that OPSO’s legal obligations, operational environment, and funding structure independently justify reserves above minimum thresholds, and that the existing fund balance is not excessive but rather necessary to ensure financial stability and compliance. Accordingly, OPSO will adopt a structured fund balance policy while maintaining sufficient reserves to address federal mandates, emergency operational conditions, and revenue uncertainty — and to ensure the continued safe, secure, and constitutionally compliant operation of the Orleans Justice Center.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 2:

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 2 as presented. While OPSO fully supports the principle of ensuring that bond proceeds are expended for authorized purposes and that duplicate reimbursements are prevented, the recommendation is duplicative of existing OPSO processes and controls that are already in place and functioning effectively. As set forth in detail below, OPSO's internal controls not only address the concerns underlying this recommendation but affirmatively demonstrate that those controls are working as intended — having independently identified and resolved the issue at issue prior to any external audit finding.

OPSO currently maintains an established process for the oversight, reconciliation, and verification of bond-funded expenditures. This process includes monthly reconciliation of bond accounts to ensure all transactions are properly recorded and supported, review and approval of all invoices prior to payment or reimbursement, and verification that expenditures align with authorized bond purposes — including jail operations support, facility maintenance, and life-safety and security improvements. These procedures are designed to ensure that bond funds are used strictly for their intended purpose, that all transactions are accurately recorded and traceable, and that any discrepancies are identified and corrected in a timely manner. The controls recommended by LLA are already embedded within OPSO's current financial management processes and have been functioning as designed.

During OPSO's routine monthly reconciliation process, the agency independently identified an accounting duplication related to reimbursement tracking, determined the issue to be a timing and recording error rather than a duplication of actual expenditures, promptly corrected the accounting entries, and returned funds to the appropriate bond account where applicable. This sequence of events demonstrates that OPSO's internal controls are active and functioning as intended, that the reconciliation process is effective in detecting anomalies, and that OPSO acts promptly and transparently to resolve issues as they arise. The fact that OPSO independently identified and corrected the issue is affirmative evidence of a strong internal control environment, not a deficiency.

OPSO affirms that all bond proceeds were used exclusively for their authorized purposes and that there have been no instances of bond funds being used for unintended or unauthorized activities. The issue identified relates solely to an accounting duplication in the reimbursement tracking system — not to an improper expenditure. There was no duplicate vendor payment, no diversion of funds, and no financial loss of any kind. The underlying expenditures were valid, necessary, and directly related to the operation and protection of the Orleans Justice Center.

OPSO further notes that Recommendation 2 is duplicative in two distinct respects. First, it duplicates OPSO's existing processes, which already include monthly reconciliations, invoice review and approval controls, and internal verification procedures. Second, it is duplicative of Recommendation 3, which specifically addresses the return of funds for duplicate reimbursements — an action OPSO has already completed through its internal reconciliation process. As such, Recommendation 2 does not introduce a new or unaddressed control requirement.

While OPSO disagrees with the necessity of this recommendation, the agency remains firmly committed to maintaining strong financial controls, enhancing documentation and tracking systems, continuing periodic reconciliation and review processes, and aligning its practices with governmental accounting standards and audit expectations. OPSO will also continue to strengthen its processes where appropriate to ensure ongoing transparency and accountability in the management of all public funds.

Again, OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 2 because the recommendation duplicates existing OPSO processes — including monthly reconciliations and invoice approval controls — that are already functioning effectively. OPSO’s internal controls successfully identified and corrected the issue without external intervention. There have been no instances of bond funds being used outside their intended purpose, and the matter identified represents a corrected accounting issue rather than a control failure. Accordingly, OPSO maintains that its current processes are sufficient, effective, and aligned with sound financial management practices, and that Recommendation 2 does not require additional action beyond what is already being performed.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 3:

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 3 as presented. While OPSO supports the principle of ensuring that bond funds are accurately accounted for and that any duplicate reimbursements are corrected, this recommendation is duplicative of actions already completed by OPSO through its established internal reconciliation processes. As demonstrated below, OPSO independently identified the accounting issue at issue, took prompt corrective action, returned the applicable funds to the appropriate bond account, and compiled full supporting documentation — all prior to the issuance of this audit finding.

During OPSO’s routine monthly reconciliation of bond accounts, the agency independently identified an accounting duplication in the reimbursement-tracking process. Upon review, OPSO determined that the issue was the result of a timing and accounting classification error, not a duplicate underlying expenditure, and confirmed that all expenditures were valid, properly incurred, and consistent with authorized bond purposes. Notably, the issue was not identified through external audit or oversight, but through OPSO’s own internal control processes — demonstrating that those controls are functioning effectively.

Upon identification of the issue, OPSO immediately corrected the accounting entries, reconciled the affected transactions across funding sources, transferred funds back to the appropriate bond account where applicable, and maintained supporting documentation evidencing each step of the correction. This process was timely, transparent, and fully documented. The corrective action contemplated by this recommendation has already been completed in full prior to the issuance of the audit finding.

OPSO has already compiled and provided documentation demonstrating the nature of the accounting error, the reconciliation process undertaken, the corrective entries made, and the return of funds to the bond account. This documentation clearly establishes that the issue was administrative in nature, that it was identified and resolved through standard internal procedures, and that there is no outstanding deficiency requiring additional corrective action.

OPSO affirms that all bond proceeds were used exclusively for their intended and authorized purposes. There were no improper expenditures, duplicate vendor payments, or fund diversion. The issue identified was strictly an accounting duplication in reimbursement tracking — not a financial misuse of any kind. The underlying transactions were appropriate, allowable, and necessary to support the operation and protection of the Orleans Justice Center.

OPSO respectfully asserts that Recommendation 3 is duplicative in two respects and no longer applicable. First, it duplicates OPSO’s existing processes, which already include monthly bond reconciliations, internal review and verification procedures, and ongoing financial oversight. Second, it is duplicative of Recommendation 2, as both address the same underlying issue: the identification and correction of duplicate reimbursements. Third, and most importantly, the corrective action has already been completed, verified, and documented in full. Therefore, the recommendation does not reflect a current or ongoing deficiency.

The sequence of events described above demonstrates that OPSO’s internal control framework is effective in detecting discrepancies, responsive in correcting errors, and reliable in maintaining financial accuracy. Rather than indicating a control deficiency, this situation reflects a functioning control environment that identified and resolved an issue without external intervention — precisely the outcome a well-designed internal control system is intended to produce.

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 3 because the issue identified was internally detected, promptly corrected, and fully documented, with funds returned to the appropriate bond account where applicable. There have been no instances of bond funds being used for unintended purposes, and the recommendation is duplicative of both existing OPSO processes and Recommendation 2, rendering it no longer applicable to current operations. Accordingly, OPSO maintains that its current reconciliation and internal control processes are sufficient, effective, and aligned with sound governmental financial practices, and that no further corrective action is required.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 4:

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 4. The recommendation presumes that OPSO maintains discretionary expenditures that can be reduced without impacting core operations. This assumption is not supported by the operational, legal, and financial realities under which OPSO currently operates. As set forth below, the expenditures characterized as discretionary are in fact essential to maintaining public safety, operational stability, and compliance with federal mandates. Any reduction in these expenditures would not produce meaningful efficiencies — it would create material legal, operational, and public safety risk.

OPSO asserts that the expenditures identified as “discretionary” are, in fact, essential to maintaining public safety, operational stability, and compliance with federal mandates. Current expenditures support staffing and workforce stabilization, inmate security and supervision, training and compliance requirements, employee engagement and retention initiatives, and community-facing public safety functions. These represent core operational functions, not

discretionary enhancements, and cannot be reduced without direct and foreseeable harm to OPSO's ability to fulfill its legal obligations.

OPSO operates under a federal consent judgment that requires adequate staffing levels, ongoing training and supervision, safe and secure facility conditions, and continuous compliance monitoring. These are not aspirational standards — they are legally binding obligations. Failure to maintain these standards exposes OPSO to federal enforcement actions, significant legal liability, and increased risk to staff, inmates, and the public. Any spending reductions in these areas would directly conflict with OPSO's federally mandated obligations and create unacceptable legal, operational, and public safety risk.

OPSO continues to operate in a structurally constrained funding environment characterized by chronic underfunding relative to operational demands and the absence of any standardized or formula-based funding model tied to inmate population or required service levels. Operational costs have continued to increase, driven by overcrowding, staffing shortages, and infrastructure deficiencies, yet OPSO has not received commensurate funding increases to support these expanding demands. The fundamental issue is not excessive discretionary spending, but rather insufficient and structurally misaligned funding relative to OPSO's mandated responsibilities.

Due to significant funding limitations and the need to prioritize immediate jail operations, OPSO has already been forced to redirect resources away from workforce development and defer or reduce training opportunities. As a result, OPSO staff are often limited to just trainings and programs deemed critical to safety, compliance, and professional development while all other development and learning opportunities are left as prospective plans. Any further reduction of resources would exacerbate this training deficit and directly undermine OPSO's ability to maintain safe, compliant, and constitutionally adequate operations.

OPSO strongly asserts that staff engagement initiatives, team meetings and operational coordination, employee bonding and retention efforts, and community engagement activities are not discretionary expenditures, but rather critical components of a functioning correctional system. These activities improve staff morale and retention, reduce turnover and vacancy rates, strengthen communication and operational coordination, and enhance public trust and community safety outcomes. Given that OPSO is currently experiencing significant staffing shortages, high operational stress, and elevated safety risks, reducing these efforts would increase turnover, worsen staffing instability, and compromise safety and operational effectiveness at precisely the time when stability is most critical.

OPSO continues to operate under conditions of overcrowding that exceed the intended facility capacity, increased demands on staff supervision and services, and heightened safety and security risks throughout the Orleans Justice Center. These conditions require increased staffing presence, ongoing coordination and communication, and continuous operational support. Any reduction in expenditures deemed "discretionary" would directly impair OPSO's ability to safely and lawfully manage the inmate population under these conditions.

Implementing the recommendation to reduce spending would further limit training and workforce development, reduce staff engagement and retention efforts, increase operational

strain on existing personnel, heighten safety risks within the facility, and undermine compliance with federal mandates. Such reductions would not yield meaningful efficiencies, but would instead increase operational, legal, and public safety risks at a time when OPSO can least afford them.

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 4 because the expenditures identified as discretionary are essential to operations, safety, and compliance. OPSO is currently operating under significant underfunding and without a formula-based funding model, and funding constraints have already resulted in reduced training opportunities and elevated operational strain. Further reductions would compromise public safety, undermine staff stability, and increase legal and compliance risk. OPSO remains committed to responsible financial management; however, any assessment of expenditures must recognize that the issue is not discretionary spending, but rather insufficient funding to meet legally mandated and operationally necessary responsibilities.

OPSO Response to Finding 2 and Recommendation 5:

OPSO respectfully acknowledges the importance of maintaining formalized policies and procedures governing procurement, contracting, and financial operations. OPSO agrees with the intent of Recommendation 5 and has already taken steps to establish and implement updated policies. However, OPSO respectfully asserts that the conclusions outlined in Finding 2 do not fully account for the legal, operational, and emergency conditions under which procurement and financial decisions were made.

OPSO has developed and implemented a procurement policy framework that aligns with the Louisiana Public Bid Law, standard governmental procurement practices, and internal control and accountability requirements. At the time of review, policies were operationally in use, while additional refinements, formal adoption, and agency-wide training were in progress. Supporting forms, documentation procedures, and workflows were simultaneously being standardized and integrated across the agency. The central issue, therefore, is not the absence of policy, but rather the timing of formal adoption and full implementation across the agency — particularly in the aftermath of significant operational disruptions.

OPSO emphasizes that, as acknowledged during the audit process, the agency issued emergency orders in response to critical life-safety conditions and acted within the authority granted by Louisiana law governing emergency procurement. Those emergency conditions included failing locks and security infrastructure, immediate threats to inmate and staff safety, and facility deficiencies requiring urgent correction. Under La. R.S. 38:2212, procurement requirements may be waived in emergency situations where delay would threaten public safety, compromise property or operations, or create unacceptable risk. Accordingly, OPSO's procurement actions during these periods were legally authorized, necessary, and appropriate given the emergency conditions that existed at the time.

OPSO operates under a federal consent judgment that imposes legally binding obligations to maintain safe and secure detention conditions, adequate infrastructure, and functioning security systems, and to immediately remediate identified deficiencies. These mandates are enforceable under federal law and carry court oversight, compliance deadlines, and potential

sanctions for non-compliance. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal requirements override conflicting state procedural requirements where compliance is necessary. Accordingly, in circumstances where adherence to standard procurement timelines would delay critical life-safety repairs or compliance actions, OPSO is legally obligated to prioritize federal mandates and constitutional requirements over procedural procurement timelines.

In multiple instances, OPSO was required to act immediately to correct safety deficiencies, without the ability to delay for formal bid processes or extended procurement timelines. These decisions were driven by active security risks, federal compliance expectations, and the need to prevent harm to inmates, staff, and the public. Procurement decisions were not made in disregard of state law, but rather in response to time-sensitive, high-risk conditions where delay was not a viable option.

OPSO acknowledges that its financial systems are not fully integrated and that reporting capabilities have been impacted by legacy infrastructure, cyber-related disruptions, and ongoing system rebuild efforts. These conditions have contributed to administrative inefficiencies, delays in documentation and reporting, and challenges in producing consolidated financial data. OPSO is actively implementing integrated financial systems, improving reporting capabilities, and strengthening data accuracy and accessibility.

OPSO recognizes the importance of compliance with the Local Budget Act and the timely payment of obligations. However, it is important to consider OPSO's reliance on City-controlled funding streams, the variability in timing and sufficiency of funding receipts, and the cash flow constraints that impact payment cycles. Payment delays, where they occurred, were not the result of mismanagement but rather of structural funding limitations, system constraints, and the operational prioritization of critical services.

OPSO agrees with the recommendation and affirms that procurement and financial policies have already been developed and are in use. Formal adoption, refinement, and agency-wide implementation are actively underway, and training and integration efforts are being expanded to ensure consistency across all divisions. OPSO respectfully submits that procurement actions taken during the review period were authorized under emergency conditions and driven by life-safety and federal compliance requirements. Federal mandates and constitutional obligations required immediate action, at times superseding standard procurement timelines. OPSO has already developed procurement and financial policies, initiated implementation and training, and begun strengthening its systems and controls. Accordingly, while OPSO agrees with the importance of formalizing and strengthening policies, it does not agree with the characterization that its actions constitute improper or unlawful procurement practices. Those actions were taken in good faith, under lawful emergency authority, and in compliance with overriding federal mandates to protect life, safety, and constitutional rights.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 6:

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 6 as presented. While OPSO recognizes the importance of complying with the Louisiana Public Bid Law under normal operating conditions, the recommendation does not adequately account for the legal authority,

operational urgency, and federal mandates that govern procurement decisions within a correctional environment.

OPSO operates under a federal consent judgment that imposes immediate and ongoing obligations to ensure safe and secure conditions of confinement, protect inmates and staff from harm, and timely correct identified deficiencies. These obligations are not discretionary and often require immediate action to prevent self-harm or suicide risks, security breaches, and unsafe living conditions. In circumstances where a delay in procurement would compromise life safety or violate federal mandates, OPSO is legally obligated to act immediately, even where standard procurement timelines cannot be met.

A key example involves the procurement of tamper-resistant mattresses, which are essential in a correctional setting to prevent self-harm and suicide attempts, eliminate the ability to manipulate or weaponize materials, and meet standards associated with safe detention practices. These mattresses are specialized, correctional-grade equipment, often available only from limited- or sole-source manufacturers and must be deployed immediately upon identification of risk. Delays associated with traditional public bid processes would extend exposure to known safety risks, potentially result in injury or loss of life, and place OPSO in violation of federal consent decree requirements. The procurement of tamper-resistant mattresses is therefore not discretionary and not suitable for delayed competitive bidding — it constitutes a time-sensitive life-safety necessity.

OPSO has, as acknowledged during the audit process, issued emergency orders in response to failing security infrastructure, immediate threats to inmate and staff safety, and conditions requiring urgent remediation. Under Louisiana Revised Statute 38:2212, public bid law requirements may be waived in emergency situations where delay would threaten public safety, compromise property or operations, or create an imminent risk to life. OPSO's actions fall squarely within this statutory exception.

Public Bid Law is designed for planned, non-urgent capital projects and procurement timelines that allow for advertisement, competitive bidding, evaluation, and award. However, correctional operations frequently require immediate procurement decisions, rapid response to evolving safety conditions, and real-time correction of deficiencies identified through inspections or federal monitoring. The Public Bid Law's timing requirements are therefore not always compatible with the immediate operational demands of a correctional facility under federal oversight.

Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal mandates override conflicting state procedural requirements when necessary to ensure compliance. OPSO's obligations under the federal consent judgment require immediate corrective action when deficiencies are identified and continuous maintenance of safe and humane conditions. Where compliance with Public Bid Law would delay necessary action, OPSO must prioritize federal constitutional obligations over procedural procurement requirements.

OPSO's procurement decisions during the audit period were driven by the need to protect human life, the obligation to maintain secure operations, and the requirement to comply with

federal mandates. These actions were taken in good faith, legally authorized under emergency provisions, and necessary to safeguard staff, inmates, and the public.

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 6 because Public Bid Law requirements, while important, cannot supersede immediate life-safety needs and federal mandates. OPSO lawfully invoked emergency procurement authority where required, and the procurement of items such as tamper-resistant mattresses represents a critical life-safety function, not a discretionary purchase. Furthermore, the timing requirements of competitive bidding are not always compatible with the operational realities of a correctional facility under federal oversight. Accordingly, OPSO maintains that its procurement actions were legally justified, operationally necessary, and consistent with its duty to protect life and ensure constitutional compliance.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 7:

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 7. While OPSO recognizes the general value of obtaining multiple quotes to promote cost efficiency and transparency, the recommendation does not adequately account for the operational realities, constitutional obligations, and safety requirements inherent in managing a correctional facility under federal oversight.

OPSO operates under a federal consent judgment that requires the agency to maintain safe and humane conditions of confinement, provide immediate response to identified deficiencies, and protect inmates from harm, including self-harm and unsafe living conditions. These requirements are legally binding and time-sensitive, often necessitating immediate procurement decisions. In situations where delay would result in unsafe or unconstitutional conditions, OPSO must act promptly and cannot be constrained by procedural requirements that would delay corrective action.

A primary example involves the procurement of inmate mattresses. OPSO is required to ensure that every inmate has access to a mattress, that conditions do not rise to the level of cruel or unusual punishment, and that housing conditions meet basic constitutional standards. It is unconstitutional and unacceptable for an inmate to be required to sleep on the floor of a jail cell without a mattress.

OPSO has experienced significant issues with mattresses procured through traditional or state contract channels. Such mattresses are easily manipulated, are not tamper-resistant, and have been used by inmates as contraband or weapons. These conditions have resulted in increased safety risks, damage to facility infrastructure, and thousands of dollars in recurring replacement costs. While state contract mattresses may appear less expensive initially, they are not suitable for correctional use, and their repeated destruction results in higher long-term costs and operational inefficiency.

To meet both safety and compliance requirements, OPSO must procure tamper-resistant, correctional-grade mattresses — products designed to prevent the concealment of contraband, reduce self-harm risks, and withstand continuous use in a detention environment. These products are often available from limited or specialized vendors, are not easily subject to standard multi-quote procurement processes and must be deployed immediately upon identification of need.

The requirement to obtain three written quotes is not always feasible when immediate action is required to replace damaged or unsafe mattresses and maintain constitutional housing conditions, or when only a limited number of vendors provide specialized correctional equipment. Delays in these circumstances would result in inmates being housed without required bedding and in increased safety and liability risks. Strict adherence to a multi-quote requirement in these circumstances would delay critical procurement and expose OPSO to constitutional violations and operational risk.

OPSO's procurement decisions consider the durability and lifecycle cost of materials, as well as their impact on safety, security, and long-term maintenance costs. In many cases, lower-cost options — such as state-contract mattresses — lead to frequent replacements, higher long-term costs, and increased safety risks. Accordingly, OPSO prioritizes cost-effective solutions over time, not merely the lowest initial purchase price.

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 7 because it is not always feasible or appropriate to obtain multiple quotes in time-sensitive, high-risk correctional environments. The procurement of essential items such as mattresses is a constitutional requirement, not a discretionary purchase, and is often urgent and immediate in nature. Standard procurement options may be unsuitable for correctional use, leading to increased long-term costs and elevated safety risks. Furthermore, a rigid requirement to obtain multiple quotes may delay necessary action and expose OPSO to legal and operational liability. Accordingly, OPSO maintains that procurement decisions must remain flexible and responsive to operational needs, particularly where they involve life-safety considerations, constitutional obligations, and the secure operation of the jail.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 8:

OPSO agrees with Recommendation 8 and acknowledges the importance of ensuring that all public works contracts are properly documented and that required bonds are obtained in accordance with Louisiana law. OPSO recognizes that formal contract execution and bonding requirements are essential to protect public funds, mitigate financial and operational risk, ensure vendor accountability, and maintain compliance with statutory requirements. While OPSO maintains that many procurement actions during the audit period were driven by emergency and life-safety conditions, the agency agrees that formal documentation and bonding processes should be consistently applied where feasible and strengthened to ensure full compliance moving forward.

OPSO acknowledges that in certain instances, contract documentation may not have been fully formalized prior to work commencing, and bonding documentation may not have been consistently obtained or centrally tracked. These conditions were influenced by emergency procurement situations requiring immediate action, operational urgency related to facility safety and infrastructure failures, and legacy process limitations stemming from the lack of a centralized contract management system. OPSO takes these findings seriously and has already initiated corrective actions to address these gaps.

OPSO has implemented and continues to implement the following corrective measures to ensure compliance with contract and bonding requirements.

1. Standardized Contract Execution Process

OPSO has established a requirement that all public works contracts exceeding \$5,000 must be reduced to writing prior to execution, except in documented emergency situations. All contracts must include a defined scope of work, compensation terms, timeline and deliverables, and applicable compliance requirements. A standardized contract template is being utilized to ensure consistency and completeness across all divisions.

2. Bonding Requirements

OPSO has updated its policies and procedures to ensure that performance and payment bonds are obtained for all public works contracts exceeding \$50,000, as required by state law. Bond documentation is verified prior to contract execution, maintained in centralized records, and reviewed as part of contract approval workflows.

3. Centralized Contract Tracking System

To strengthen oversight, OPSO is developing and implementing a centralized contract management and tracking system. This system will maintain a repository of executed contracts, bond documentation, and vendor compliance records, enabling improved visibility, enhanced accountability, and easier audit verification.

4. Procurement and Finance Review Controls

OPSO has enhanced its internal review processes to require procurement and/or legal review prior to contract execution, and to verify that contract thresholds are properly assessed, required documentation is complete, and all applicable bonding requirements are satisfied.

5. Staff Training and Policy Implementation

OPSO is conducting training for relevant staff to ensure a thorough understanding of contract thresholds, bonding requirements, and documentation standards, as well as the consistent application of procurement policies across all divisions.

6. Emergency Procurement Documentation Protocol

Recognizing the operational realities of emergency conditions, OPSO has established procedures to ensure that emergency procurements are properly documented and justified, and that contracts and bonding requirements are formalized as soon as practicable following emergency action.

OPSO will continue to perform periodic internal reviews of contract compliance, monitor adherence to bonding requirements, and update policies and procedures as needed to align with best practices and applicable legal requirements. OPSO agrees with Recommendation 8 and has taken immediate and proactive steps to strengthen its contract and bonding processes. The agency is committed to ensuring all public works contracts are properly documented, verifying that required bonds are obtained and maintained, enhancing internal controls and oversight

mechanisms, and maintaining compliance with Louisiana law while balancing operational and emergency demands. These corrective actions demonstrate OPSO's commitment to continuous improvement and financial accountability.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 9:

OPSO agrees with Recommendation 9 and acknowledges the importance of implementing an integrated financial management system capable of supporting comprehensive reporting, reconciliation, and operational efficiency. OPSO further emphasizes that the agency has already taken proactive, measurable steps to address this need; however, certain external factors and operational considerations have impacted the timing of full implementation.

OPSO initiated the process to procure a modern, integrated financial system by issuing a formal Request for Proposals (RFP) for financial management and related services, conducting a pre-proposal meeting with interested vendors, and identifying system requirements to address financial reporting limitations, operational inefficiencies, and integration gaps across departments. This demonstrates that OPSO had already recognized the deficiency and taken formal procurement action to resolve it. After issuing the RFP, OPSO decided to cancel the procurement process. This decision was based on a transition in administration following the Sheriff's election outcome and, on the need, to ensure that the incoming administration had the opportunity to evaluate and align on long-term system investments without making significant financial commitments during a leadership transition. The cancellation of the RFP was not due to inaction but rather a prudent business decision to ensure fiscal responsibility, governance alignment, and the long-term success of the investment.

OPSO's current financial system, while functional in certain respects, has significant limitations. The system can produce balance sheets, income statements, and trial balances to support basic financial operations and reporting requirements. However, the system is outdated and not designed to handle current data volumes and operational demands. It is unable to consistently generate full general ledger reports or detailed reconciliation reports, and when comprehensive general ledger reports are attempted, the system crashes due to data volume and processing limitations. Beyond financial reporting, OPSO's current system lacks integration with critical operational functions, including warehouse inventory management, maintenance and work order tracking systems, facilities management systems, and other operational support functions necessary for jail operations. This results in fragmented systems, reliance on manual processes, and an increased risk of inefficiencies and errors.

OPSO also engaged with the City of New Orleans to evaluate the BRASS system as a potential solution. Through this evaluation, OPSO determined that the system does not have the capability to support the Sheriff's Office's full operational needs, as it lacks functionality to manage complex jail operations, inventory systems, maintenance workflows, and integrated financial and operational reporting. While BRASS may support certain municipal functions, it is not suitable for the scale and complexity of OPSO operations.

OPSO remains fully committed to procuring and implementing a modern, integrated financial and operational system capable of generating complete general ledger and reconciliation reports, supporting vendor payment tracking, integrating with budgeting processes,

and providing operational functionality across key departments. The agency intends to reinstate procurement efforts under the appropriate administrative leadership and to ensure that system selection aligns with long-term operational needs, financial sustainability, and full agency integration.

OPSO agrees with Recommendation 9 and affirms that the agency has already taken substantial steps toward addressing system deficiencies, including issuing an RFP. The decision to cancel the RFP was a responsible and strategic action during a leadership transition, not a failure to act. The current system provides limited functionality and cannot support the full operational and reporting needs of OPSO. Alternative systems, including the City's BRASS platform, were evaluated and found insufficient to meet OPSO's operational complexity. Accordingly, OPSO will continue to pursue the implementation of an integrated system that supports financial reporting, operational efficiency, accountability, the responsible stewardship of public resources, and the overall mission of maintaining a safe and secure correctional facility.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 10:

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 10 as presented. While OPSO acknowledges the importance of effective contract management and oversight, this recommendation is duplicative of Recommendation 9 and does not reflect the broader, integrated solution already identified and in progress by the agency.

Recommendation 10 calls for the creation or procurement of a contract management system and the assignment of contract oversight responsibilities. However, OPSO notes that Recommendation 9 already addresses the procurement of a comprehensive, integrated financial system, which inherently includes contract management functionality, vendor tracking, payment monitoring, and budget integration. A standalone contract management system would therefore be redundant and inefficient, as modern integrated financial systems are designed to incorporate contract lifecycle management as a core component.

OPSO has already taken steps to procure a fully integrated financial and operational system to address financial reporting deficiencies, vendor payment tracking, budget integration, and contract management and oversight. This approach ensures that contract data is fully integrated with financial and operational systems, that duplication is avoided, and that data integrity and reporting capabilities are enhanced. The actions taken under Recommendation 9 will therefore provide a permanent, comprehensive solution that fully addresses the intent of Recommendation 10. While OPSO acknowledges that contract management processes can be strengthened, the agency currently maintains department-level oversight of contracts, procurement and finance review processes, and documentation of contractual agreements. Additionally, OPSO has already initiated improvements to centralize contract tracking, standardize documentation, and enhance oversight and accountability.

Implementing a separate contract management system, as suggested, would create unnecessary duplication of effort and cost, require additional resources for implementation and maintenance, and risk data fragmentation across multiple systems. In contrast, OPSO's approach to implementing a single, integrated system ensures efficiency, reduces long-term costs,

improves data accuracy and reporting, and aligns with best practices in governmental financial management. Best practices in public sector financial management support integrated enterprise systems rather than siloed solutions, centralized data management, and streamlined workflows across procurement, finance, and operations. OPSO's current direction aligns with these principles and represents a more effective and sustainable solution than a standalone contract management system.

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 10 because it is duplicative of Recommendation 9; the procurement of an integrated financial system will inherently address contract management needs, and implementing a separate system would be redundant, inefficient, and not cost-effective. OPSO has already taken steps to improve contract oversight and is committed to further strengthening these processes through a comprehensive system solution. Accordingly, OPSO maintains that the actions already underway will provide a permanent, integrated, and efficient resolution to the concerns raised, without the need for a separate contract management system.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 11:

OPSO agrees with Recommendation 11 and recognizes the importance of ensuring that vendor invoices and credit card obligations are paid in a timely manner to avoid unnecessary late fees, interest, and finance charges. OPSO is committed to strengthening its financial processes to improve payment timeliness and overall operational efficiency. OPSO has already taken proactive steps to address this matter by implementing enhanced internal processes designed to streamline invoice processing and approval workflows. These steps include establishing centralized invoice intake and tracking procedures, implementing clear approval timelines and accountability measures, and improving coordination between procurement, finance, and departmental leadership. OPSO has also enhanced oversight to ensure invoices are reviewed promptly and payments are processed in a timely, efficient manner. These improvements are intended to reduce processing delays, increase transparency, and strengthen internal accountability.

While OPSO agrees with the recommendation and has taken corrective action, it is important to note that timely payment of obligations is not always fully within OPSO's control. Under Louisiana law, the City of New Orleans is responsible for providing the primary funding for jail operations, while OPSO manages those operations. This structure creates a dependency in which OPSO relies on the timing and consistency of funding disbursements from the City and has limited ability to control cash flow timing or the availability of funds at specific points in the fiscal cycle. As a result, delays in funding from the City may directly impact OPSO's ability to make payments within standard timeframes, meaning the agency is, at times, operating at the mercy of external funding cycles despite having established internal controls and processes.

Despite these constraints, OPSO continues to make every effort to prioritize critical vendor payments, manage cash flow responsibly within available resources, communicate with vendors regarding payment timing when delays occur, and minimize the occurrence of late fees and associated costs. OPSO remains committed to further refining its invoice processing and payment systems, enhancing financial planning and cash flow management, and working collaboratively with the City of New Orleans to improve funding predictability and consistency.

OPSO agrees with Recommendation 11 and has already implemented measures to improve the timeliness of vendor payments and invoice processing. However, OPSO respectfully emphasizes that payment timing is partially dependent on the consistency and timing of funding from the City of New Orleans, and that certain delays result from structural funding constraints rather than internal process deficiencies. Accordingly, OPSO will continue to strengthen its internal processes while recognizing that full compliance with the recommendation is influenced by external factors beyond its direct control.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 12:

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 12 as presented. OPSO maintains that its use of petty cash is already aligned with legitimate public purposes, and that the recommendation does not fully recognize the operational role that certain expenditures play in maintaining a safe, effective, and compliant correctional environment.

OPSO affirms that petty cash expenditures support official agency functions and operational needs, including employee engagement and morale initiatives, graduation ceremonies and recognition events for staff, the purchase of minor maintenance supplies and operational materials, and immediate, low-dollar operational needs that cannot be delayed through standard procurement processes. These expenditures are directly connected to workforce stability, operational continuity, and organizational effectiveness. These uses are not personal in nature but rather serve a legitimate governmental purpose related to the agency's operations.

OPSO operates in a high-risk, high-stress correctional environment characterized by staffing shortages, elevated safety risks, and high employee turnover. Employee engagement activities — including ceremonies, recognition events, and structured gatherings — are essential to improve retention and reduce turnover, strengthen communication and coordination among staff, reinforce policies, expectations, and compliance requirements, and maintain morale in a demanding operational environment. Employee engagement is directly tied to public safety outcomes, as stable and well-informed staff are essential to maintaining secure jail operations.

OPSO recognizes the need for accountability in the use of public funds; however, expenditures such as employee recognition events, graduation ceremonies, and end-of-year or holiday gatherings are permissible when they serve a clear governmental purpose, support workforce readiness and retention, and provide structured opportunities for agency-wide communication, leadership engagement, and operational alignment. For example, holiday or end-of-year events provide an opportunity for leadership, including the Sheriff, to communicate agency priorities, provide updates on policy, operations, and expectations, and align staff on strategic direction for the upcoming year. These events are not solely social in nature but are structured organizational functions that support agency operations and public safety objectives.

Petty cash serves an important operational function by allowing OPSO to address immediate, low-dollar needs without delay and to procure minor supplies necessary for routine maintenance, facility operations, and daily functionality. In a correctional setting, delays in addressing even small but critical needs can disrupt operations, create safety concerns, and

increase long-term costs. Petty cash, therefore, provides the operational flexibility necessary for efficient and responsive facility management. OPSO maintains oversight over petty cash usage through internal review and approval processes, documentation of expenditures, and monitoring of petty cash balances and transactions. While OPSO is open to strengthening documentation and standardization where appropriate, the agency maintains that its current use of petty cash is controlled, purpose-driven, and aligned with operational needs.

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 12 because petty cash expenditures are already used for legitimate public purposes, and employee engagement, recognition, and communication activities are operationally necessary and directly tied to public safety and workforce stability. The use of public funds for structured employee events, including holiday gatherings, is appropriate when used to facilitate communication, reinforce organizational objectives, and support retention and morale. Accordingly, OPSO maintains that its current use of petty cash is consistent with governmental purpose requirements and supports the agency's effective and safe operation.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 13:

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 13 and the implication within Finding 3 that overtime reliance reflects inefficiency or avoidable staffing practices. OPSO asserts that the current use of overtime is a necessary, legally driven, and operationally unavoidable response to significant staffing shortages, funding limitations, and increasing inmate population demands. The circumstances giving rise to overtime expenditures are not the product of poor management or discretionary excess, but rather the direct consequence of structural deficiencies that cannot be resolved solely through internal adjustments. Each of the following sections addresses a distinct dimension of this position in detail.

While the report notes that payroll costs increased by 55.1%, it is critical to evaluate this increase within its proper operational context rather than in isolation. That context includes three interconnected realities: minimal staffing growth, a 46.6% increase in the inmate population, and federal requirements governing supervision and safety that OPSO is legally obligated to satisfy. When these factors are considered together, the data clearly demonstrate that staffing increases have not kept pace with inmate population growth, and that OPSO is operating with insufficient personnel relative to its operational demands. Overtime is therefore not a discretionary expense or a byproduct of poor planning. It is a necessary mechanism employed to fill a structural staffing gap — one that exists not because of how OPSO manages its workforce, but because the resources available to the agency are fundamentally misaligned with the scope of its obligations.

OPSO continues to face significant and persistent challenges in recruiting and retaining qualified personnel. These challenges stem from a combination of factors that place the agency at a structural disadvantage in the labor market. Chief among them is the fact that OPSO's wages are non-competitive and do not meet a living wage standard, making it exceedingly difficult to attract candidates who might otherwise choose to pursue careers in public safety. Instead, prospective employees are drawn away by other law enforcement agencies and private-sector employers, both of which can offer more attractive compensation packages and, in many cases, more favorable working conditions. The nature of correctional work further limits the pool of

willing applicants, as the high-stress environment of jail operations deters many potential recruits who might otherwise consider employment with the agency.

As a direct result of these compounding pressures, OPSO is unable to attract and retain the best possible talent. Vacancy rates remain persistently high, and the staff who do remain are routinely required to work overtime in order to maintain the minimum staffing levels necessary for safe and lawful operations. Without competitive compensation, OPSO cannot reduce its reliance on overtime solely through hiring. The agency is caught in a cycle where insufficient wages lead to vacancies, vacancies necessitate overtime, and overtime costs consume resources that might otherwise be directed toward improving compensation. This cycle cannot be broken without external intervention in the form of increased and sustained funding. The competition OPSO faces from neighboring law enforcement agencies and the private sector, combined with the high-stress working conditions inherent to correctional operations, means existing staff are continually required to work overtime simply to maintain the minimum staffing levels the law demands. Without a fundamental change in how the agency is compensated and funded, this dynamic will persist indefinitely.

- The high-stress working conditions associated with correctional operations compound these challenges further, as they deter potential recruits and accelerate burnout among existing employees. As a direct consequence, existing staff are routinely required to work overtime simply to maintain the minimum staffing levels required for safe and lawful operations.

OPSO operates under a federal consent judgment that imposes specific, non-negotiable obligations on the agency regarding conditions of confinement and the management of its facilities. These obligations include maintaining adequate staffing ratios, continuously supervising inmates, and maintaining safe and secure conditions throughout the facility. These are not aspirational standards or internal benchmarks — they are legally enforceable requirements that OPSO must comply with regardless of the staffing and funding challenges it faces.

The consequences of failing to meet these federal mandates are severe and far-reaching. Non-compliance would expose OPSO to direct federal intervention, including the potential appointment of a federal receiver or the imposition of other court-ordered remedies. It would also generate significant legal liability for the agency and, most critically, would create an immediate and heightened risk of harm to both inmates and staff. Given these stakes, overtime is not merely a convenient operational tool — it is the only available mechanism through which OPSO can ensure continued compliance with its federal obligations when sufficient permanent personnel are not available to fill required posts.

In a correctional environment, the consequences of insufficient staffing are immediate, tangible, and potentially catastrophic. When posts go unfilled and housing units lack adequate supervision, the risk of serious incidents increases dramatically. Specifically, understaffing creates conditions conducive to inmate-on-inmate violence, exposes staff to a heightened risk of inmate-on-staff incidents, compromises the agency's ability to properly supervise housing units

at all times, and significantly delays the response to emergencies that require swift intervention to prevent injury or death.

Reducing overtime without a corresponding and substantial increase in permanent staffing levels would not produce savings — it would produce danger. Such a reduction would directly compromise the safety of the facility, increase the likelihood and severity of violent incidents — including inmate-on-inmate and inmate-on-staff incidents — and ultimately undermine both public safety and institutional security. The human and legal costs associated with those outcomes would far exceed any financial savings achieved through reduced overtime expenditure. OPSO therefore maintains that the current level of overtime utilization is not excessive — it is the minimum necessary to preserve a safe and lawful operating environment.

Recommendation 13 suggests that OPSO identify methods to reduce its reliance on overtime. While OPSO appreciates the intent behind this recommendation, the agency must respectfully assert that it is not operationally feasible under current conditions. OPSO has already conducted a thorough evaluation of its staffing levels and resource allocation, and the conclusion of that analysis is unambiguous: there are no viable alternatives to overtime given the combination of staffing shortages, funding limitations, and federal compliance requirements that define the agency's operating environment. The recommendation does not account for the practical limitations and constraints under which OPSO operates, nor does it propose any mechanism to alleviate them. In the absence of such a mechanism, the recommendation cannot be meaningfully implemented without creating risks that are far more serious than the financial concerns it seeks to address. Two points:

- It is essential that the fundamental issue at the center of this discussion be correctly identified. The primary issue is not overtime utilization — it is the chronic and structural underfunding that has prevented OPSO from building and sustaining an adequately staffed workforce. Specifically, OPSO lacks sufficient funding to support staffing levels required by its operational obligations, and it lacks a sustainable staffing model aligned with the growth of its inmate population. These are systemic failures originating outside the agency and cannot be corrected through internal adjustments to scheduling or overtime management practices.
- Without increased funding and without the implementation of competitive compensation structures, OPSO is simply unable to hire sufficient staff or to reduce overtime usage in any meaningful or lasting way. Any recommendation that focuses on overtime as the problem, rather than as a symptom of the underlying problem, mischaracterizes the situation and directs attention away from the structural reforms that are actually needed. OPSO urges that the conversation be reoriented toward the root cause: the gap between the resources provided to the agency and the obligations placed upon it. The absence of a sustainable staffing model that is properly aligned with the agency's compensation structures and inmate population growth is a systemic failure that demands systemic remedies, not internal administrative adjustments.

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 13 for both practical and principled reasons. Overtime is a necessary and unavoidable response to the staffing shortages that

currently define OPSO's operational reality. The agency does not currently offer a competitive or living wage, which severely limits its capacity to recruit and retain qualified personnel through conventional hiring. Federal mandates imposed through the consent judgment require minimum staffing levels that must be met regardless of the agency's staffing shortfalls, leaving overtime as the only lawful and available means of meeting those requirements. Any reduction in overtime, if undertaken without a corresponding increase in permanent staffing, would create immediate life-safety risks, compromise facility security, and negatively impact public safety in ways that would be far more costly — in human and financial terms — than the overtime expenditures the recommendation seeks to reduce.

Accordingly, OPSO maintains that the appropriate solution is not reducing overtime, but rather increasing and sustaining funding, paired with competitive compensation structures, to allow the agency to attract, hire, and retain the personnel necessary to meet its obligations. Overtime is not the problem — it is the solution to a problem that requires a fundamentally different remedy than the one proposed. Reducing overtime without a commensurate increase in permanent staffing would not generate savings — it would generate danger, leaving posts unfilled, supervision compromised, and the agency exposed to the very incidents its federal obligations are designed to prevent.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 14:

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 14 as presented. While OPSO continuously monitors overtime usage and remains committed to responsible financial management, the recommendation is duplicative of Recommendation 13 and does not adequately consider the operational, legal, and structural constraints under which OPSO operates. The information that follows will explain in detail why this recommendation, as written, neither reflects OPSO's current practices nor offers a feasible path toward the outcome it envisions.

Recommendation 14 reiterates the same premise as Recommendation 13 — specifically, the goal of reducing reliance on overtime — without addressing the underlying causes previously identified or offering a new analytical framework or proposed remedy. Recommendation 13 calls for identifying methods to reduce overtime, while Recommendation 14 calls for monitoring and minimizing overtime. Although the language differs slightly, both recommendations address the same fundamental issue and rest on the same foundational assumption: that overtime can be reduced through internal adjustments and improved oversight. That assumption is incorrect, and it is incorrect for the same reasons articulated in response to Recommendation 13. OPSO has already evaluated its staffing levels and has determined that there are no viable alternatives to overtime under current conditions. Issuing a second recommendation that repeats the same premise without engaging with the substantive constraints OPSO has identified does not advance the analysis — it simply restates a conclusion that the available evidence does not support.

OPSO has consistently monitored overtime usage. The agency tracks overtime expenditures, reviews staffing allocations on an ongoing basis, and has implemented internal controls to ensure that overtime is authorized and utilized only when operationally necessary. These oversight mechanisms are not new — they are embedded in OPSO's existing administrative processes and represent a standard component of how the agency manages its workforce. The issue, therefore, is emphatically not one of monitoring. The issue is capacity.

Overtime at OPSO is driven by three structural realities that no amount of monitoring can resolve: insufficient staffing levels, a continuously increasing inmate population, and federal requirements for supervision and safety that must be met at all times. Monitoring can identify where overtime is being used, but it cannot create the staff needed to eliminate the need for it. OPSO has already implemented the controls that Recommendation 14 implicitly suggests are lacking, and those controls have confirmed what the agency already knew — that overtime is not a product of mismanagement, but of a fundamental mismatch between the agency’s resources and its responsibilities.

A critical and frequently overlooked dimension of OPSO’s staffing challenges is the agency’s lack of unilateral authority over its own compensation structure. OPSO does not have the ability to independently set compensation levels or adjust pay structures to make its positions more attractive to prospective employees. These decisions are not within the agency’s control. Compensation is determined by ordinances issued by the New Orleans City Council, meaning that any meaningful change to OPSO’s wage structure requires external legislative action that the agency itself cannot compel. The practical consequences of this constraint are severe and ongoing. Because OPSO cannot offer a competitive or living wage, the agency cannot attract the volume or caliber of applicants necessary to fill its vacancies. Recruitment and retention remain significant challenges despite the agency’s efforts, and vacancy rates persist even as the need for additional personnel continues to grow. The result is a workforce that is chronically understaffed relative to its obligations, with existing employees bearing the burden of those vacancies through mandatory or voluntary overtime assignments. Without the ability to offer competitive wages, OPSO cannot increase staffing levels sufficiently to reduce reliance on overtime — and it cannot gain that ability without the City Council's cooperation and action.

As previously detailed in OPSO’s response to Recommendation 13, the agency operates under a federal consent judgment that establishes binding requirements for the management of its facilities. These requirements include maintaining adequate staffing ratios, providing continuous inmate supervision, and ensuring safe and secure conditions throughout the facility. These mandates are non-negotiable and legally enforceable, and they exist independently of whatever staffing or funding challenges the agency may be experiencing at any given time.

Failure to comply with these federal requirements would trigger the most serious consequences. Federal intervention — including the possible imposition of court-appointed oversight or receivership — would follow any sustained non-compliance. Beyond the institutional consequences, non-compliance would also increase the agency's legal liability and, most critically, place the safety of inmates, staff, and the broader public at immediate risk. In this context, overtime is not a management preference or a budgetary convenience — it is the only mechanism available to OPSO to ensure compliance with its federal obligations when the permanent workforce is insufficient to meet required staffing levels. The non-negotiable nature of these federal mandates, the threat of federal intervention, and the agency’s exposure to increased liability all underscore why overtime remains the only responsible and lawful response to persistent staffing shortfalls.

Recommendation 14 suggests that reducing overtime expenditures would free up financial resources to redirect toward other priorities, such as maintenance and repairs. While OPSO understands the appeal of that logic in the abstract, it does not reflect the operational reality the agency faces. Reducing overtime without a simultaneous and substantial increase in permanent staffing would not redirect funds — it would leave posts unfilled, compromise inmate supervision, and create immediate and serious safety risks throughout the facility. The financial savings projected by the recommendation would be offset — and likely far exceeded — by the costs associated with the safety incidents that understaffing would produce.

Furthermore, OPSO's ability to address the staffing deficiencies that drive overtime is itself constrained by funding. The agency cannot hire additional staff without increased funding to support expanded payroll, and it cannot increase wages to attract those staff without the City Council's approval. These are not internal administrative barriers that OPSO can resolve on its own — they are external structural constraints that require external action. The recommendation, as written, does not provide a feasible or actionable path to achieve the outcome it envisions.

In the absence of sufficient permanent staffing, overtime is the mechanism through which OPSO maintains safe staffing levels within housing units, ensures timely response to incidents, and prevents the violence and security breaches that inevitably follow when supervision is inadequate. These are not abstract or speculative risks — they are well-documented consequences of understaffing in correctional environments, and they represent the conditions that OPSO's federal consent judgment was designed to prevent. Reducing overtime under current conditions would not simply create a budget variance — it would pose immediate life-safety risks to both inmates and staff, increase the frequency and severity of incidents within the facility, and negatively impact public safety in ways that extend well beyond the jail's walls. The agency's obligation to prevent these outcomes is both legal and moral, and it takes precedence over the financial considerations that motivate the recommendation. OPSO cannot responsibly reduce overtime without the staffing and funding necessary to absorb the gap that overtime currently fills.

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 14 for several interconnected reasons. First, the recommendation is duplicative of Recommendation 13, addressing the same issue through marginally different language without offering any new analysis or remedy. Second, OPSO already monitors overtime usage and has implemented robust oversight controls — the absence of monitoring is not the problem, and adding more of it will not change the underlying conditions that make overtime necessary. Third, the recommendation fails to account for the staffing shortages, compensation limitations set by City ordinance, and federal consent decree requirements that collectively prevent OPSO from reducing overtime through internal action alone. Overtime is not discretionary and cannot be reduced without increasing staffing and funding in a sustained and meaningful way.

Accordingly, OPSO maintains that the appropriate solution is not reducing overtime, but rather increasing funding and competitive compensation to support adequate staffing levels. If those conditions are met, overtime reliance will naturally decrease as the agency builds and sustains a workforce commensurate with its operational obligations. Until then, any effort to reduce overtime that is not accompanied by corresponding increases in staffing and resources

will compromise the safe and compliant operations that OPSO is legally and morally obligated to maintain. Recommendation 14 is duplicative of Recommendation 13 and fails to account for the compensation limitations imposed by City ordinance, both of which render the recommendation unactionable without the broader structural reforms that OPSO has consistently advocated.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 15:

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 15 as presented. While OPSO fully supports understanding employee separation trends and improving retention, the recommendation is duplicative of existing OPSO practices that are already implemented, operational, and actively used by the agency. The following sections document the scope and substance of those existing practices, explain why the recommendation fails to address the actual root causes of employee turnover, and identify the structural and funding constraints that continue to limit OPSO’s ability to act on the insights its own data has already produced.

OPSO currently conducts exit interviews as a formal and consistently applied component of its offboarding process for all separating employees. These interviews are not an informal or ad hoc practice — they are a structured element of the agency’s human resources operations, designed to serve specific and deliberate analytical purposes. Through this process, OPSO captures detailed information on the reasons employees leave the agency, identifies trends in compensation, working conditions, and broader organizational challenges, and develops insights into the patterns of workforce instability that affect the agency’s ability to maintain adequate staffing levels over time.

The data generated from these exit interviews is consistently documented and maintained within OPSO’s human resources systems. It is not simply collected and filed — it is actively reviewed on an ongoing basis to identify patterns, understand the operational impacts of employee separation, and inform the agency’s response to the workforce challenges it faces. The process outlined in Recommendation 15 is, in all material respects, already in place and actively being utilized by OPSO. The recommendation does not identify a gap in practice — it describes a practice that the agency has already institutionalized. This includes identifying trends in compensation, working conditions, and broader organizational challenges — all of which are documented consistently and made available to agency leadership for ongoing review and action.

OPSO does not merely collect exit interview data — it actively and purposefully uses this information to drive both internal decision-making and external advocacy. Internally, the agency uses exit interview findings to develop comprehensive workforce analyses, identify systemic issues affecting retention across the organization, and inform strategic decisions that shape how OPSO manages and invests in its human resources. This is not passive data collection — it is an active analytical process that feeds directly into the agency’s operational planning.

Beyond its internal applications, OPSO also uses exit interview data to support external communication and stakeholder engagement. The agency presents workforce findings to the public and the New Orleans City Council as part of its ongoing effort to demonstrate the scope and severity of the challenges it faces and to make the case for the additional funding and structural support necessary to address them. Exit interview data is, in this respect, a key instrument through which OPSO justifies its funding needs and highlights operational constraints

beyond its control. The agency's use of this data is sophisticated, intentional, and directly tied to its broader advocacy for the resources it requires. In this way, exit interview findings serve a dual purpose: informing internal decision-making while simultaneously equipping OPSO with documented evidence to present to the New Orleans City Council and other governing authorities.

Through its exit interview process, OPSO has consistently found that employee turnover is driven primarily by structural factors largely outside the agency's direct control. The most frequently cited reasons for separation are non-competitive wages and the absence of a living wage standard — conditions that make it financially untenable for many employees to remain with the agency when more lucrative opportunities are available elsewhere. This problem is compounded by the intense competition OPSO faces from other law enforcement agencies and private sector employers, both of which can offer compensation packages that OPSO, given its funding constraints, simply cannot match.

Despite the clarity of these findings, OPSO does not have the authority to act on them unilaterally. Salary structures are determined by ordinance of the New Orleans City Council, meaning the agency's ability to address the primary driver of its turnover problem is entirely dependent on external legislative action. OPSO has identified the problem, documented it thoroughly, communicated it to the appropriate authorities, and advocated for the changes necessary to address it. The root cause of turnover is not a lack of internal analysis or employee engagement — it is structural underfunding and compensation limitations that persist because the decision-making authority over those issues rests with bodies outside the agency. In sum, the data is clear, and the analysis is complete: the problem is not that OPSO lacks insight into why employees leave, but rather that the agency lacks the authority and funding necessary to address the conditions that cause them to do so.

OPSO notes that despite ongoing workforce challenges and a clearly demonstrated need for additional resources, the agency experienced a 20% budget reduction for Fiscal Year 2026 — making OPSO the only public safety agency subject to such a significant and disproportionate funding cut. This reduction has further limited the agency's already constrained ability to improve compensation, enhance retention strategies, and invest in workforce development initiatives that could meaningfully address the turnover trends identified in its own data. The consequences of this budgetary decision are not abstract — they are directly felt in the agency's continued inability to recruit and retain qualified personnel. Retention challenges of this magnitude cannot be resolved solely through additional analysis when funding constraints directly and materially limit OPSO's ability to act on the issues analysis has already identified.

While Recommendation 15 emphasizes the need for exit interviews and data collection, OPSO has already implemented these processes, collected and analyzed comprehensive workforce data, and communicated its findings to the appropriate governing authorities. The recommendation, therefore, does not identify a gap in practice — it describes a practice that is fully operational. More critically, the recommendation does not address the agency's inability to adjust compensation or the lack of funding to implement the retention strategies supported by the existing data. The recommendation focuses on a process that already exists rather than confronting the underlying structural issues driving retention challenges — namely,

compensation limitations and funding constraints that prevent OPSO from translating its analytical findings into meaningful operational improvements.

Accordingly, OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 15 for several interconnected reasons. Exit interviews are already a standard, consistently applied component of OPSO's offboarding process, and the data generated through those interviews is thoroughly documented, rigorously analyzed, and actively used for both internal strategic planning and public reporting. The primary drivers of employee turnover have already been identified through this process: compensation limitations and funding constraints that are outside OPSO's direct control. Despite these clearly documented findings, the agency experienced a 20% budget reduction in Fiscal Year 2026, further limiting its already constrained ability to address the retention challenges identified in its own data. Accordingly, OPSO maintains that the issue is not the absence of exit interview processes — those processes are fully in place and functioning as intended. The issue is the lack of funding and the absence of authority to implement meaningful retention solutions based on the data that has already been collected, analyzed, and communicated to the appropriate governing bodies.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 16:

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 16 as presented. While OPSO fully agrees that deputy compensation should be competitive and aligned with neighboring jurisdictions, the recommendation does not accurately reflect the actions already taken by OPSO, nor does it account for the structural, funding, and governance constraints that have prevented sustained implementation of those efforts.

OPSO, under the leadership of Sheriff Susan Hutson, has actively worked to address compensation disparities by securing two pay increases for deputies and aligning compensation more closely with those of neighboring sheriff's offices and law enforcement agencies. These actions demonstrate that OPSO has not only recognized the severity of the compensation gap but has also taken concrete, documented steps to resolve it. The agency's proactive approach to this issue stands in direct contrast to the implication embedded in Recommendation 16 that OPSO has been passive or insufficiently engaged in addressing deputy pay.

Despite these documented efforts, the approved pay increases were subsequently defunded in the 2026 budget, directly and materially undermining OPSO's ability to retain existing staff, recruit qualified personnel, and stabilize its workforce over the long term. The consequences of this defunding decision were immediate and far-reaching, reversing the progress made and leaving the agency in a position of competitive disadvantage in the labor market. The critical point is that the issue is not a failure on OPSO's part to pursue increased compensation — the agency pursued it and secured approval. The issue is the inability to sustain those increases due to external funding decisions beyond OPSO's control.

OPSO continues to face significant challenges in its working relationship with the City Council, stemming primarily from ongoing disagreements regarding the agency's cash position and funding needs, as well as persistent misinterpretations of the resources available to OPSO. During a City Council meeting, it was asserted that OPSO had sufficient cash on hand to fund major capital needs, including emergency lock replacements that were necessitated by a

critical security incident. This assertion was inaccurate, but its impact on the Council's perception of OPSO's financial condition was substantial. It led to increased scrutiny of the agency's funding requests, created resistance to legitimate operational needs, and ultimately undermined OPSO's ability to secure the operational and personnel funding required by the agency's obligations.

OPSO further notes that discussions at the City Council level have included a demonstrated reluctance to reallocate funding from other municipal departments — including parks and recreation — in order to prioritize jail operations, despite the clear and well-documented public safety implications of failing to do so. This reflects a broader, deeply concerning policy issue in which the public safety risks associated with correctional operations are not adequately weighed in funding decisions. When the operational needs of a jail facility — an institution responsible for the safety of inmates, staff, and the surrounding community — are deprioritized in favor of other municipal expenditures, the consequences extend well beyond budgetary inconvenience and into the realm of genuine public safety risk.

Recent funding decisions by the City of New Orleans have further compounded OPSO's already significant operational challenges. Beginning April 1, the City will transition from quarterly to monthly payments — a structural change that, in isolation, might appear administratively neutral, but which, in practice, carries serious financial consequences for the agency. The monthly payments OPSO will receive under this new arrangement will be less than the agency's monthly payroll obligations, meaning the funding structure will be insufficient to meet the agency's most basic operational costs. This change will create immediate cash flow deficits, limit OPSO's ability to consistently meet payroll, and further constrain the agency's capacity to sustain operations and recruit and retain the staff it so critically needs. Taken together, this funding structure places OPSO in a position of financial constraint despite ongoing, non-negotiable operational obligations, effectively setting the agency up for failure through a series of external decisions it has no power to prevent.

Recommendation 16 suggests that OPSO should work with the City Council to increase deputy pay. However, OPSO has already engaged with the Council on this issue and has successfully secured approved pay raises — demonstrating that the problem is not a lack of collaboration or effort on the agency's part. The issue lies in the sustainability of those funding decisions, not in the quality of the engagement that produced them. The recommendation does not address the root cause of the compensation problem, which is the inconsistency and insufficiency of the funding that has been made available to OPSO, combined with the broader pattern of policy decisions made outside the agency's control that have repeatedly undermined its ability to implement and sustain the compensation improvements it has fought to achieve.

The inability to maintain competitive compensation has produced a cascade of interconnected and serious consequences for the agency. Continued employee separations have depleted the workforce, while persistent difficulty recruiting qualified candidates has prevented the agency from replenishing it. The resulting staffing shortfalls have driven an increased reliance on overtime that, as previously detailed, carries its own financial and operational costs. These conditions do not exist in isolation — they directly and materially impact facility safety and day-to-day operations, and they increase the risk of harm to staff, inmates, and the broader

public. The failure to sustain competitive compensation is therefore not merely a human resources concern; it is a public safety issue with consequences that extend throughout the institution and into the community it serves.

OPSO respectfully disagrees with Recommendation 16 for several interconnected and well-documented reasons. The agency has already taken meaningful, concrete steps to increase deputy pay, and those efforts have resulted in approved raises that represent genuine progress toward competitive compensation. However, those approved raises were subsequently defunded, directly negating the progress achieved and leaving the agency at a competitive disadvantage in the labor market. Ongoing funding disputes and persistent mischaracterizations of OPSO's financial position have further undermined compensation initiatives and limited the agency's ability to recruit and retain the qualified staff it needs. Recent funding changes by the City — including the transition to monthly payments that are insufficient to cover OPSO's payroll obligations — will create cash flow instability and further hinder the agency's ability to meet its most basic operational and personnel needs. Accordingly, OPSO maintains that the issue is not a lack of coordination or effort on the agency's part. The issue is a pattern of inconsistent and insufficient funding decisions made by external authorities — decisions that prevent the implementation of the compensation strategies necessary to address the staffing crisis and ultimately compromise both public safety and the institution's operational stability.

OPSO Response to Finding 4 and Recommendation 17:

OPSO agrees with Recommendation 17 and acknowledges the importance of security checks and inspections. Nevertheless, it is important to explain that the Orleans Justice Center (OJC) is a concrete-framed building with intermediate mezzanines that can provide secure housing for up to 1,438 inmates. The building contains 24 housing units and 600 cells. Each cell accommodates two occupants. OJC houses a range of inmates with varying classifications, including Low, Medium, Medium High, High, Protective Custody, Medical, Youthful Offenders, and Mental Health, for both male and female inmates. In addition to the inmate housing facilities, the site also including an intake processing center and an administrative building that must stay safe and secure. The intake processing center is a two-story steel structure to accommodate admission of inmates and storage of possessions. Inmates enter the complex through a secure sallyport on the ground level. Above the sallyport is a three-story steel structure to accommodate the needs of the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office.

Jail staff work for low salaries in the New Orleans criminal justice system. More jail personnel are deciding that the risks of the job outweigh the rewards and are leaving the field. Staff retention is an ongoing concern at OJC. Other departments within public safety have higher pay with many OJC staff leaving to work for other departments. Staffing vacancies at OJC have reached 47%. We continue to maintain a normal operation in staffing with minimal mandatory overtime, one shift per pay period, which has led to staff burnout and taking shortcuts. The OJC was designed for direct supervision. However, due to the staffing vacancies, the OJC cannot operate as a direct supervision model. The OJC staff are adjusting their supervision of inmates the best they can, but it is not a direct supervision model. One deputy sometimes oversees two housing pods at the same time.

The percentage of female to male staff is about 75% to 25%. This high percentage of female staff in a predominantly male facility creates operational concerns. The recurring deputy shortages present a significant challenge for staff assigned to the area. The day-to-day area of responsibility for each vacant post was incorporated into the duties of available staff. It is these additional duties that increase risk factors and create safety concerns for overworked staff in these areas. Such deficiencies are expected to occur frequently, if not routinely, in the face of a 47% custody staff vacancy level.

It is important to consider that the vacancy level existing at OJC dictates tough decisions by facility managers and supervisors in deciding what custody posts can be filled and which must be left vacant. When faced with a 47% vacancy rate, the certainty of some posts being left vacant becomes a given factor and not the exception. This, naturally, often leads to a strained ability to conduct checks resulting in additional security concerns.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 18:

OPSO disagrees with this recommendation since the suggested practice has long been in place at OJC. Please see the attached forms with the supervisors' signatures on each form. Also attached is information about the handheld devices the OPSO has purchased and will use to digitize and carryout real-time security checks and inspections. In the meantime, we continue to provide trainings on the manual process, and trainings for the new handheld devices are being scheduled for all OJC staff to ensure proper use at rollout.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 19:

OPSO disagrees with Recommendation 19 since the suggested practice has long been in place at OJC. Please see the attached forms with the supervisors' signatures on each form. Also attached is OJC's final American Correctional Association Report showing 100% compliance with security checks and inspections. Again, OPSO has purchased handheld devices that will be used to digitize and carryout real-time security checks and inspections. In the meantime, we continue to provide trainings on the manual process, and trainings for the new handheld devices are being scheduled for all OJC staff to ensure proper use at rollout.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 20:

OPSO agrees with Recommendation 20, and OPSO routinely works with the federal monitors to adopted operational changes that considers OPSO's practical limitations. OJC houses a diverse population with varying security levels and special needs, including protective custody, mental health, and youthful offender populations. When the inmate populations census exceeds the design capacity of the facility, such overpopulation creates challenges for inmate classifications and placement decisions. OPSO uses a structured classification system that was revalidated in year 2024, and the purpose of the classification system is to understand an inmate's risk to the safety and security within the facility and in light of his/her housing assignment. By this, OPSO uses various assessments models, including an initial classification assessment, a reclassification assessment, a predator assessment, and a victim assessment.

Again, OJC houses inmates with various types of classification designations. Such differing classifications, along with staffing realities, should inform and set OPSO security check requirements respectively. Accordingly, Chief of Corrections Jay Mallett has had several

discussions with the federal monitors regarding limiting the number of security checks where low security inmates are housed in OJC, and OPSO will continue its advocacy for sensible reforms.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 21:

OPSO cannot agree or disagree with Recommendation 21 at the time of this submission. Notwithstanding, OPSO is planning to establish a predetermined weekly or monthly percentage of details to be reviewed by the Detail Department. Additionally, implementation of routine reviews will account for staffing limitations to ensure expectations remain reasonable and achievable. For claims of potential violations, OPSO has assigned the Inspections Division, under Major Orlando Matthews, to provide assist and additional support to address infractions.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 22:

OPSO agrees with this recommendation, and with complete implementation of the detail management software, Detail Kommander, the recommended actions can be easily managed through electronically. Limited exceptions may be necessary for events where end times are not known in advance (e.g., concerts or other fluid events). In such cases, the end time must be documented prior to vendor payment.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 23:

OPSO agrees with this recommendation, and the need for this type of reconciliation was a primary focus and key concern raised in discussions between the vendor for Detail Kommander and OPSO leadership. Accordingly, the Detail Kommander system is expected to assist in identifying and preventing such discrepancies.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 24:

OPSO agrees with this recommendation. Again, with full implementation, Detail Kommander will allow timing parameters to be established and enforced electronically, helping prevent scheduling conflicts and excessive work hours.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 25:

OPSO agrees with this recommendation. Detail Kommander will enable electronic tracking and enforcement of leave parameters to ensure compliance and eliminate conflicts.

OPSO Response to Recommendation 26:

OPSO agrees with this Recommendation 26. OPSO began to procure an electronic off-duty detail management system known as Detail Kommander. In December 2024, OPSO personnel participated in a virtual meeting with the vendor's lead representative, Bill Kicklighter. During this meeting, OPSO leadership stressed the importance of ensuring the system could reconcile secondary employment hours with the agency's payroll system (ADP) to prevent instances of employees receiving simultaneous compensation from multiple sources ("double-dipping"). The vendor indicated that such functionality was achievable, though potential limitations in integration with ADP were noted. At present, the system has not been fully implemented and does not yet support real-time reconciliation with ADP.

To address this limitation, OPSO has proposed an interim process whereby, following the biweekly payroll lock in ADP, payroll data will be transmitted to the vendor. Reconciliation will then be conducted prior to issuing any off-duty detail payments, providing an additional control measure until full integration is achieved.

OPSO is committed to maintaining a culture of high performance, accountability, and integrity. All employees are expected to adhere to agency policy, uphold the highest professional standards, and comply with all applicable laws and regulations. OPSO takes all allegations of misconduct seriously and will take immediate corrective action upon identification of any violations.

In cases involving allegations of “double-dipping,” an internal investigation has been initiated as a result of this audit. Disciplinary action, up to and including termination and potential criminal charges, may result if violations are substantiated. Nevertheless, Detail Kommander has already been adopted by OPSO and has been in the pilot phase since 2025. OPSO has established a target date of July 1, 2026, for full implementation of the system across all off-duty paid details.

During the exit meeting with representatives of the LLA on March 24, 2026, OPSO clarified its objective to achieve full implementation of the electronic detail management system by that date.

OPSO expressly reserves the ability to supplement and/or amend this response how and when it deems necessary.

[END OF OPSO RESPONSE]

**Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office
Daily Housing Unit Inspection Form**

Rev: 05/2024

DATE: _____ **POD:** _____ **DEPUTY (First & Last Name):** _____ **BWC #** _____

Available Forms if Kiosk Not Functioning: **Grievance Forms** ____ Yes ____ No **Medical Request Forms** ____ Yes ____ No

All Housing Units

Area / Equipment Inspected	Is the Equipment Present?	Description of Equipment
Computer Monitor	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Security Electronics Control Panel	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Cut Down Tool	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Dayroom	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Emergency Exit Doors	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
First Aid Kit & Blood Spill Kit	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Housing Unit Keys	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Resident Kiosk	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Resident Telephones	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Resident Video Attorney Visitation	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Resident Video Visitation	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Interlock	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Pod Tables / Chairs	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Portable Radio	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
PPE Kit (1)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Program Room	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Shower Area	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Telephone	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Televisions / Remotes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Utility Closet	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
Washer / Dryer	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	

Deputy's Name (PRINT) _____ Date _____
Supervisor's Name (PRINT) _____ Date _____

Work Order Submitted: ____ Yes ____ No

Supervisor Comments _____

Cleaning Equipment Inventory

Item & Quantity	Condition Good / Poor	Quantity	
		Beginning	Ending
Broom (1)			
Dust Mop (1)			
Dust Pan (1)			
Green Scrubbing Pags (1-2)			
Green/Yellow Combo Sponge (1-2)			
Mop (1)			
Mop Bucket (1)			
Red Shower Squeegee/Brush Combo (1)			
Round Handle Toilet Brush (1)			
Wet Floor Signs (1-2)			

Chemical Inventory Quantity

Item & Quantity	Quantity	
	Beginning	Ending
Cleanser (1 can)		
ECO 13 - Blue Writing (1)		
ECO 23 - Green Writing (1)		

Miscellaneous Items

Item & Quantity	Quantity	
	Beginning	Ending
Grievance Collection Box		
Sick Call Collection Box		
Resident Hanhbooks		

COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS

STANDARDS COMPLIANCE INITIAL AUDIT

Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office

Orleans Justice Center
New Orleans, Louisiana

December 15 - 16, 2025

VISITING COMMITTEE MEMBERS

John P. Sargent, Jr., Chair
ACA Auditor

William Russell
ACA Auditor

A. Introduction

The initial audit of the Orleans Justice Center, New Orleans, Louisiana, was conducted on December 15 - 16, 2025 by the following team: John Sargent, Chair; and William Russell, Member.

B. Facility Demographics

Rated Capacity: 1,450

Actual Population: 1,143

Average Daily Population for the last 12 months: 1,464

Average Length of Stay: 81 days ***The Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office has 90 residents in custody, that have been awaiting trial two years or more. Of these, four have been incarcerated seven years or greater with two being continuously incarcerated over nine years.

Average Sentence Length: 3 days

Security Level/Custody: High - 388, Medium - 425, Low - 330

Age Range of Offenders: 17 - 75

Gender: Male - 1,045

Female - 98

Juveniles - 15 ***Under Louisiana law, 17-year-olds adjudicated as adults; housed under constraints of sound, sight and touch dynamics.

Full-Time Jail Staff: 439

Administration	1 (Civilian)
Support	30 (Deputy)
	5 (Recruit)
	58 (Civilian)
Program	8 Civilian)
Security	163 (Deputy)
	126 (Recruit)
	48 (Civilians)

**Recruit - non-sworn staff that have completed the LA POST 92-hour Jailer Course.

**Deputy 2 - sworn correctional officers with limited arrest authority and the ability to carry a firearm (220 hours).

**Deputy 1 - sworn deputy sheriff with full law enforcement powers (400 hours).

Contract: Medical - Wexford Medical Sources, 107

Food Service - Summit Food Services, 7

Education - Nola Public Schools, 12

C. Facility Description

The Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office (OPSO) is located at 2800 Perdido Street, New Orleans, Louisiana. The Orleans Justice Center (OJC) is part of this building. A satellite facility, Temporary Detention Center (TDC)/Temporary Mental Health Facility (TMH) is located at 3200 Perdido Street, New Orleans, Louisiana. Between these two facilities is the Kitchen Warehouse building and a construction project, Phase III, designed to add an 89 bed medical/mental health annex. Overall, management responsibility is assigned to the Chief of Corrections, reporting directly to the Sheriff. In addition to this Core Jail Audit, OJC, in early December, underwent a National Conference on Correctional Health Care Audit (NCCHC) for which the final report is pending.

Within the OJC, first floor, general population male/female residents are assigned to one of six units. On the second floor there are six units for male residents; one for juvenile males, one for mental health step down, one for protective custody, two general population units and one general mental health unit. There are five general population units and a disciplinary unit on the third floor. The six units on the fourth-floor house general population and medical need residents; all male. In addition, there is an intake area, medical unit, a fully accredited school, and designated recreation areas for each pod. Meals are prepared at the Kitchen Warehouse location and transported to the respective units. Similarly, there are four units at the Temporary Detention Center; one for low-medium females, two general population male units and one unit for kitchen workers. In the overflow Mental Health area, one unit is designated for females and three for male residents. An outside recreation yard is designated for each unit. A small medical office, staffed 24/7, is present to attend to resident needs.

The Phase III, 120 million dollar building project, is approximately 81% complete. Once opened, the Temporary Detention/Temporary Mental Health units will be closed; laundry services, a newly opened medical infirmary and eight attorney contact visitation rooms will be consolidated here. Within resident housing units, locks are being replaced on swing doors. This 5.2-million-dollar project is about 25% completed. Other projects included installing a second perimeter fence intended to meet resident custody level security needs and installing steel plating on the exterior fencing area of outside recreation areas. This is designed to limit residents from viewing exterior OJC perimeter while providing natural light and an outside recreation space.

History and Significant Events: For most of the 20th century, the OPSO (then the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's Office) ran a large, aging jail complex known collectively as the Orleans Parish Prison; a patchwork of buildings, work-release sites and even a 'Tent City' with chronic overcrowding and safety issues. Decades of overcrowding, poor conditions, and federal court findings of unconstitutional treatment, intensified by the chaos during Hurricane Katrina, led to a massive jail expansion, a post-Katrina rebuild and, ultimately, a 2013 consent decree to reform operations. To address these issues, the Orleans Parish Prison was replaced by the Orleans Justice Center; a 433,000 square foot

pod-style jail that opened in 2015 with a design capacity of 1,438 beds and integrated intake, medical, mental health and program space.

At present, OJC is operating under a 2013 federal court decree; Lashawn Jones, et al., {v} Marlin Gusman, Sheriff (Civil Action no 2-12-cv-00859). It was this federal civil rights case that led to a sweeping consent decree over jail conditions at Orleans Parish Prison (now the Orleans Justice Center). After years of civil-rights litigation and scathing Department of Justice (DOJ) findings letters in 2009 and 2012 describing rampant violence, excessive force and inadequate medical care and mental health care, the federal courts approved a negotiated consent judgment requiring OPSO to overhaul protection from harm, use-of-force practices, security, mental health and medical care, fire and safety, sanitation, language access and conditions for offenders with independent monitors and, later, an outside jail Compliance Director. In 2024, the Federal Courts ordered a new corrective action plan after finding of “regression” in recent monitoring reporting mandates. Accordingly, drawing on monitoring work from October 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025, 70 of 174 provisions are now in substantial compliance, 98 are in partial compliance with six in non-compliance. Monitors report ‘material progress’ even as gains are not always sustained. Never-the-less, the decree is still active, and OPSO is in a long-term, court-supervised reform process that has improved conditions.

Use of tablets: At OJC, the resident issued tablets are used in a variety of operational areas. As part of the intake process, before receiving a tablet, residents complete a facility orientation, sign for receipt of a ‘Resident Handbook’ (English /Spanish) and PREA overview. Generally, tablets are issued on a one-to-one basis within 48 hours. Charging stations were readily available to housing units. If damaged the resident is financially responsible. Among the many uses, tablets are used to order commissaries, file grievances, request medical care, obtain legal reference materials and engage in general staff contact. On a personal level, residents are able to receive text messages, play games, and access pleasure reading materials. If there are technical problems with the system, OJC has a policy/procedure in place to permit paper driven communication.

Residents can purchase a variety of health/snack items from Keefe commissary services. A commissary schedule is available for resident review. Staff report OJC receives a commission of 38% of gross sales equal to \$60,000 on average. Smart Com offers phone services. Residents receive one free 15-minute call a day. Other calls are charged at \$.16 per minute (\$.08 call cost and \$.08 returned to OJC as commission). Cable services are provided by Cox Cable. Funds derived from these services are used for resident needs/services.

It is reported OJC has a 25% vacancy for minimum staffing needs. This is reflective of a sizeable number of resident transports/pick-ups from local/state facilities and hospital/medical transport. OJC maintains minimum staffing with mandatory overtime which is currently one day per every fourteen workdays. Recruitment efforts include attendance at job fairs and use of social media. For example, a full-page recruitment advertisement was included in the New Orleans Saints 2025 Yearbook. On Friday December 11, 2025, prior to this audit, two classes of 13 completed the Basic Corrections

Class and were honored at a graduation ceremony. Similarly, during the audit, approximately 40 civilians were interviewed as part of the staff selection process.

Mission Statement: “The mission of the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office is to provide community safety and service to the people of Orleans Parish by protecting the rights and humanity of people in custody, supporting the wellness of our staff and facilitating connections to community in order to restore public trust and maintain a healthy lifestyle. [Further}, OPSO will be a quality system of detention and court services promoting public safety in our community by operating a humane, accountable and community-responsive agency that maintains a safe and restorative culture.”

D. Pre-Audit Meeting

The pre-audit meeting was held at approximately 7:15 am on Monday, December 15, 2025, at the Hampton Inn (Downtown), New Orleans, Louisiana to discuss the information provided by the ACA staff and officials from Orleans Criminal Justice Center.

The chairperson divided standards into the following groups:

John Sargent, Chair: 1-CORE-4A-01 to 1-CORE-7E-01
William Russell, Member: 1-CORE-1A-01 to 1-CORE-3A-01

E. The Audit Process

1. Transportation

The team was escorted to and from the facility each day by Major Silas Phipps.

2. Entrance Interview

The visiting committee arrived at the Orleans Criminal Justice Center at approximately 7:45 am on Monday, December 15, 2025. Prior to entering the facility, the team was able to complete a driving tour of the exterior perimeter. Upon entering the Sheriff’s Office, the team preceded to the Large Administrative Conference Room. The team expressed the appreciation of the Association for the opportunity to be involved with Orleans Criminal Justice Center initial audit. The Chair requested some additional information or changes that may have taken place since the audit arrangements had been finalized. Chief of Corrections, Jeworski Mallett stated that there were several renovation projects and a consent decree ongoing for which additional information is contained in this VCR. The Chair advised Chief Mallett that, at the conclusion of each day of the audit or more frequently as needed, the audit team would provide a short out-briefing on their activities, to include any significant findings.

The team advised the goal of the visiting committee was to be as helpful and non-intrusive as possible during the conduct of the audit, and team members would

visit as many departments and areas as possible and meet and speak with as many staff and residents as possible in the time available. The Chair emphasized the goals of accreditation toward the efficiency and effectiveness of correctional systems throughout the United States. The audit schedule, the team's goals for staff and resident interviews and the overall expectations of the audit process were also discussed at this time. The Chair noted that following the tour that mandatory standards would be evaluated first.

The following people were in attendance:

Sheriff Susan Hutson
Chief of Corrections Jeworski Mallett
Chief Financial Officer Bianka Brown
Chief Administrative Officer Troy Glover
Colonel Nicole Harris - Jail Administration & Jail Monitoring
Colonel Anthony Giovingo - Jail Operations
Major Silas Phipps - Director of Compliance/ACA Manager
Major Djuana Bierria - Director of Intake & Screening
Ms. Tracey Jefferson - Sanitation Manager
Ms. Pamela Toledano - Food Services Manager
Dr. Andrea Walker - Medical Director
Ms. Alexes Walker - DNP Regional Medical Coordinator/Acting HSA
Sergeant Dwi'Shana Smith - Scribe
Sergeant Ebony LaFrance - Scribe

3. Facility Tour

The visiting committee toured the Orleans Criminal Justice Center to include the Kitchen Warehouse and Temporary Housing Center, from 8:45 am to 1:50 pm. The posting of ACA audit announcements was displayed for review by residents, staff, and visitors. The following people accompanied the team on the tour and responded to the team's questions concerning facility operations:

Chief of Corrections Jeworski Mallett
Colonel Anthony Giovingo - Jail Operations
Major Silas Phipps - Director of Compliance/ACA Manager
Major Djuana Bierria - Director of Intake & Screening
Lt. Chauntay Esteen - Intake and Processing
Dr. Andrea Blake - Medical Director
Ms. Alexes Walker - DNP Regional Medical Coordinator/Acting HSA
Sergeant Dwi'Shana Smith - Scribe
Sergeant Ebony LaFrance - Scribe
Sergeant Ariel Mercadal - Media
Deputy Kevin Files - SRT Escort
Deputy Brandon Jones - SRT Escort
Deputy Paulnisha Milton - SRT Escort

4. Conditions of Confinement/Quality of Life

During the tour, the visiting committee evaluated the conditions of confinement at the facility. The following narrative description of the relevant programmatic services and functional areas summarizes the findings regarding the quality of life.

Security:

The entrance into OJC is on the second floor. This post is staffed 24/7 by a deputy. Prior to entering the facility, all complete a body scan and have property searched. A handheld wand is available as needed. Visitors require a government issued ID to sign in/out. Once completed, staff/guests proceed to the facility secure entrance where Central Control will activate security doors for admittance.

OJC adheres to a two shift (12 hours) officer schedule, 6:30 am to 6:30 pm, which includes roll call. Deputies are trained and authorized to carry a Mark 3 gas canister. Though deputy sheriff personnel are authorized to carry firearms, there is no armory at OJC, rather, it is in the OPSO. At the entrance to OJC, the sallyport and in the Sheriff's Office, there are ample gun lockers for securing weapons.

Central Control is manned by two-three staff. Entrance is restricted to authorized staff all others require management approval. Staff monitor 899 cameras: 730 interior and 169 exterior. Camera recordings are maintained for a six-month period. In addition, staff work with pod deputies in resident movement and door controls within the facility.

Residents enter the facility through the secure sallyport, double doors and into the intake area. There are ten holding cells available for those requiring enhanced security, otherwise, those waiting processing are seated in an open area. As part of the booking process, wristbands are issued. Residents are provided a color-coded uniform matching their custody status; orange - male general population, burgundy - female general population, red - discipline, administrative segregation, blue - juveniles. Both single cell and dorm housing are available to match the residents' custody. All resident movement is controlled. When in movement, they are placed in leg shackles, handcuffs and multiple officer escorts. A pat down search is completed both coming and going.

OJC completes four counts daily; start and end of each shift. A supervisor or designated officer completes a full exterior inspection on each shift. In housing areas, random searches are conducted daily. OPSO attempts to conduct one shakedown of each pod per month, for a goal of 24 per month. In addition, there is a 13-member Special Response Team (SRT) available for enhanced security needs and during an emergency situation.

There are a limited number of tools in the facility. Where present, the kitchen for example, a shadow board is used. A master inventory of tools is maintained. Use logs were checked and found to be accurate.

The facility utilizes a biometric Key Track system to control and account for facility keys. There is a key box containing specific designated keys in both the secure and non-secure of the facility. OJC has a trained locksmith who monitors key use and maintains the master key inventory. Use reports are generated daily with distribution to the executive command staff and maintenance.

Environmental Conditions:

OJC is compliant with all applicable ACA standards regarding airflow, access to natural lighting, and noise levels. Required inspections are completed by trained OPSO maintenance personnel. Both dorms and single cells comply with square foot space requirements. The number of toilets, sinks and showers are within prescribed ratio numbers. Random checks of shower/sink hot water in housing areas found running hot water within a very short time. Staff reports that water is maintained at 120 - 124 degrees. There are nine domestic hot water heaters at OJC, five at the Kitchen & Warehouse and eight at the TDC/TMH building. Potable water is tested as required. During the facility tour and subsequent re-visits, the team further viewed the facility as being well lit and temperatures within comfort zones; 70 - 72 degrees year-round. When repairs are needed, either OPSO maintenance staff or outside contractors will address these concerns. For example, during the tour, the team observed a sewer specialist working on clearing a resident generated backed up sewer line. Facility furnishings meet fire-safety performance standards.

There are four generators available for emergency power; two operate on natural gas and two on diesel. A supply of emergency use fuel is available. Each is load tested and receives preventive maintenance on a regularly scheduled basis. Elevator systems serving the facility were reviewed. The main building is equipped with nine elevators with the Kitchen Warehouse having three. Elevators are inspected and maintained by TK Elevators. Permit/operation certificates were found to be up to date.

Utilities and pest control services are provided by local suppliers. Recycling is limited to kitchen oil. The team suggested that OJC consider the recycling of cans and cardboard generated by food service. Facility trash/refuse is collected, removed from the facility and placed in large dumpsters. This area was observed to be mostly clean and odor free.

Sanitation:

OJC adheres to a comprehensive housekeeping plan as outlined in policy/procedure and highlighted in the Inmate Handbook. Each resident is responsible for his/her cell and surrounding area. Lights and air conditioning

vents are to be kept uncovered and clear of any paper or other debris. To ensure proper sanitation in housing areas, the pod deputy may direct the residents to assist in common area cleanup, i.e. floors swept and mopped, and showers, sinks and toilets cleaned at regular intervals. In addition, residents are required to always keep themselves clean and presentable. Wireless clippers are available in all pods for hair care needs. Barbicide is used to disinfect these upon return. Cleaning supplies/equipment are accessible from sanitation closets located on each floor. A Cleaning Chemical Log tracks chemical usage, showing use patterns and re-fill needs. A Chemical Dispenser Log Sheet documents floor storage closet inventory of chemicals on a scheduled basis.

Within the OJC complex, common area sanitation is completed by civilian staff. All are required to complete the 92-hour in-service course, inclusive of biohazard spill and cleaning chemicals training. In addition, during the reporting period, 8 trained resident workers were assigned to the sanitation department. Adequate cleaning supplies were readily available, and procedures/practices were in place for the accountability and control of these supplies and related equipment. During the tour and re-visits, the team found the facility to have high levels of sanitation. Heavily traveled areas showed minimal signs of dust/dirt. The resident living areas were clean, including shower, sink and toilet areas. Hallways, dayroom areas and walkways (indoor and outdoor) were free of clutter and were mopped/swept on an ongoing basis.

Of note, at the intake area, above holding cells, the team observed five high wall/ceiling mounted high pressure hoses. It was explained that these facilitate cleaning/sanitation of cells in situations of body waste or blood contamination.

Fire Safety:

At OJC, a Fire & Life Safety Officer manages fire safety protocols. An emergency plan, approved by the Louisiana State Fire Marshall is in place. Documents provided and interviews with staff and residents verified all weekly, monthly and quarterly fire, life safety and sanitation inspections are conducted as required. The annual State Fire Marshal inspection was completed for 2025.

Fire extinguishers are located at strategic areas throughout OJC (175), with an additional ten at the Kitchen & Warehouse and 65 at the TDC/TMH service area. Similarly, there are five hydrants and six standpipes at OJC with three hydrants and four standpipes at the Warehouse & Kitchen and a like number at TDC/TMH. Other components of the fire prevention protocols include duct detectors, pull stations, smoke detectors, strobes/horns. Random checks of inspection tags showed these are inspected by policy. Evacuation routes are clearly posted in housing units and throughout the facility. The main fire control panel is located in master control. Fire drills are conducted quarterly. A New Orleans Fire Department Station is located nearby; estimated response time of three-seven minutes.

Food Service:

Summit Food Service manages and operates the food service program at OJC. The kitchen and food storage area is in the Kitchen Warehouse building, a short distance from both the OJC and temporary housing units. The kitchen is staffed by seven ServeSafe trained employees and 23 approved/trained, via a four-hour in-house module, resident workers; ten scheduled for breakfast, seven for lunch and seven for dinner. Assigned numbers reflect total resident staff workers and does not consider days off or overlapping shift assignments. Resident workers are transported from the Temporary Detention Center for work shifts. All meals are transported from the kitchen to the OJC and the TDC/TMH locations by deputy sheriff personnel. Staff record meal temperatures at preparation and prior to delivery to ensure items remain consistent with designated temperatures.

Summit Food Service adheres to a four-week dietitian approved menu cycle, based on a minimum of 2800 calories daily. Medical, special and religious meals are prepared as warranted. For example, there are approximately ten medical meal menus that may be ordered, i.e. cardiac, diabetic, renal, or full liquid. There is separate juvenile menu with a snack included. Sack meals are prepared for residents scheduled for court, transport or otherwise will miss scheduled mealtimes. The team sampled the lunch meal on Monday of the audit which consisted of a grape drink, corn, rice & red beans, large hot dog, 4 pack cookies. The meal was found to be temperature appropriate, tasty and ample portions. Mealtimes are as follows: breakfast - 3:00 am, lunch - 9:30 am, dinner - 3:30 pm. During the audit, kitchen staff report there were, on average, 1300 meals prepared for each meal service. The average meal cost is approximately \$1.54 - \$1.60 with special meals and snack options more costly at \$1.80 - \$1.84. OJC retains a three-day sample meal. OJC, also, has a minimum three-week emergency food supply.

During the audit, the team found all temperature logs in food storages to be accurate and completed as required. Tools and equipment are securely maintained by shadow board and listing on the Master Tool Inventory Log. A random check of tools logged out were found to be in use as indicated. Logs are reviewed for completeness on a regular basis by Summit Food Services management.

Food preparation and storage areas were clean with no sign of pest/rodents. Chemicals are properly maintained, logged and reviewed by Summit Food Service staff on a regular basis. Safety Data Sheets (SDS) were present. An eyewash station, AED and safety signs for wet floors are present. Daily cleaning is documented. Review of the log shows thorough cleaning of the kitchen; for example, walls, floors, chillers, drains/sinks, ice machines and food warmers. A weekly "Routine Inspection" with "Reinspection" as necessary is completed by Summit Food Service management. Monthly, a comprehensive inspection is completed by the Manager of Sanitation and Summit Food Service staff. Annually, the Louisiana State Department of Health conducts a retail food service inspection. The most recent inspection was completed on November 8, 2025. As a result OJC received a 'permit to operate' a retail food operation through June

30, 2026.

Medical Care:

Care & Pharmacy: Medical/mental health care at OJC is provided by WEXFORD Health Sources (WHS). Medical care is managed by Director Andrea Blake, while mental health care is managed by Director Deonka Winn. The Credentialing Log was reviewed with all staff licenses found to be up to date. Care is provided by a combination of LPNs, RNs, NPs and MHPs (mental health). Specialty care is provided by a dentist, optometrist, and psychiatrist. An OBGYN skilled NP is available to address the medical care needs of the female resident population. Emergency/off site OBGYN care is provided by Touro Hospital. Medical care is available 24/7. Emergency/off-site care is provided by UMC (New Orleans); within five miles of the facility. Emergency transport is provided by Acadian. Residents utilize the kiosks in unit dayrooms to request sick calls. A paper request can be made by placing a written request in a secure lock box for medical personnel pick-up. During an emergency, the pod deputy will contact the medical unit. At OJC, there is a medical clinic with three medical and one dental exam rooms, a medical office in Intake and a small medical/exam office at the TMH, all staffed 24/7. Medication pass occurs daily from 8:00 am-10:00 am, 10:00 am-12:00 pm and 8:00 pm-10:00 pm. All medications are taken in the presence of medical personnel. A mouth check is conducted after taking the medication.

At OJC, the medical clinic is on the second floor. In addition to exam rooms, there are six triage bags (verified twice daily), 1st Aid Kit, and one AED. The fire safety officer arranges for 1st Aid Kits in other facility locations, i.e. Master Control or Intake. Medication carts are stored here when not in use. The small medical office at the TMH, used by residents at the TDC as well, has O2, an EKG machine, an AED, a Nebulizer, an Ambu bag and a crash bag. Medications are stored under double lock/key. A perpetual inventory and use records are maintained and found to be in accordance with Wexford policy and industry standards.

A limited access Pharmacy Room is found in the OJC clinic. In accordance with NCCHC standards, the pharmacy nurse ensures all supplies and controlled substances are inventoried, counted and documented on a perpetual log on every shift with a monthly reconciliation. The log reflects real-time medication counts with each transaction and shift verification. The Charge RN /shift supervisor will verify completion and accuracy of logs. Similarly, pharmacy carts inventories occur at the beginning and end of every shift, after medication passes and after restocking/transfers. Documentation reviewed determined that OJC is accurately adhering to stated protocols. Medication is supplied by Diamond Pharmacy in blister packs. A secure refrigerator is available for items requiring refrigeration. Inspections are conducted twice daily. OJC does not permit keep on person (KOP) medications.

Under the guidance of Wexford staff, 177 residents participate in a medication

assisted treatment (MAT) program. Opioid use disorder is treated with the use of medications alongside counseling and behavioral therapies, i.e. a whole-patient approach. At discharge, participants are provided with medication to carry them over till their next scheduled primary care visit for continuity of care.

Staff report that over the course of this audit cycle, medical care:

- has achieved a 30% reduction in acute care transfers related to poorly managed chronic diseases,
- show average blood pressure control rates among hypertensive patients improved from 58% to 82%, and
- find that diabetic patients with controlled A1C levels increased from 45% to 70%

Mental Health: The mental health program at OJC provides essential behavioral health services to incarcerated individuals with mental health needs. The program emphasizes early identification, continuous treatment, crisis intervention and discharge planning to promote mental stability, safety and overall well-being. Currently, the mental health team supports a caseload of approximately 700 residents with approximately 500 of those on some form of medication.

In addition to psychiatric RNs and NPs, there are number of mental health technicians and CNC observers working with the resident population. MHPs follow a varied schedule; one working 10:00 am – 6:00 pm, one 11:00 am – 7:00 pm, and another 2:00 pm – 11:00 pm. Two are scheduled for the overnight shift. Daily, an average of 12 -15 initial mental health checks are made. The number of risk assessments varies day-to-day. Staff visit segregation twice weekly and pods as needed. Staff are also involved with suicide /crisis intervention.

Staff report that over the course of the audit cycle, the average wait time to see a mental health provider was cut in half from ten days to five days with a daily mental health call for urgent needs. In addition, there has been a 22% reduction in incidents involving people with mental illness, including, less reliance of restrictive housing. Mental health initiatives are re-enforced via regular collaboration among mental health staff, medical personnel, and custody and case management. Further, mental health professionals provide ongoing support and training to custody staff to improve recognition and response to mental health symptoms.

Recreation:

At OJC, there are 24, identical, recreation yards of 480 square feet. Each yard is covered and enclosed with metal fencing. On the yard, residents are able to play basketball. The way the yards are constructed offenders are afforded an outside view, access to fresh air and natural lighting. At the TMH/TDF, each of the four housing units has a sizable yard attached. These four recreation yards are also covered and constructed of metal fencing. Mounted cameras facilitate enhanced security when in use. Residents follow a posted recreation schedule.

Dayrooms comply with standards size expectations. It was observed there are appropriate tables/seating for passive recreation. Each unit has a mounted flat screen television; cable services permit a selection of viewing options. Residents also have access to board games such as Connect4, Scrabble, or Jenga and coloring books/crayons.

In addition to the active/passive recreation opportunities, OJC has on staff a recreation therapist (RT) through Wexford. The RT strives to develop group coping skills, address past trauma, and encourage residents to participate in a healthy lifestyle. Toward this end, games and exercise are used to enhance these objectives. For example, UNO is a card game to develop problem solving skills while SEQUENCE is a board game used for team building. The RT works a Monday - Friday schedule, works with approximately 300 residents weekly in groups of three to ten. Sessions are generally held in resident housing areas.

Religious Programming:

A volunteer Chaplin works with the Clinical Program Director in organizing and coordinating services and volunteers. Currently, there is an HR approved roster of thirty volunteers with five-seven who are active. Activities and services are conducted in unit breakout rooms, day rooms or open interview rooms. Within OJC, residents have access to a variety of religious opportunities. On the facility issued tablet, there are several religious themed programs provided such as Behind Bars, Our Relationship with God and Freedom in Jesus Prison Ministry. Likewise, residents can select from a listing of religious books. These include, for example La Santa Bible, New International Version Bible, The Book of Mormon, The Koran (English) and The Torah. On Friday, there is a Jehovah's Witnesses and Islamic Services offered. Monday, Wednesday, Saturday and Sunday (female residents), Bible Study sessions are offered.

Offender Work Programs:

Residents at OJC are not required to work. However, they are expected to maintain cleanliness and proper sanitation in their assigned units/housing areas. To accomplish this goal, the pod deputy may direct residents to assist in cleaning these common areas. Residents interested in facility sanitation details and other tasks around the facility can apply for worker status via the kiosk. Workers are selected based on arrest history, institutional behavior and medical history, for example.

Staff report that during this audit period eight resident workers were assigned to the sanitation department. All were trained in cleaning chemicals via a power point created for visual learning. Similarly, there are 23 residents assigned as kitchen workers. Each completes a four-hour in-house training module covering safety, sanitation, and hygiene standards.

Academic and Vocational Education:

In consultation with the Nola Public Schools, OJC offers physical space for a fully accredited school within the security perimeter. Travis Hill School is for incarcerated youth under Orleans Parish School District guidance. Their stated mission is to “provide teens and young adults with a top-notch education that is relevant, meaningful, and designed to help students re-engage with school, both while detained and upon release”.

Youthful residents, 17 - 21 years old, adhere to an 8:00 am - 4:15 pm class schedule provided by 12 educators. There are five classrooms with each observed to have applicable seating, student work areas and educational aids (Chrome Laptop Books). Upon course completion and successful testing, students receive a high school diploma. Staff report 42 diplomas have been earned in the current year. Presently, there are 24 students enrolled in the Travis Hill School.

In addition to the educational component, staff maintain student discipline and adherence to acceptable behavior by one-on-one behavior intervention, i.e. Restorative Practice. As staff report, the intervention allows the student to reset his/her focus to acceptable behavioral parameters.

Residents older than 21 years can participate in the Hi-Set Program, designed to strengthen reading, writing, math, science and social studies in preparation for the Hi-Set examination. Volunteers function as facilitators. Sessions meet on Monday, Wednesday and Friday. Males and female resident meet in separate locations. This program is offered independent of Travis Hill School.

Though there are no specific active vocational training programs, in the early phase of the current audit cycle, residents were able to participate in an Introduction to Barbering class and a Thrive NOLA program, both of which were fund driven. The Barbering class was an eight-week course designed to provide participants with foundational knowledge and hands on exposure to the barbering profession. Thrive NOLA is designed to prepare residents for successful employment through comprehensive job readiness training and industry recognized safety certifications (OSHA).

Social Services:

At OJC, an array of social services is available to the resident population. These are guided by a Clinical Program Director and a case manager staff. Data for October 2025, for example, shows that case managers completed 65 Resident Holistic Assessments which are a multi-page record of resident social needs and a corresponding plan of action). In addition, 130 outgoing referrals were made for example housing, employment, and training/education with provider and contact information. Residents are provided with an extensive listing of community resources. These include shelter housing for men/women, legal assistance, employment assistance and vital document assistance.

Residents also can participate in a host of programming options. These include the following:

- Job 1 Restore (ten residents): The Restore program is designed to disrupt justice involvement by providing rewarding and engaging alternatives that lead to employment, career advancement and a reduced risk of recidivism.
- Women With a Vision (nine residents): This program aims to achieve pregnancy and STD prevention among incarcerated women who will be released from custody. The goal is to support women in making educated decisions about their reproductive health once they are no longer in custody.
- Metropolitan Human Services District (97 residents): The MHSD program provides incarcerated individuals with access to comprehensive behavioral health services designed to address immediate needs and support long-term recovery. In addition, Jail Program offers a wide range of support to the residents upon release to ensure continuity of care and stability during transition.
- Addicted to the Lifestyle (23 residents): Through an intense 12 session, ATL will reduce the number of participants who recidivate and who choose to emulate and engage in the negative activities associated with the trap culture of violence/drugs.
- Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse (13 residents): CADA provides incarcerated individuals with evidence-based education and counseling services to address substance use and its impact of their lives.

Other programming options that have either been offered or are waiting funding/scheduling include the following:

- Goodwill GEAR (one week job readiness training session),
- Decarceration of Incarcerated Trauma (designed for women to explore the trauma associated with incarceration),
- ARCH (an art based program to promote creative expression),
- Music Therapy (this program uses music-based interventions to promote emotional expression and personal growth),
- Helping Others Progress Everyday (HOPE is an evidence based curriculum designed to foster career readiness, provide mentorships and teach life skills that a person would need to be successful),
- Utilizing issued tablets, residents are able to obtain re-entry programming 2nd Opportunity, Changing Your Game Plan and Smart Ed

In addition to the mental health services provided by Wexford Health, as ordered by the Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System (court ordered) staff visit OJC to provide competency restoration sessions. One case worker reported having a weekly client base of 31 residents with the other case worker reporting checking on 20 residents twice a week.

Visitation:

Resident visitation is conducted via the video visitation kiosks located on the housing units following a posted schedule. Visitation may also be conducted via the tablets. Civilian visitors can travel to the Video Visitation Center located across the parking lot from OJC. Visitation times are Tuesday - Saturday: 8:00-11:00 am, 1:00-5:00 pm and 8:00-10:00 pm. During visits, residents are required to be in full uniform. Visits are limited to fifteen minutes.

There are several booths for attorney, legal, mental health and religious contact visits. Contact visits need to be scheduled during posted hours. At both the OJC and the TMJ/TDC, visitation hours are 8:30 am - 6:30 pm daily, inclusive of holidays. In addition, there are also several non-contact visitation booths at OJC specifically restricted to attorneys only. Residents are also able to conduct attorney visits utilizing the video visitation system. At such times, the resident may be placed in the private video visitation booth during the attorney visit.

Special visits may be approved as unique circumstances warrant, for example, a family emergency or medical/hospital scenario. As approved, OJC has provided deputy escort of residents to family funerals.

Library Services:

At OJC, the resident use of tablets facilitates access to reading materials. In review of materials available, it was found that residents can access general reading materials based on genre, educational materials, re-entry information and a host of religious books.

Likewise, residents can access legal reference materials such as LA Revised Statutes and Rules of Evidence via tablet. Use data for 2025 year to date, show 2,305 resident contacts totaling 79,796 minutes.

Laundry:

At OJC, in-house laundry facilities are limited to unit 2C (juveniles) and unit 4C (male honor housing). In each area there is a commercial grade washing machine and a dryer. Liquid soap is supplied by the facility. Each area was observed to be clean and organized.

All other laundry services are provided by an outside contractor, TLC Services, Inc., at a cost of \$.62 a pound. Laundry in the main building is collected according to a posted schedule and transported to the Warehouse for pick-up by TLC. When washing services are completed, TLC Services returns the laundry to this location. OJC staff complete final sorting prior to return to the main complex for distribution. At the Temporary Detention Center/ Temporary Mental Health location, laundry services adhere to a Monday - Thursday schedule. All laundry is collected during the day for night washing and return the following day. When Phase III is completed, all OJC laundry services will be consolidated in this new

building.

Per OJC practice, orange jumpers and burgundy 2-piece female uniforms are exchanged on weekly basis, sheets bi-weekly and blankets monthly. The resident reports damaged/worn items to the Pod Deputy for replacement consideration. Prior to the return of laundry to the residents, all items are searched for contraband.

F. Examination of Records

Following the facility tour, the team went to the conference room in the administrative wing of the jail to review and evaluate compliance levels of the OJC policies and procedures. Accreditation files were presented in paper format. The files were found to be organized with necessary documentation. When additional explanation or documentation was requested, staff were readily able to provide this. The facility has no notices of non-compliance with local, state or federal laws or regulations.

1. Litigation

Lashawn Jones, et al., v} Marlin Gusman, Sheriff (Civil Action no 2-12-cv-00859) discussed previously in Facility Description section.

2. Significant Incidents

During the audit cycle, there have been two noteworthy incidents; an escape and one ransomware attack significantly impacting OJC operations.

Resident Escape - 5/16/2025: During the early morning hours of 5/16/25, ten residents escaped from the Orleans Justice Center by exploiting faulty cell locks and breaking through a wall behind a toilet in their housing area. After removing the toilet-sink fixture, they squeezed through a narrow hole, moved to a loading area and climbed out of the secure perimeter. Their absence was not discovered until an 8:30 am headcount.

Many of the escapees were charged or convicted in violent cases, including multiple homicides, which led to an intensive manhunt involving local, state and federal agencies. Over the following months, all ten men were recaptured in Louisiana, Texas and Georgia. Subsequent investigations and criminal charges against a maintenance worker and several alleged accomplices highlighted long-standing infrastructure issues, staffing shortages and the need for tighter security and oversight at the jail.

To date, OJC is actively recruiting new deputy staff, replacing old cell locks and installing a double fence on the back side of the complex. As the Chief of Corrections notes, there is a strong process to harden the facility.

Ransomware Attack - 9/4/2025: In September 2025, the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office was hit by a ransomware attack that disrupted key technology systems, including the online DocketMaster court case lockup, bond processing tools, jail release workflows and some communication channels with justice partners. The incident, detected on September 4, 2025 left DocketMaster offline for days and contributed to delays in releasing some people who had already posted bond. Shortly afterward, the ransomware group Qilin claimed responsibility on its dark-web site. Qilin also known as 'Agenda' is a Russian speaking ransomware-as-a-service operation active since 2022. OPSO continues to work with state partners and cybersecurity vendors to rebuild and harden its systems, but recovery has been gradual: as of the date of this audit, not all functions lost during the attack have been fully restored.

As noted, the ransomware attack occurred on 9/4/25 which caused a delay in the previously scheduled ACA audit. OJC staff report there have been no significant incidents in the period of 7/1/25 to the date of the audit.

Based on professional judgment, experience and personal observations within the facility by the audit team, information presented reference significant incidents, aside from that noted, accurately reflect the level of operations and are consistent with the overall mission and the security level of the facility.

Outcome Measures

Several entries listed need additional clarity. First is the listing of 125 incidents of force used on residents. Per the active consent decree, any incident when a restraint or control measure used outside of normal security is considered as a use of force. Secondly, it is reported that there were 237 weapons found in the facility. Staff note that most of these were made by residents from material in the facility and were found during area searches. The next items of concern refer to the number of Hepatitis C positive cases and HIV positive residents. Medical authorities acknowledge that these numbers are reflective of what would be found among non-incarcerated populations of similar characteristics.

Data shows that there were 92 resident suicide attempts and two deaths in custody during the reporting period. Per the Wexford Medical contract, any threat (no matter how minor), gesture or indication of suicide ideation is considered as an attempt. The two deaths in custody were both of natural causes; one death occurred in the OJC with one at the hospital. Review of Mortality & Morbidity Reports provided details pertinent to the natural cause of death. Both show a long history of medical issues, medical care and a progressive decline in health, culminating in the reported death.

Lastly, per the active consent decree, any communication, concern or written notation by a resident of a complaint, issue, and concern is considered as a grievance. This definition was framed in such a manner that it generated a deeper

understanding of resident concerns and needs at OJC. This was one of the key issues raised in the initial civil court filing.

As noted, the ransomware attack occurred on 9/4/25 which caused a delay in the previously scheduled ACA audit. OJC staff noted that there have been no significant changes in reported outcome measures in the period of 7/1/25 to the date of the audit.

Based on professional judgment, experience and personal observations within the facility by the audit team, information presented reference outcome measures, aside from those noted, accurately reflect the level of operations, are consistent with the overall mission and the security level of the facility and reflect the nature of the resident population.

Departmental Visits

Team members visited or revisited the following departments after the initial tour to review conditions relating to departmental policy and operations. All the people contacted were helpful and supplied information for clarity of the audit process.

<u>Department Visited</u>	<u>Person (s) Contacted</u>
Overall Operations	Chief Jeworski Mallett Major Silas Phipps Jr.
Business	Bianka Brown, CFO
1 st Shift	Captain Jody-Lee Banks
2 nd Shift	Captain Corey Amacker Sgt. T. Ross Sgt. J. Lewis
Intake/Processing	Major D. Bierria & Lt. C. Esteen
Entrance/Lobby	Deputy Shirley Berry
Social Services & Religious Programs	Damon Smothers, Clinical Program Director
Medical	Dr. A. Blake, Medical Director Dr. Walker, HSA Nurse R. Turner, Pharmacy Nurse T. Keller, TMH
TDC/TMH	Lt. Steele, Sgt. Sterling
Travis Hill School	Principal Gilbert, Ms. Carney

4. Shifts

- a. First Shift: 6:30 am to 6:30 pm

The visiting committee was present at the facility, on this shift, both days of the audit. Staff were observed in assigned duty locations, housing units and, generally, throughout the Orleans Justice Center and satellite locations. After the tour, the team spent the balance of the day reviewing files and follow-up visits as needed. On Monday, the team was able to sample the noontime resident meal. Tuesday, the team completed file review, re-visited areas of the jail and spoke to several residents in the housing areas prior to the official close-out.

b. Second Shift: 6:30 pm to 6:30 am

The visiting committee was present at the facility on Monday from 6:30 to 7:00 pm. The Team attended shift briefing and was able to offer a status update of the ACA jail audit. Prior to the briefing start, the team was able to briefly interview oncoming staff and the shift supervisor. Prior to exiting the facility, the team provided a summary of the audit status to Chief of Corrections Mallett and Major Phipps along with an overview of the work plan for the following day.

On both shifts, the security staff were found to be friendly, professional and cognizant of their role in the overall mission of the facility. Staff were knowledgeable and aware of post orders. Staff were viewed to be effective in monitoring and controlling resident movements. All staff were observed to work well together with good communication and support for each other.

5. The team reviewed the status of standards previously found non-compliant, for which a waiver was not granted and found the following:

This was an initial audit; accordingly, there were no non-compliant or non-applicable standards to review.

G. Interviews

During the audit, team members met with both staff and offenders to verify observations and/or to clarify questions concerning facility operations.

1. Resident Interviews

The audit team spoke with approximately 30 residents during the audit, many at length, individually and in groups. Residents were interviewed in housing areas and work locations (kitchen). Within OJC, inmates report that they feel safe in their assigned housing areas. Residents report participating in fire drills and feel that staff treat them fairly and are approachable. Residents report an understanding of the process of accessing medical care stating that they frequently see the nurse making rounds. The female residents reported no issues with hygiene or health care needs. There were minimal complaints regarding food service. Based on observations and resident interviews, overall, the audit team

found the resident morale was very good with many observed to be actively involved in housing area and program activities.

2. Staff Interviews

The team spoke with 34 program, security and administrative staff during the audit. The team was present on the Monday afternoon shift and was able to address the oncoming officers as they prepared to start their shift. Personnel on all shifts, including administration, were interviewed. All employees displayed a high level of professionalism and pride. Each was willing to explain their area of responsibility with detail and a sense of pride. Staff had a positive approach to the work they do, and they were happy to be working at OJC. Staff show respect for management and offered many comments high in praise for their support. Likewise, management and administration views rank and file as part of the team, hence, a quality work environment is readily apparent. Staff noted that management is very approachable and attentive to concerns and questions. Management is reported to frequently tour the facility and engage staff as well as inmates in conversation. Staff stated they felt safe in their working environment. Inmate and staff rapport appeared to be good. It is obvious that staff are proud of their role in the operations of the facility and the impact they have on the fulfillment of the correctional goals.

H. Exit Discussion

The exit interview was held Tuesday, December 16, 2025, at 12:00 pm in the Sheriff's Large Conference Room. Sheriff Hutson and 28 of her staff were present. Also in attendance was Lead Federal Monitor, Margo Fraiser.

The Chair expressed appreciation for the exceptional hospitality and cooperation of everyone involved. The team discussed the compliance levels of the mandatory and non-mandatory standards and reviewed their individual findings with the group. Staff were recognized for the good job they do every day to keep the staff, residents, and public safe. At the end of the day both staff and residents stated they felt safe at OJC. A positive and strong staff and resident morale was noticeably present throughout the complex.

The Chair explained the audit team is the eyes and ears of the commission, and the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections determines and awards accreditation at the scheduled panel hearing. The Chair explained the procedures that would follow the completion of the audit.

The Chair again thanked and congratulated the OJC staff for the progress made and encouraged them to continue to strive toward even further professionalism within the correctional field as they begin their new audit cycle.

COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS
AND THE
AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION

COMPLIANCE TALLY

Manual Type	Core Jail Standards, 1 st Edition	
Supplement	2016 Standards Supplement	
Facility/Program	Orleans Justice Center New Orleans, Louisiana	
Audit Dates	December 15 - 16, 2025	
Auditor(s)	John P. Sargent, Chair William Russell, Member	
	MANDATORY	NON-MANDATORY
Number of Standards in Manual	47	106
Number Not Applicable	2	1
Number Applicable	45	105
Number Non-Compliance	0	0
Number in Compliance	45	105
Percentage (%) of Compliance	100%	100%
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of Standards <i>minus</i> Number of Not Applicable <i>equals</i> Number Applicable • Number Applicable <i>minus</i> Number Non-Compliance <i>equals</i> Number Compliance • Number Compliance <i>divided by</i> Number Applicable <i>equals</i> Percentage of Compliance 		

COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS

Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office

Orleans Justice Center
New Orleans, Louisiana

December 15 - 16, 2025

Visiting Committee Findings

Non-Mandatory Standards

Non - Compliance

All standards were found to be either applicable or not - applicable; there were no standards determined to be in non-compliance.

COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS

Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office

Orleans Justice Center
New Orleans, Louisiana

December 15 - 16, 2025

Visiting Committee Findings

Mandatory Standards

Not Applicable

Standard # 1-Core-4D-09

INVOLUNTARY ADMINISTRATION OF PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION(S) TO INMATES IS AUTHORIZED BY A PHYSICIAN AND PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH POLICIES AND PROCEDURES APPROVED BY THE HEALTH AUTHORITY, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE JURISDICTION.

FINDINGS:

Neither the agency nor its medical contractor utilizes or permits the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication to inmates under any circumstances.

Standard # 1-Core-4D-21

RESTRAINTS ON INMATES FOR MEDICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC PURPOSES ARE ONLY APPLIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH POLICIES AND PROCEDURES APPROVED BY THE HEALTH AUTHORITY, INCLUDING:

- CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH RESTRAINTS MAY BE APPLIED
- TYPES OF RESTRAINTS TO BE APPLIED
- IDENTIFICATION OF A QUALIFIED MEDICAL OR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL WHO MAY AUTHORIZE THE USE OF RESTRAINTS AFTER REACHING THE CONCLUSION THAT LESS INTRUSIVE MEASURES ARE NOT A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
- MONITORING PROCEDURES
- LENGTH OF TIME RESTRAINTS ARE TO BE APPLIED
- DOCUMENTATION OF EFFORTS FOR LESS RESTRICTIVE TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES

- AN AFTER-INCIDENT REVIEW.

FINDINGS:

Neither the agency nor its medical contractor utilizes or permits the use of clinically ordered restraints, whether physical or chemical, for medical or psychiatric purposes.

COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS

Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office

Orleans Justice Center
New Orleans, Louisiana

December 15 - 16, 2025

Visiting Committee Findings

Non - Mandatory Standards

Not Applicable

Standard # 1-Core-4C-04

IF INFIRMARY CARE IS PROVIDED ONSITE, IT COMPLIES WITH APPLICABLE STATE REGULATIONS AND LOCAL LICENSING REQUIREMENTS. PROVISIONS INCLUDE TWENTY-FOUR-HOUR EMERGENCY ON-CALL CONSULTATION WITH A PHYSICIAN, DENTIST, AND MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL.

FINDINGS:

OJC does not currently operate an on-site infirmary.

Significant Incident Summary

This report is required for all **residential** accreditation programs.

This summary is required to be provided to the Chair of your visiting team upon their arrival for an accreditation audit and included in the facility's Annual Report. The information contained on this form will also be summarized in the narrative portion of the visiting committee report and will be incorporated into the final report. Please type the data. If you have questions on how to complete the form, please contact your Accreditation Specialist.

This report is for Adult Correctional Institutions, Adult Local Detention Facilities, Core Jail Facilities, Boot Camps, Therapeutic Communities, Juvenile Correctional Facilities, Juvenile Detention Facilities, Adult Community Residential Services, and Small Juvenile Detention Facilities.

Facility Name: Orleans Justice Center, New Orleans, LA **Reporting Period:** July 1, 2025-June 30, 2025

Incident Type	Months	Jul '24	Aug '24	Sep '24	Oct '24	Nov '24	Dec '24	Jan '25	Feb '25	Mar '25	Apr '25	May '25	Jun '25	Total for Reporting Period
	→													
Escapes		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Disturbances*		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sexual Violence		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Homicide*	Offender Victim	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Staff Victim	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Other Victim	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Assaults	Offender/Offender	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Offender/Staff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suicide		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-Compliance with a Mandatory Standard*		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fire*		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Natural Disaster*		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unnatural Death		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other*														0

Name of Facility: **Orleans Justice Center**

Date: **August 25, 2025**

Number of Months Data Collected: **July 1, 2024 – June 30, 2025**

Core Jail Outcome Measures				
	Outcome Measure	Numerator/Denominator	Value	Calculated O.M
1A		The community, staff, contractors, volunteers, and inmates are protected from injury and illness caused by the physical environment.		
	(1)	Number of inmate illnesses requiring medical attention	1	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0.0006
	(2)	Number of inmate illnesses requiring medical attention	1	
	divided by	Number of Admissions in the past 12 months	9,487	0.0001

	(3)	Number of inmate injuries requiring medical attention	1	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0.0006
	(4)	Number of staff injuries requiring medical attention	10	
	divided by	Number of full-time employees in the past 12 months	677	0.0147
	(5)	Number of inmate lawsuits related to safety or sanitation found in favor of the inmate	0	
	divided by	Number of inmate lawsuits related to safety or sanitation resolved.	0	0
1C		The number and severity of emergencies are minimized. When emergencies occur, the response minimizes the severity.		
	(6)	Number of emergencies in the past 12 months	1	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0
	(7)	Number of fires that resulted in property damage	0	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0
2A		The community, staff, contractors, volunteers, and inmates are protected from harm. Events that pose risk of harm are prevented. The number and severity of events are minimized.		
	(8)	Number of incidents	0	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0
	(9)	Number of escapes	1	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0

2B		Physical force is used only in instances of self-protection, protection of the inmate or others, prevention of property damage, or prevention of escape		
	(10)	Number of inmates upon whom force was used	125	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0.0839
	(11)	Number of times force was used	*0	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	
2C		Contraband is minimized. It is detected when present in the facility		
	(12)	Number of weapons found in the facility	237	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0.1591
	(13)	Number of controlled substances found in the facility	43	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0.0288
2D		Improper access to and use of keys, tools and utensils are minimized.		
	(14)	Number of incidents involving lost/missing keys	1	
	divided by	Number of full-time employees	677	0.0014
	(15)	Number of incidents involving lost/missing tools	0	
	divided by	Number of full-time employees	677	0
	(16)	Number of incidents involving lost/missing culinary equipment	0	
	divided by	Number of full-time employees	677	0
	(17)	Number of incidents involving lost/missing medical equipment and sharps	0	
	divided by	Number of full-time employees	677	0
3A		Inmates comply with rules and regulations.		
	(18)	Number of inmates rule violations	4,888	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	3.2827
	(19)	Number of inmates on inmate assaults	23	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0.0154
	(20)	Number of inmate on staff assaults	2	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0.0013
4C		Inmates maintain good health. Inmates have unimpeded access to a continuum of health care services so that their health care needs, including prevention and health education, are met in a timely and efficient manner		
	(21)	Number of inmates with a positive tuberculin skin test on admission	0	
	divided by	Number of admissions in the past 12 months	9,487	0
	(22)	Number of Hepatitis C positive inmates	48	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0.0322
	(23)	Number of HIV positive inmates	43	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0.0288

	Outcome Measure	Numerator/Denominator	Value	Calculated O.M
	(24)	Number of inmate suicide attempts	92	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0.0617
	(25)	Number of inmate suicides	0	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0
	(26)	Number of inmate deaths (other than suicide)	2	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0.0013
4D		Health services are provided in a professionally acceptable manner. Staff are qualified, adequately trained, and demonstrate competency in their assigned duties		
	(27)	Number of staff with lapsed licensures and/or certification	1	
	divided by	Average number of licensed or certified staff	133	0.0075
6A		Inmates' rights are not violated		
	(28)	Total number of inmate grievances	2,532	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	1.7004
	(29)	Number of inmate grievances regarding access to court, mail or correspondence, sexual harassment, discipline, discrimination or protection from harm	156	
	divided by	Average Daily Population for the past 12 months	1,489	0.1047
	(30)	Number of grievances resolved in favor of inmates		
	divided by	Total number of grievances	2,532	
6C		Alleged rule violations are handled in a manner that provides inmates with appropriate procedural safeguards		
	(31)	Number of appealed disciplinary decisions found in favor of the inmate	87	
	divided by	Number of inmate disciplinary decisions that were appealed	158	0.5506
7B		Staff, contractors, and volunteers demonstrate competency in their assigned duties		
	(32)	Number of new employees who completed required hours of training	246	
	divided by	Number of new employees	247	0.9959
	(33)	Number of employees who completed required hours of in-service training	268	
	divided by	Number of employees who were required to complete in-service training	304	0.8815
7C		Staff, contractors, and volunteers are professional, ethical, and accountable		
	(34)	Number of times employees were found, through a formal process, to have acted in violation of facility policy	91	
	divided by	Number of full-time employees in the past 12 months	677	0.1344
	(35)	Number of employees terminated for cause	12	
	divided by	Number of full-time employees in the past 12 months	677	0.0177

	Outcome Measure	Numerator/Denominator	Value	Calculated O.M
	(36)	Number of employee substance abuse tests failed	5	
	divided by	Number of full-time employees in the past 12 months	677	0.0073
	(37)	Number of employee terminations for violation of drug-free workplace policy	5	
	divided by	Number of employees terminated for cause	12	0.4166
7E		Staff are treated fairly		
	(38)	Number of grievances filed by employees	15	
	divided by	Number of full-time employees in the past 12 months	677	0.0221
	(39)	Number of employee grievances decided in favor of the employee	11	
	divided by	Number of grievances filed by employees	15	0.7333

Note: * means that the data is not currently tracked in the format requested or is unavailable because of the cyber-attack of September 2025.

**Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office
Orleans Justice Center
Weekly Pod Inspection Report**

Pod Deputy Floor Supervisor Watch Commander

Date: 1-31-26

Pod Deputy: J Edwards

Location: 1FOX

Inspector: _____

GENERAL POD AREAS	
Common Areas	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Grievance Kiosk Working
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	iPad Tablet Working
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Inmate Handbook on Pod
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Stairs - Clean/Good Repair
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Hallways - Clean
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Ventilation - Unobstructed
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Tables & Chairs - Clean/Good Rep.
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	T.V.'s - Good Repair
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> N	Trash on Floor

SHOWER AREAS - BOTTOM FLOOR	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Floors, Walls, Ceiling - Clean
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Fixtures/Curtains - Clean
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> N	Insects Present
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Showers - Adequate Water Temp

SHOWER AREAS - MEZZANINE LEVEL	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Floors, Walls, Ceiling - Clean
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Fixtures/Curtains - Clean
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> N	Insects Present
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Showers - Adequate Water Temp

DEPUTY'S DESK	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Counter/Cabinet - Clean/Good Rep.

RECREATION YARD	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Entry Doors - Secured
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Floors, Walls, Ceiling - Clean
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Windows - Clean
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> N	Insects Present
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Trash on Floor

MOP SINK / CLEANING CLOSET	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Entry Doors - Secured
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Cleaning Supplies - Properly stored
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Spray Bottles - Missing
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Mop Sink - Good Repair

Deputy Notes:

Supervisor Notes:

LAUNDRY ROOM	
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> N	Entry Doors - Secured
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input type="checkbox"/> N	Floors, Walls, Ceiling - Clean
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> N	Washer/Dryer - Good Repair
<input type="checkbox"/> Y <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> N	Dryer Connected Properly
<input type="checkbox"/> NA	Washer/Dryer

Cleaning Inspection - Page 2

Cell Inspections will be based on the following criteria: Circle the number or alphabet corresponding to each cell's deficiency.

Inspection Criteria

• Bed(s) not made (1)	• Lighting covered (2)	• Excess commissary items (3)
• Pictures on walls (4)	• Trash on floor (5)	• Property bag not properly stored (6)
• Ventilation obstructed (7)	• Graffiti on walls (8)	• Toilet/Sink not clean (9)
• Pest/Insects (10)		

Individual Cell Inspections (Circle the numbers below which correspond to the above deficiency)

BOTTOM LEVEL	
<input type="checkbox"/> 05	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 06	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 07	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 08	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 09	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 10	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 11	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 12	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 13	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 14	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 15	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 16	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (8) 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 17	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 18	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 19	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG

MEZZANINE LEVEL	
<input type="checkbox"/> 05M	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 06M	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (8) 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 07M	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 08M	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 09M	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (8) 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 10M	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 (8) 9 10 NG → Floor
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 11M	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 12M	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 13M	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 14M	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 15M	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 16M	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 17M	(1) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 18M	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG
<input type="checkbox"/> 19M	(1)(2) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NG

Notes:

Inmates are still asleep, therefore beds are not made!

Date: 1/31/20

Supervisor's Signature: 

TC22 and TC27 Accessories Guide

The ultimate cost-effective
tool for small businesses —
with big business features

Revised Feb 2025



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Single-slot cradles



Single-slot charger cradle

SKU# CRD-TC2L-BS1CO-01

Single-slot charge-only cradle for one TC22 / TC27 device.

- Charges standard capacity battery from 0 to 80% in less than 2 hours 20 minutes.
- Charges extended capacity battery from 0 to 80% in less than 3 hours 10 minutes.
- Compatible with TC22 / TC27 units with hand straps, trigger handle or protective boot when shim is removed.
- Sold separately: Single-slot cradle requires power supply SKU# PWR-WUA5V12W0XX (last XX of SKU are country-specific, listed later in this document) and USB-C cable SKU# CBL-TC5X-USBC2A-01.



Single-slot USB / Ethernet charger cradle

SKU# CRD-TC2L-SE1ET-01

Single-slot charger and USB cradle. Charges a single device.

- Charges standard capacity battery from 0 to 80% in less than 1 hours 20 minutes.
- Charges extended capacity battery from 0 to 80% in less than 1 hours 50 minutes.
- Compatible with TC22 / TC27 units with hand straps, trigger handle or protective boot when shim is removed.
- Sold separately: Power supply SKU# PWR-BGA12V50W0WW, DC cable SKU# CBL-DC-388A1-01, and country-specific AC line cord (listed later in this document). To charge and sync using USB port with a computer, purchase USB cable SKU# 25-124330-01R. To connect to Ethernet, purchase USB-to-Ethernet module SKU# MOD-MT2-EU1-01 with bracket SKU# BRKT-TC51-ENET1-02.



Single-slot device and battery charger cradle

SKU# CRD-TC2L-BS11B-01

Single-slot charger charges a TC22 / TC27 device and its spare Li-Ion battery.

- Charges Standard battery in device from 0 to 80% in less than 1 hour 20 minutes.
- Charges Extended battery in device from 0 to 80% in less than 1 hour 50 minutes.
- Compatible with TC22 / TC27 units with hand strap, trigger handle, or protective boot when shim is removed.
- Sold separately: Power supply SKU# PWR-BGA12V50W0WW, DC cable SKU# CBL-DC-388A1-01, and country-specific AC line cord (listed later in this document).



Multi-slot cradles



Five-slot charger cradle

SKU# CRD-TC2L-BS5CO-01

Multi-slot cradle to charge up to five TC22 / TC27 devices.

- Charges Standard Capacity battery from 0 to 80% in less than 1 hour 20 minutes.
- Charges Extended Capacity battery from 0 to 80% in less than 1 hour 50 minutes.
- Compatible with TC22 / TC27 units with hand straps, trigger handle, or protective boot when shim is removed.
- Can be rack-mounted in a standard 19-inch server rack via mounting bracket SKU# BRKT-SCRD-SMRK-01.
- Sold separately: Power supply SKU# PWR-BGA12V108W0WW, DC cable SKU# CBL-DC-381A1-01, and country-specific AC line cord (listed later in this document).




Five-slot charge / Ethernet cradle

SKU# CRD-TC2L-SE5ET-01

Five-slot charge / Ethernet cradle. Charges five devices with network speeds of up to 1Gbps.

- Charges Standard Capacity battery from 0 to 80% in less than 1 hour 20 minutes.
- Charges Extended Capacity battery from 0 to 80% in less than 1 hour 50 minutes.
- Compatible with TC22 / TC27 units with hand straps, trigger handle, or protective boot when shim is removed.
- Can be rack-mounted in a standard 19-inch server rack via mounting bracket SKU# BRKT-SCRD-SMRK-01.
- Sold separately: Power supply SKU# PWR-BGA12V108W0WW, DC cable SKU# CBL-DC-381A1-01, and country-specific AC line cord (listed later in this document).

Cradle cups




Device cradle cup replacement kit

SKU# CRDCUP-TC2L1C-01

One TC22 / TC27 device cradle cup replacement kit. Can be used to replace another device's cup purchased after 2019 on ShareCradle when upgrading to TC22 / TC27.

- Also available as a 5-pack — 5 device cradle cups — SKU# CRDCUP-TC2L5C-01.
- Not all five cups need to be used, therefore creating a multi-slot cradle supporting a mixed combination of devices (e.g., two TC22 / TC27 and three TC5X devices).



Charge and communication device cradle cup replacement kit

SKU# CRDCUP-TC2L1E-01

One TC22 / TC27 charge and USB / Ethernet connection device cradle cup replacement kit. Can be used to replace another device's cup purchased after 2019 on ShareCradle when upgrading to TC22 / TC27.

- Also available as a 5-pack — 5 device cradle cups — SKU# CRDCUP-TC2L5C-01.
- Not all five cups need to be used, therefore creating a multi-slot cradle supporting a mixed combination of devices (e.g., two TC22 / TC27 and three TC5X devices).

Mounting options for chargers



Rack mounting for space optimization

Optimize available space by mounting any set of five-slot chargers for TC22 / TC27 on a standard, 19-inch server rack.

- Ideal for customers that have several devices per location.
- Compatible with all five-slot chargers for TC22 / TC27.



Mounting bracket

SKU# BRKT-SCRD-SMRK-01

Use five-slot ShareCradle mounting bracket to attach five-slot TC22 / TC27 cradles to the wall or mount on a 19-inch server rack.

- Offers cable routing slots and removable tray that stores / conceals power supply.
- Adjustable orientations:
 - 25° angle for high-density (five-slot chargers).
 - Horizontal (single-slot or four-slot spare Li-ion charger).
- Four 4-slot spare battery chargers can be mounted as shown with mounting bracket.
- Use to mount to wall or with standard 19-inch server rack for more density and save space.

Spare Li-on batteries



Standard Li-ion Bluetooth Battery with PowerPrecision

SKU# BTRY-TC2L-2XMAXB-01

Standard capacity 3,800mAh PowerPrecision Li-Ion Battery with BLE Beacon.

- Premium-grade battery cells with longer lifecycle and tested to meet rigorous controls and standards.
- BLE beacon allows device with this battery to be located even if powered off using [Zebra Device Tracker](#).
- Sold separately: Zebra Device Tracker licenses for either 1-year SKU# SW-BLE-DT-SP- 1YR or 3-years SKU# SW-BLE-DT-SP-3YR.



Standard Li-ion Battery with PowerPrecision

SKU# BTRY-TC2L-2XMAXX-01

Standard capacity 3,800 mAh PowerPrecision Li-ion Battery.

- Premium-grade battery cells with longer lifecycle and tested to meet rigorous controls and standards.



Extended PowerPrecision Li-ion Battery

SKU# BTRY-TC2L-3XMAXX-01

Extended capacity 5,200 mAh PowerPrecision Li-ion battery.

- Premium-grade battery cells with longer lifecycle and tested to meet rigorous controls and standards.

Spare battery chargers



Battery Charger

SKU# SAC-TC2L-4SCHG-01

Spare battery charger to charge any four Li-ion batteries.

- Charges Standard Capacity battery from 0 to 90% in less than 3 hours.
- Charges Extended Capacity battery from 0 to 90% in less than 4 hours..
- Can be used standalone or up to 4 chargers can be mounted on Mounting Bracket SKU# BRKT-SCRD-SMRK-01.
- Sold separately: Power Supply SKU# PWR-BGA12V50W0WW, DC Cable SKU# CBL-DC- 388A1-01, and Country-specific AC Line cord ([listed later in this document](#)).




Battery charger replacement kit

SKU# CRDCUP-TC2L4B-01

Four-slot battery charger replacement cup.

- Used to replace a legacy TC21 / TC26 series 4-slot Battery Charger on single-slot or multi-slot ShareCradle base when migrating from TC21 / TC26 to TC22 / TC27.
- No more than one cup shall be installed on a multi-slot ShareCradle base when converting with this 4-slot Battery Charger cup.
- Should replace the TC21/TC26 toaster cup in the same location on the ShareCradle base, usually the left-most slot when facing the cradle.





Accessories that power devices

Power supply, cables, and adaptors

Power supply and cable matrix

SKU#	Description	Note
PWR-BGA12V108W0WW	Level VI AC/DC power supply brick. AC Input: 100–240V, 2.8A. DC Output: 12V, 9A, 108W.	Sold separately. Use for: • CRD-TC2L-BS5CO-01 • CRD-TC2L-SE5ET-01
CBL-DC-381A1-01	DC line cord for running multi-slot cradles from a single Level VI power supply.	
PWR-BGA12V50W0WW	Level VI AC/DC power supply brick. AC Input: 100-240V, 2.4A. DC Output: 12V, 4.16A, 50W.	Sold separately. Use for: • CRD-TC2L-SE1ET-01 • CRD-TC2L-BS11B-01 • SAC-TC2L-4SCHG-01
CBL-DC-388A1-01	DC line cord for running single-slot cradles or battery chargers from a single Level VI power supply.	
CBL-TC2X-USBC-01	USB-A to USB-C cable with an additional ferrite bead.	
KIT-PWR-12V50W	Power supply kit for single-slot cradle including Power Supply SKU# PWR-BGA12V50W0WW and DC line cord SKU# CBL-DC-388A1-01.	Sold separately: Country-specific AC line cord.
CBL-DC-382A1-01	DC line cord for running five-slot cradles when using Level VI Efficiency power supply SKU# PWR-BGA12V108W0WW. Includes black extension tab for releasing the cable.	
CBL-TC5X-USBC2A-01	USB C to USB A communications and charging cable, 1m long	Sold separately. Use to: • Directly charge TC22 / TC27 using a wall wart • Connect TC22 / TC27 to a computer (developer tools) • Charge TC22 / TC27 in a vehicle (can be used with cigarette light adapter SKU# CHG-AUTO-USB1-01, if needed)
CBL-TC2Y-USBC90A-01	USB C to USB A cable with 90° bend in USB-C adapter	
25-124330-01R	Micro USB active-sync cable for use with Single Slot USB/ Communication Cradle.	Sold separately. Required for use with SKU# CRD-TC2L-SE1ET-01 if syncing with a computer is desired while TC22 / TC27 is in the charger.
CBL-DC-523A1-01	DC Y-line cord for running two 4-slot battery chargers to a single Level VI power supply SKU# PWR-BGA12V108W0WW.	Sold separately. Use to: Consolidate power supplies for multiple spare battery chargers proximally placed to each other.
PWR-WUA5V12W0XX	USB type A power supply adaptor (wall wart). Replace 'XX' in SKU as follows to get the right plug style based on region: US (United States) • GB (United Kingdom) • EU (European Union) AU (Australia) • CN (China) • IN (India) • KR (Korea) • BR (Brazil)	Sold separately. Use with a communications & charge cable to directly charge TC22 / TC27 device drawing power from a wall socket.

Accessories that power devices



Power supply, cables, and adaptors

Country-specific AC line cords: grounded, 3-prong

SKU#	Country / region	Note
23844-00-00R	North America (United States, Canada, Mexico)	7.5 feet long Commonly used with chargers mounted in server racks
50-16000-678R	North America (United States, Canada, Mexico)	3 feet long
50-16000-221R	North America (United States, Canada, Mexico)	6 feet long
50-16000-727R	Brazil	1.8 meters (6 feet) long
50-16000-680R	Argentina	1.8 meters (6 feet) long
50-16000-217R	American Samoa, Australia, New Guinea	1.8 meters (6 feet) long
50-16000-218R	Japan	1.8 meters (6 feet) long
50-16000-219R	Antigua, Bermuda, Burma, Channel Islands, Hong Kong, Iraq, Ireland, Malaysia, North Ireland, Scotland, Singapore, United Kingdom, Wales	1.8 meters (6 feet) long
50-16000-257R	China	1.8 meters (6 feet) long
50-16000-220R	Europe, Abu Dhabi, Bolivia, Dubai, Egypt, Iran, Korea, Russia, Vietnam	1.8 meters (6 feet) long
50-16000-671R	Italy	1.8 meters (6 feet) long
50-16000-669R	India, S. Africa, Africa	1.8 meters (6 feet) long



Accessories that power devices



Power supply, cables, and adaptors

Country-specific AC line cords: ungrounded, 2-prong

SKU#	Country / region	Note
50-16000-182R	United States	Type A NEMA 1-15 plug
50-16000-255R	Europe, Abu Dhabi, Bolivia, Dubai, Egypt, Iran, Korea, Russia, Vietnam.	Type C CEE7/16 plug
50-16000-670R	Bermuda, Hong Kong, Iraq, Ireland, Malaysia, Singapore, United Kingdom.	



Accessories that enable productivity solutions



Headsets

Close gaps, Open possibilities with Workcloud Sync

Usher in a new era of transformation—one led by your frontline and powered by Zebra Workcloud Sync. One where communication and information flows freely and gaps between teams, workflows and data are closed.

With Workcloud Sync, hindered workers become effective problem solvers, contributing their best. Critical workflows are streamlined in one place, on one device, equipping workers with the information they need, right at their fingertips.

Only Zebra offers the most complete lineup of software and rugged hardware with the scalability, support and service needed to make the greatest impact where it counts—on the frontline.

[Learn more about you can elevate your frontline workers with Zebra Workcloud Sync.](#)



Wired headsets for Workcloud Sync

SKU# HDST-USBC-PTT1-01

PTT headset with USB-C connector; one-piece solution.

- For Push-To-Talk (PTT) applications with volume up/volume down/PTT buttons. Compatible with PTT Express/PTT Pro.
- Rotating earpiece allows for right or left ear configuration. Mono headset with microphone.
- Includes clip for attaching PTT button to clothing.



Wired headsets for Workcloud Sync

SKU# HDST-35MM-PTVP-02

PTT and VoIP headset with 3.5mm standard jack.

- For Push-To-Talk (PTT) and VoIP telephony. Compatible with PTT Express/PTT Pro.
- Rotating earpiece allows for right or left ear configuration. Mono headset with microphone.
- Includes clip for attaching PTT button to clothing.
- Requires adapter SKU# ADP-USBC-35MM1-01.

Accessories that enable productivity solutions



Headsets

Rugged Bluetooth and corded HD voice headsets for the most demanding industrial environments

When it comes to enabling speech-driven applications and voice communications in warehouses, manufacturing plants and outdoor yards, you need a headset that is specially designed for the job. The HS3100 Bluetooth and HS2100 corded headsets are loaded with features that offer everything you need in an industrial headset.

Wired headsets for voice-directed picking

HS2100 rugged wired headset

Corded HD voice headset. Can be used with TC22/TC27 devices with adapters SKU# CBL-HS2100-3MS1-01 and SKU# ADP-USBC-35MM1-01.

- Dustproof, spray proof, and waterproof.
- Noise cancellation for a superior voice experience in the noisiest environments.
- Swiveling boom mutes microphone allowing user to prevent voice pick applications from recognizing non-voice pick conversations.
- Feather-light for extraordinary comfort.



SKU#	Description
HS2100-OTH	HS2100 Rugged Wired Headset Over-The-Head Headband includes HS2100 Boom Module and HSX100 OTH Headband Module
HS2100-BTN-L	HS2100 Rugged Wired Headset (Behind-the-neck headband left)
HS2100-OTH-SB	HS2100 Rugged Wired Headset (Over-the-head headband) includes HS2100 Shortened Boom Module and HSX100 OTH headband module
HS2100-BTN-LSB	HS2100 Rugged Wired Headset (Behind-the-neck headband left) includes HS2100 Shortened Boom Module and HSX100 BTN headband module

Wireless headsets for voice-directed picking

HS3100 rugged Bluetooth headset

Bluetooth headset for voice-directed picking applications.

- Noise cancellation tuned for Voice-Directed Picking applications.
- Swap batteries on the fly — without losing the Bluetooth connection.
- Split-second tap-to-pair simplicity using NFC. 15 hours of battery power.



SKU#	Description
HS3100-OTH	HS3100 Bluetooth Headset Over-The-Head Headband includes HS3100 Boom Module and HSX100 OTH Headband Module
HS3100-BTN-L	HS3100 Bluetooth Headset (Behind-the-neck headband left)
HS3100-OTH-SB	HS3100 Bluetooth Headset (Over-the-head headband) includes HS3100 Shortened Boom Module and HSX100 OTH headband module
HS3100-BTN-LSB	HS3100 Bluetooth Headset (Behind-the-neck headband left) includes HS3100 Shortened Boom Module and HSX100 BTN headband module
HS3100-SBOOM-01	HS3100 Shortened Boom Module (includes microphone boom, battery and windscreen)

Accessories that enable productivity solutions



Cables and adapters




Cigarette lighter adapter plug

SKU# CHG-AUTO-USB1-01

USB cigarette lighter adapter plug.

- Used with USB C Cable SKU# CBL-TC5X-USBC2A-01 (sold separately) to provide in-vehicle charging.
- Includes two USB-A ports providing higher current (5V, 2.5A) for faster charging.



HS2100 Standard cable

SKU# CBL-HS2100-3MS1-01

HS2100 headset standard cable – 3.5mm jack.

- 3.5mm barrel jack connector with cable length 43 inches or 1.1 meters.
- For use with TC22 / TC27 or other devices using a 3.5mm barrel jack audio connector. Requires SKU# ADP-USBC-35MM1-01.
- Rugged cable with rugged connectors that are keyed / collared for a locking failsafe connection.
- Includes one clothing clip. Additional clips can be purchased separately.



Adapter cable

SKU# ADP-USBC-35MM1-01

USB-C to 3.5mm adapter cable.

- Allows headsets with 3.5mm jack to be connected to TC22/TC27.
- Adapter provides push-to-talk (PTT) button, volume up / down buttons.
- Adapter cable length is about 2.5 feet or 78 centimeters.
- Clip on rear of adapter allows cable to be wrapped for length management
- PTT button functionality tested with headset SKU# HDST-35MM-PTVP-02 where both the PTT button the headset and the adapter may be used.

Arm / wrist mounts



Arm mount with medium size length strap

SKU# SG-TC2L-ARMNT-01

Arm mount with medium size length strap.

- Enables the TC22 / TC27 to be mounted to the arm for hands free operation and can be used with the RS5100 / RS6100 (or similar) ring scanner.
- Compatible with Standard or Extended Capacity battery.
- Not compatible with Rugged Boot.
- Includes: Medium length (30cm or 12 inches) Velcro wrist strap SKU# SG-TC2L-ARMSTRAP-01 and carrier comfort pad SKU# SG-TC2L-CMPD-01

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*



Arm mount with large size length strap

SKU# SG-TC2L-ARMNT-02

Arm mount with large size length strap.

- Enables the TC22 / TC27 to be mounted to the arm for hands free operation and can be used with the RS5100 / RS6100 (or similar) ring scanner.
- Compatible with Standard or Extended Capacity battery.
- Not compatible with Rugged Boot.
- Includes: Large sized (33cm or 13 inches) Velcro wrist strap SKU# SG-TC2L-ARMSTRAP-02 and carrier comfort pad SKU# SG-TC2L-CMPD-01

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*



Arm mount with extended length strap

SKU# SG-TC2L-WMADP1-02

- Wrist mount with extended BOA dial-to-fit wrist strap
- Swivel design allows device to be viewed in portrait or landscape mode enabling hands- free functionality.
- Velcro-free design uses non-absorbent materials that can be wiped down.
- Strap length can be adjusted between 164 to 265mm (approx. 6.5 to 10.5")
- Not compatible with Rugged Boot.
- Includes: Carrier, Comfort Pad SKU# SG-TC2L-CMPD-01 and medium / large sized wrist strap SKU# SG-NGWT-WSTPLN-01

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*

Replacement straps and arm sleeve



BOA Replacement wrist strap

SKU# SG-NGWT-WSTPST-01

Replacement wrist strap – standard size.

- White dial and accent color on strap identify size as standard (small / medium).
- Strap length can be adjusted between 128 to 191mm (approx. 5.0 to 7.5").

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*



BOA Replacement wrist strap

SKU# SG-NGWT-WSTPLN-01

Replacement wrist strap – extended size.

- Black dial and accent color on strap identify size as extended (medium / large).
- Strap length can be adjusted between 164 to 265mm (approx. 6.5 to 10.5").

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*



BOA Replacement wrist strap

SKU# SG-NGWT-WSTPXL-01

Replacement wrist strap – extra-large size.

- Blue dial and accent color on strap identify size as extra-large.
- Strap length can be adjusted between 218 to 375 mm (approx. 8.5 to 14.75").

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*



Arm sleeve

SKU# SG-WT4027050-01R

Arm sleeve – pack of 5.

- Worn under wrist mount strap if worker is in short-sleeved shirt and wants extra sweat wicking / personal layer, comfort and slip-resistance
- Material will not snag. One size fits all.
- Washable in mild detergent. Should be air dried.

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*

Replacement straps, hand strap, and comfort pad



Medium Velcro Replacement Strap

SKU# SG-TC2L-ARMSTRAP-01

Replacement arm strap – size medium.

- Replaces the Velcro strap included for SKU# SG-TC2L-ARMNT-01
- Comes in size large with strap length of 300mm or 12"

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*



Large Velcro Replacement Strap

SKU# SG-TC2L-ARMSTRAP-02

Replacement arm strap – size large.

- Replaces the Velcro strap included for SKU# SG-TC2L-ARMNT-02
- Comes in size large with strap length of 330mm or 13"

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*



Hand strap

SKU# SG-TC2L-HSTRP1-01

Hand strap.

- Allows device to be easily held in palm of hand.
- Attaches directly to device, even with rugged boot installed.
- Sold separately: Rugged boot SKU# SG-TC2L-BOOT-01.

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*



Replacement Comfort Pad

SKU# SG-TC2L-CMPD-01

Comfort Pad for Arm Mount

- Replaces the Comfort Pad included on either SKU# SG-TC2L- ARMNT-01 or SKU# SG-TC2L-ARMNT-02 or SKU# SG-TC2L- WMADP1-02.
- Soft Rubber material.
- Easily removable and hygienic.

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*

Accessories that enable productivity solutions



Stylus and tether



Stylus

SKU# SG-STYLUS-TCX-MTL-03

Fiber tipped stylus – pack of 3.

- Heavy-duty and made from stainless steel / brass. No plastic parts — real pen feel. Can be used in rain.
- Micro-knit, hybrid-mesh, fiber tip provides silent, smooth gliding use. 5" length.
- Big improvement over rubber tipped or plastic tipped stylus.
- Compatible with all capacitive touch screen devices.
- Tether to device or hand strap using SKU# SG-TC5NGTC7NG-TETHR-03.

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*



Stylus tether

SKU# SG-TC5NGTC7NG-TETHR-03

Stylus tether.

- Can be attached to device tower bar.
- String type tether prevents loss of stylus.
- This tether is recommended when using Fiber Tipped Stylus (SG-STYLUS-TCX-MTL-03).

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*

Accessories that enable productivity solutions



Trigger handles and accessories



Electronic trigger handle

SKU# TRG-TC2L-SNP1-01

Pistol-grip trigger handle.

- Uses electrical trigger via contacts on back side of TC22 / TC27.
- Trigger handle accessory offers customers the option of using the product in a gun form factor, ideal for scan-intensive operations.
- Requires rugged boot SKU# SG-TC2L-BOOT-01.
- Does not block access to rear facing camera and flash allowing camera to be used while using the trigger handle.
- Compatible with both standard and extended capacity batteries.
- Not compatible with Hand Strap,



Wrist Strap

SKU# 50-12500-066

- Attaches to bottom of Snap-on Trigger Handle (SKU# TRG-TC2L-SNP1-01).

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*

Soft holsters, rugged boots, and screen protectors



Rugged boot

SKU# SG-TC2L-BOOT-01

Rugged protective boot.

- Boot increases drop spec of device to 5 ft. (1.5 m) and drop surface to concrete.
- Compatible with devices using Standard or Extended Capacity battery.
- Compatible with Hand Strap.

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*



Screen protector

SKU# SG-TC2L-SCRNPT1-01

Screen protector.

- Tempered glass.
- Includes: Alcohol wipes, cleaning cloth, and instructions needed for screen protector installation.

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*



Soft holster

SKU# SG-TC2L-HLSTR1-01

Soft holster.

- Vertical orientation with open bucket design to accommodate TC22 / TC27 with optional trigger handle SKU# TRG-TC2L-SNP1-01 .
- Compatible with rugged boot SKU# SG-TC2L-BOOT-01 and hand strap SKU# SG-TC2L-HSTRP1-01.
- Opening at bottom of holster for providing drainage and route for audio from device's speaker.
- Nonrotating for maximum durability.
- Compatible with devices using Standard or Extended Capacity battery.

** Please note this accessory is a consumable and may require replacement during the device's lifespan.*

Workstation Connect Cradle



TC22 and TC27 Connect Cradle

Introducing the new **Connect Cradles** (Workstation and Point of Sale) for TC22 and T27 mobile computers. These accessories allow for the TC22 and TC27 mobile computer to connect to multiple purpose-built peripherals and enable Zebra Workstation Connect on an external monitor. The Connect Cradle offers connections for standard workstation setups (monitor, keyboard, mouse) while the point-of-sale configuration provides three additional powered USB ports for setups utilizing POS-specific peripherals such as a payment terminal, receipt printer, or scanner.




Connect Cradles

SKU# CRD-TC2L-1SNWS-01 | SKU# CRD-TC2L-1SNHP-01

Workstation | Point of Sale

- Workstation (SKU #CRD-TC2L-1SNWS-01): This connect cradle, allows users to use TC22 and TC27 device as a workstation or kiosk. Includes HDMI, Ethernet, USB-A (x4) ports, shims, and 3.5mm headset jack. Power supply, DC line cord and AC line cord are all sold separately.
- Point of Sale (SKU# CRD-TC2L-1SNHP-01): This connect cradle allows users to use the TC22 and TC27 devices as a Point of Sale terminal. Includes HDMI, Ethernet, USB-A (x3), 24V Powered USB (x1), 12V Powered USB (x2) ports, shims, and 3.5mm headset jack. Power supply and AC line cord are all sold separately.



Power Supply & DC Line Cord for Workstation Connect Cradle

SKU# PWR-BGA12V50W0WW | SKU# CBL-DC-388A2-01

Power Supply | DC Line Cord

- Power Supply PWR-BGA12V50W0WW for Connect Cradle : 100-240VAC, 12VDC, 4.16A.
- DC Line Cord CBL-DC-388A2-01 for above power supply: 12 VDC, 4.16A 1.8m length.
- Requires: Country Specific AC grounded line cord.



Power Supply for Point-of-Sale Cradle

SKU# PWR-BGA24V150W1WW

Power Supply for POS Cradle

- Level VI AC/DC Power Supply Brick. AC Input: 100-240V, 2.0A. DC Output: 24V, 6.25A, 150W.
- Requires: Country Specific AC grounded line cord.

Third Party Accessories for TC22 and TC27

Note: Products sold that do not bear the Zebra brand name are serviced and supported exclusively by their manufacturers in accordance with terms and conditions packaged with the products. Zebra's Limited Warranty does not apply to products that are not Zebra branded, even if packaged or sold with Zebra products. Please contact the manufacturer directly for technical support and customer service.



Purpose-Built Mounts™
For Zebra TC22/TC27



ProClip cradles provide:

- ✓ Easy one-handed docking and undocking
- ✓ Tilt-swivel gives users an optimized viewing angle
- ✓ Channeled sidewalls guide the device into the cradle and hold the device securely
- ✓ Heavy-duty construction provides protection and longevity
- ✓ Custom design to fit the device with or without the rugged boot



Part #	Description
3PTY-PCLIP-712348	Charging Cradle with Cigarette Lighter Plug for Zebra TC22 / TC27 with Rugged Boot
3PTY-PCLIP-712347	Charging Cradle with Cigarette Lighter Plug for Zebra TC22 / 27 (Bare Device)



Part #	Description
3PTY-PCLIP-713347	Charging Cradle with Hard-Wired Power Supply for Zebra TC22 / TC27 (Bare Device)
3PTY-PCLIP-713348	Charging Cradle with Hard-Wired Power Supply for Zebra TC22 / TC27 with Rugged Boot



Part #	Description
3PTY-PCLIP-711348	Non-Charging Cradle with Tilt-Swivel for Zebra TC22 / 27 with Rugged Boot
3PTY-PCLIP-711347	Non-Charging Cradle with Tilt-Swivel for Zebra TC22 / TC27 (Bare Device)






RAM® Form-Fit Docks


for Zebra TC22 / TC27 Handheld Computers



Protect your investment and stay hands-free in the field with RAM® Mounts spring-loaded docking solutions for the new Zebra TC22 & TC27 handheld computers. These docks are available with and without power, as well as non-locking and key-locking functions. Powered dock options offer a seamless experience by utilizing the device's pogo pad docking contacts and USB Type-A connector — simply dock the device to keep it charging. Pair with any modular RAM® Mounts components to create a custom mounting solution for your forklift, truck, pick cart and more!

Zebra TC22 / TC27 RAM® Mounts Docks			
PART NUMBER	 KEY LOCK	 USB TYPE-A POWER	 FOR BOOT
3PTY-RAM-HOL-ZE24U			
3PTY-RAM-HOL-ZE24LU	•		
3PTY-RAM-HOL-ZE24PU		•	
3PTY-RAM-HOL-ZE24PLU	•	•	
3PTY-RAM-HOL-ZE24-1U			•
3PTY-RAM-HOL-ZE24L-1U	•		•
3PTY-RAM-HOL-ZE24P-1U		•	•
3PTY-RAM-HOL-ZE24PL-1U	•	•	•

COMPATIBLE HARDWIRE CHARGER



3PTY-RAM-GDS-CHARGE-V88U
GDS® 30-64V Hardwire Charger w/ USB Type-A

Product Highlights



Pogo Pin Charging

Protect the charge port and increase efficiency utilizing the device's pogo pad docking contacts — simply dock the TC22/TC27 to keep the device charged. Each powered RAM® dock comes equipped with pogo pin technology for this seamless docking experience.



Removable Inserts (*-1U" Part Numbers Only)

Part numbers ending in "-1U" indicate docks that include removable inserts. When installed, these inserts retain form-fit docking of the TC22/TC27 when the rugged boot is removed from the device.



Stylus Holder

Integrated snap-in stylus holder on all docks prevent lost or dangling styluses when on-the-go.



Mount It

With RAM® Compatibility™ customize your mount to your environment. Our recommended mount is the RAM-101U Drill-Down mount.

Gamber-Johnson
**ZEBRA TC22/TC27 Cradles
& Mounting Accessories**



ZEBRA TC22/TC27 CRADLE

SKU# 3PTY-GJ-7160-1856

- Compatible with Zebra TC22/TC27 Handheld (Requires Zebra rugged boot)
- Cradle accommodates the Zebra TC22/TC27 hand strap.
- Adjustable cable restraint holds USB-C cord (not included) securely in place.
- Lightweight, small form factor designed to be resilient and reliable in harsh material handling and enterprise environments.
- Reduce costly damages by safely securing your device.
- Attaches to Gamber-Johnson mounting solutions using the AMPs hole pattern.



**ZEBRA TC22/TC27 CRADLE W/ ZIRKONA
MEDIUM JOINER MOUNT**

SKU# 3PTY-GJ-7170-1016

Combine the Zebra TC22/TC27 handheld computer cradle with our Zirkona Medium Joiner to achieve a reliable and secure mounting solution.

- Kit includes Zebra TC22/TC27 Cradle (SKU# 3PTY-GJ-7160-1586)
- Designed for lightweight mounting.
- Round plates offer AMPS hole pattern to mount cradle, and to attach to a Gamber-Johnson dash mount or other AMPS mounting options.
- Quick adjust handle to easily adjust your device for optimal visibility.
- Zirkona Medium Joiner provides all axes range of motion in X axis (left/right), Y axis (front/back) and Z axis (up/down)
- All metal construction (anodized aluminum) will not deform or degrade.



**ZEBRA TC22/TC27 CRADLE W/ ZIRKONA
MEDIUM JOINER + SUCTION CUP MOUNT**

SKU# 3PTY-GJ-7170-1017

Mount with confidence using the small suction cup from Zirkona. Combine the Zebra TC22/TC27 handheld computer cradle with our Zirkona medium joiner to achieve a reliable and secure mounting solution.

- Kit includes Zebra TC22/TC27 Cradle (SKU# 3PTY-GJ-7160-1586)
- Designed for lightweight mounting.
- Quick adjust handle to easily adjust your device for optimal visibility.
- Zirkona Medium Joiner provides all axes range of motion in X axis (left/right), Y axis (front/back) and Z axis (up/down)
- Small suction cup footprint of 3.5" creates a strong yet small mounting solution.
- Long handle provides ease of use when suctioning.
- Tacky surface on material helps with positioning your mount.

RUGGED BOOT FOR ZEBRA TC22-TC27

Increase the lifetime of your TC22-TC27 device by protecting it with the Mobilis rugged boot!
The TC22-TC27 Zebra is designed for intensive use in environments where drops and shocks are frequent.
The Mobilis Protech case offers unbeatable protection:

- Unbreakable** : withstands 1000 drops from 1.20m/4ft.
- Lightweight** : thin, compact and discreet
- Antimicrobial treatment** : for impeccable hygiene
- Eco-friendly** : 30% recycled materials, 100% recyclable
- Made in France** : like all our PROTECH cases



Zebra Part number
3PTY-MOB-065022

40X
MILITARY
STANDARD

x1000
DROPS
1.20m



AIRCELL SYSTEM

4 air pockets to absorb shocks.
Up to 1000 drops from 1.20m/4ft



HANDSTRAP READY

Compatible with
Mobilis Hand Strap



RESPONSIVE BUTTONS

High tactile reactivity



HOT SWAP BATTERY COMPATIBLE

ECO-CONCEPTION

Case made with
30% recycled material
& 100% recyclable



ADVANCED RAISED EDGES

Design to protect the screen and camera lens in the event of falls



COMPATIBLE DOCKING INSERTS/SHIM ZEBRA

Compatible with ZEBRA charging stations :
CRD-TC2L-BS1CO-01 / CRD-TC2L-BS1IB-01 / CRD-TC2L-SE1ET-01

Compatible with ZEBRA multiple charging stations :
CRD-TC2L-SE5ET-01 / CRD-TC2L-BSSCO-01

Compatible extended battery ZEBRA :
BTRY-TC2L-3XMAXX-01



BOOTED



RUGGED BOOT FOR ZEBRA TC22-TC27



Weight : 24 g | Dimensions : 138 x 82 x 33 mm

BOOST YOUR BRAND VISIBILITY!

Customize your protective boots with your colors and logo.



ADDITIONAL PRODUCTS



Handstrap
3PTY-MOB-0013E7



Screen Protector TC22
3PTY-MOB-03630Z



Holster Size M
3PTY-MOB-03100Z



Pack of 10 capacitive stylus
with spiral cord
3PTY-MOB-0010S4



Universal Wrist Mount
Armband 5-7" - HMD
3PTY-MOB-030004

SPECIFICATIONS

Ref	Product
3PTY-MOB-06502Z	RUGGED BOOT ZEBRA TC22-TC27



EXPLORE OUR
ZEBRA PRODUCTS

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☎ +33 682 005 064
💻 datacapture.mobiliscase.com



APPENDIX B: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of our evaluation of the Orleans Parish Sheriff's Office (OPSO). We conducted this evaluation under the provisions of Title 24 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, as amended. This evaluation covered January 2022 through December 2025. In some instances, our analyses included information after this period. Our objective was:

To evaluate OPSO operations pertaining to finances, staffing, and jail security.

To complete our objective, we performed the following steps:

- Reviewed documentation regarding the May 16, 2025, escape incident.
- Researched relevant federal and state laws, rules, and regulations.
- Researched relevant OPSO policies, standard operating procedures, and protocols.
- Met with OPSO staff to gain an understanding of its operations, including finances, security, and maintenance.
- We analyzed OPSO expenditures and identified vendors that received total payments exceeding \$30,000. Based on this analysis, we tested a selection of invoices to determine whether appropriate documentation existed for those vendors.
- Obtained past audits and underlying financial documentation, including financial statements, bank account records, payroll records, etc., from OPSO and its external auditor, EisnerAmper.
- Obtained timesheet, payroll, personnel files, staffing, turnover, and vacancy information from OPSO.
- Obtained pay scale information from OPSO and other sheriff's offices near Orleans Parish to identify potential discrepancies in pay.
- Obtained documentation related to details performed by OPSO staff from OPSO and detail vendors.
- Used ACL and Excel to analyze timesheet, payroll, and detail data to calculate OPSO payroll costs and to identify OPSO employees who appeared to be working at OPSO while also scheduled to work a detail during the same hours.

- Obtained forms used to document inspections and security checks performed for the week of May 11, 2025, through May 17, 2025.
- Obtained past reports published by the Federal Consent Decree Monitor regarding operations of the OPSO.
- Obtained a Department of Corrections Basic Jail Guidelines audit conducted after the escape to review OPSO security measures.
- Reviewed New Orleans Office of Inspector General audits.
- Obtained data from OPSO's work order system to identify deficiencies with maintenance, as well as ongoing preventive and unplanned maintenance occurring at OPSO facilities.

APPENDIX C: OPSO EXPENDITURES CALENDAR YEARS 2022 THROUGH 2024

Category	2022	2023	2024	Total	% Change 2022 - 2024
Central services	\$6,914,335	\$10,152,579	\$13,190,715	\$30,257,629	90.8%
Court services	2,679,699	3,275,965	4,370,844	10,326,508	63.1%
Security services	15,519,654	18,032,937	19,918,556	53,471,147	28.3%
Investigative services	3,193,946	4,079,026	4,730,045	12,003,017	48.1%
Administrative services	5,525,591	6,847,896	8,018,117	20,391,604	45.1%
Records and booking	3,913,454	4,581,326	5,404,402	13,899,182	38.1%
Inmate services	4,278,845	5,177,194	6,639,383	16,095,422	55.2%
Grants and special programs	648,118	884,776	984,846	2,517,740	52.0%
Plant and maintenance	8,801,116	10,478,975	11,013,541	30,293,632	25.1%
Debt retirement	1,567,767	1,251,765	732,954	3,552,486	-53.2%
Interest payments	92,006	89,388	145,660	327,054	58.3%
Civil administrative services	2,272,996	2,283,001	2,512,158	7,068,155	10.5%
Civil security services	2,012,286	1,882,616	2,049,314	5,944,216	1.8%
Capital outlays	1,716,702	2,478,068	2,409,916	6,604,686	40.4%
Total	\$59,136,515	\$71,495,512	\$82,120,451	\$212,752,478	38.9%
Source: Prepared by legislative auditor's staff using information from OPSO's 2024 financial audit.					

APPENDIX D: OVERTIME PAID BY JOB TITLE CALENDAR YEARS 2022 THROUGH 2025

Job Title	2022	2023	2024	2025	Total
Deputy	\$919,001	\$1,297,155	\$1,751,972	\$1,894,286	\$5,862,414
Recruit	294,944	549,189	807,295	1,172,271	2,823,699
Administrative Staff	425,413	691,302	776,650	553,844	2,447,209
Sergeant	305,377	455,837	585,202	712,032	2,058,448
Maintenance Staff	256,769	432,977	468,943	532,135	1,690,824
CMT	230,131	300,049	378,221	414,872	1,323,273
Detective	120,473	261,973	300,085	255,287	937,818
Captain	86,048	175,535	240,417	282,257	784,257
Lieutenant	139,717	139,795	188,015	157,147	624,674
Corporal	80,802	88,138	37,905	43,662	250,507
Supervisor	9,426	42,431	42,385	46,226	140,468
Investigator	12,914	24,076	14,594	12,048	63,632
Special Response Recruit	26,491	15,323	-	-	41,814
Executive Protection	7,352	1,426	7,333	17,725	33,836
Director	-	7,640	10,416	5,485	23,541
Agent	13,833	-	-	-	13,833
Colonel	-	-	3,794	5,143	8,937
Civilian	1,715	2,020	1,825	418	5,978
Major	-	-	-	5,127	5,127
Inspector	-	970	1,288	535	2,793
Manager	-	-	-	836	836
Total	\$2,930,406	\$4,485,836	\$5,616,340	\$6,111,336	\$19,143,918

Source: Prepared by legislative auditor's staff using information from OPSO's ADP system.

APPENDIX E: DEFICIENCIES IDENTIFIED THROUGH INSPECTIONS MAY 11, 2025, THROUGH MAY 17, 2025

Deficiency	Number	Percentage of Total
Washer/Dryer	74	23.9%
Housing Unit Keys	39	12.6
Utility Closet	28	9.1
Computer Monitor	25	8.1
Security Electronics Control Panel	24	7.8
Televisions/Remotes	22	7.1
Program Room	20	6.5
Personal Protective Equipment Kit	13	4.2
Portable Radio	12	4.0
Cut Down Tool	10	3.2
First Aid Kit and Blood Spill Kit	10	3.2
Pod Tables and Chairs	6	1.9
Resident Video Visitation	5	1.6
Telephone	5	1.6
Resident Kiosk	4	1.3
Resident Video Attorney Visitation	4	1.3
Resident Telephones	3	1.0
Shower Area	3	1.0
Interlock	2	0.6
Dayroom	0	0.0
Emergency Exit Doors	0	0.0
Total	309	100.0%
Source: Prepared by legislative auditor's staff using OPSO inspection forms.		